Severing body from mind: the Cartesian model revisited

Authors

Supakwadee Amatayakul

Publication Date

2006-01-01

Abstract

This paper attempts to reevaluate Descartes's doctrines of mindbody distinctness and mind-body union and their contribution to feminist theories. The understanding that Descartes's substance dualism establishes an absolute demarcation between mind and body is philosophically misleading, especially when his investigations of "genuine human beings" that are capable of having "passions" are considered. Descartes's accounts of the mind-body union and the passions can be interpreted as consistent with feminist tenets and thus deemed a possible resource for feminist philosophical analyses.

DOI

10.58837/CHULA.ARV.19.1.7

First Page

155

Last Page

169

Recommended Citation

Amatayakul, Supakwadee (2006) "Severing body from mind: the Cartesian model revisited," Asian Review: Vol. 19: No. 1, Article 8.
DOI: 10.58837/CHULA.ARV.19.1.7
Available at: https://digital.car.chula.ac.th/arv/vol19/iss1/8