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EXPLORING IMPACTS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE
CRISIS ON GERMAN AND TURKISH POLITICAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN 2015 AND 2021: FROM THE
GERMAN PERSPECTIVE



An Independent Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts in European Studies
Inter-Department of European Studies
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Chulalongkorn University
Academic Year 2021
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สารนิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต
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Independent Study Title	EXPLORING IMPACTS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS ON GERMAN AND TURKISH POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN 2015 AND 2021: FROM THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE
By	Miss Siyu Pan
Field of Study	European Studies
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Accepted by the GRADUATE SCHOOL, Chulalongkorn University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Master of Arts

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สิญ พาน : -. (EXPLORING IMPACTS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE
CRISIS ON GERMAN AND TURKISH POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN 2015 AND 2021: FROM THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE) อ.

ที่ปรึกษาหลัก : ฉัชนันท์ คุณมาศ, อ.ที่ปรึกษาร่วม : มาติน สอแลนค์

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KEYWORD TÜRKIYE-GERMANY RELATIONS, SYRIAN REFUGEE
D: CRISIS, FOREIGN POLICY, INTERDEPENDENCE

Siyu Pan : EXPLORING IMPACTS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS
ON GERMAN AND TURKISH POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
2015 AND 2021: FROM THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE. Advisor: Assoc.
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Due to the fluctuating interests of states, the international environment has a complex and ever-changing structure. In these circumstances, governments work in their best interests to adapt to the shifting world order. Türkiye and Germany have historically had cordial ties, which have deepened on an economic, political, and cultural basis, testifying to a more profound interdependence between Türkiye and Germany. The Syrian conflict has become one of the most important crises in international affairs. This crisis has significantly impacted the political parties and cultural influence of several nations, including Germany and Türkiye. When the issue of Syrian refugees became a concern for Germany and Turkey, increased ties and partnerships were unavoidable, and a new decision-making mechanism was established in various areas. Hence, a unique aspect has been added to structures that reinforce interdependence, such as political communication, economic links, and foreign policy in Germany. This study will describe Turkey-Germany relations considering the material provided. It will be claimed that Germany and Türkiye are already mutually dependent on one another and that this interdependence has grown because of the refugee crisis. This situation is also noticeable from the German political parties' points of view.

Field of Study: European Studies

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study explores the impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis on German-Turkish political relations between 2015 and 2021: From the German perspective, I would appreciate two professors, namely Professor Natthanan Kunnamas and Professor Martin Holland. They had been kind and compassionate in being a consultant, guiding, and caring since my written independent study began. At the same time, the professors kept patient to fix my research, never tiredly and reviewed the accuracy and completeness of this study. During my study and research, the professors still accompanied me and always gave me more constrictive and valuable suggestions and comments also encouraged me to improve myself continually. Therefore, I would like to thank you here.

Thank you so much, all the Interdisciplinary Department of European Studies professors, Chulalongkorn University. Thankful all professors can give me valuable academic knowledge and let me know the different levels of European studies. Although during the covid 19 period, could not have face-to-face teaching, all of the professors benefited me. And thank you to the assistant who provided an example and guidelines for this work.

The student thanks family and friends for supporting education and daily lives, including encouraging the student's work and research.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Problems

Since 2011, the conflict between Bashar al-regime Assad and various forces in Syria has resulted in tens of thousands of mass migrations from Syria. This has resulted in a refugee and migrant crisis that has swept Europe and stunned the continent. Due to the continuous conflict, Europe has become a refuge for numerous Syrian, Afghan, and Iranian refugees. A survey indicates that around 1,300,000 refugees applied for asylum in Europe in 2015. The EU's Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is in crisis and grave danger, heightening both the humanitarian crisis and the political crisis inside the EU's internal structures. ("Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015" 2022).

In the face of massive refugee influxes, EU migration policy has proven to be fundamentally ineffective in its implementation and expression of EU values (Maldini & Takahashi, 2017). On the one hand, the liability scheme outlined in the Dublin Regulation directly contributes to future disputes between EU member states because of geopolitical considerations; most Middle Eastern refugees come through the Eastern Mediterranean. Hence, Greece became the first concentration camp for refugees, followed by Germany, Hungary, and the Nordic nations further away. Not all Schengen countries were eager to take in refugees. Some, like the Netherlands, Poland, and Denmark, were hostile and chose to stay quiet, which was very different from Sweden, the largest Nordic country.

Consequently, the world has begun to question the EU's capacity to adequately respond to this humanitarian catastrophe due to the uneven distribution of refugees and the divergent mindsets of the countries. In contrast, Germany's refugee policy is more favourable than the EU's. The Merkel government continues to maintain an open-door policy towards refugees, proclaiming "Wir Schaffen das" (We will succeed), despite facing numerous obstacles, such as the high approval rating of right-wing parties in Germany due to the massive refugee admissions, an increase in terrorist attacks perpetrated by refugees, and an already high unemployment rate in Germany. But these

obstacles could not prevent the German government play an important role in finding a unified and peaceful solution to the Syrian refugee situation.

In the interim, the pillars of the European Union, namely respect for human and civil rights, freedom, equality, and security, are in jeopardy. The refugee issue has immediately caused a conflict of interests amongst member nations, revealing their disparate development. Most people have realized that the European Union is not a unified entity but rather a federation of conflicting interests due to the conflict of interests between its member states. As a large industrial nation with an ageing population needing youthful workers, the German government has expressed optimism over immigrants. In the meantime, Germany aspires to be a worldwide actor in developing the European Union. It has not only taken in a huge number of migrants during the refugee crisis, but it has also sought political solutions and urged all institutions to work together to end the issue. The EU and Türkiye reached a refugee accord in 2016, which has helped control the EU's borders to some extent (Akn, 2018).

In recent years, relations between the EU and Türkiye have spiralled downwards (Luigi, 2022); combined with the competition between the Turkish navy and Greece and Cyprus over Mediterranean oil and gas resources, the EU-Türkiye relationship has been tested more than ever. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has coveted the presidency since the 2014 presidential campaign, is the new president of Türkiye. He represents the largest party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), with the highest approval ratings. But the power of democracy and the rule of law showed a declining trend under his control. There have been two political events that can be proven. First, the military brutally suppressed the Gezi Park demonstrations in 2013, and the people were prevented from asserting their democratic rights. Corruption scandals in Türkiye in the same year, as well as political manipulation of free speech and media commentary, obscured the truth about these matters and challenged human rights.

Moreover, as head of the AKP, President Erdogan's actions imply that Türkiye's foreign policy under his leadership moves toward authoritarianism and expansion. In early 2017, the failed military coup in Türkiye in July 2016 led to the complete suspension and deadlock of the EU's accession negotiations with Türkiye. Nonetheless, looking back on the EU-Türkiye refugee accord negotiations between 2015 and 2016, one could say that the impasse and tensions between the EU and Türkiye were

somewhat reduced. Nevertheless, the refugee deal did not directly contribute to weakening EU-Türkiye relations. Instead, Türkiye's democratic deficiencies directly contributed to the EU's mistrust of Türkiye, and it could be seen that many member states view Türkiye as an "unwanted country." However, Türkiye's economy and trade values in some EU member states have become more significant. Thus, most member states have stated their support and consent for Türkiye's accession to the EU to be placed on the agenda as soon as possible for the common interest and development (Kathleen, 2017).

German-Turkish ties are weak, turbulent, and complex but remarkable. This is obvious when comparing the two countries' ideological and political differences with the Syrian refugee deal. In recent years, several academics have investigated the impact of refugees on a nation's economy and social fabric, paying more attention to the Turkish-German ties being studied considering Türkiye's "hostage diplomacy," democratic problems, and failed military coups. However, the refugee crisis could lead to political cooperation and a fight between political parties. Back to historical connection, three million Germans of Turkish descent contributed to Germany's industrialization (Szabo, 2022). In the 1970s, Turks could vote in SPD and CDU elections in Germany (AktÜrk, 2010). No doubt, Germany and Türkiye are interdependent, and the cooperation will be diversified and deepened by the outbreak of the Syrian refugee crisis.

In recent years, the 2015 refugee crisis has been one of the most significant political events. Humanitarian relief, infrastructure development, border controls, and international agreements against people trafficking cost the EU billions of dollars (Solodoch, O. 2021). Thus, as the main actors in the refugee crisis - Germany and 'the third safety country'- Türkiye, these debates have undoubtedly brought Turkish-German relations back to the forefront of political discussions among politicians concerned with Germany's role in the Merkel controls and how to maintain relations with Türkiye have gradually become the most important issues.

Furthermore, most refugees living in Germany were affected by the epidemic. For example, long-term unemployment, security issues, and health concerns for refugees have contributed to social security, causing some lawyers and political parties to decry the German government as a country that has forgotten about the refugee who suffered

in the epidemic. However, as an essential economic power in the EU, Germany needs to negotiate with Türkiye to provide funding for its refugee pacification project, as Türkiye already hosts around 4 million refugees as of 2020 (UNHCR Türkiye- Fact Sheet September 2021 [EN/TR] - Türkiye, 2021). Suppose Türkiye allows refugees to cross illegally into European borders. In that case, European frontlines will suffer greatly, undermining their economic growth and social stability and questioning Germany's ability to lead the refugee crisis. Also, the political fights between parties and the rise of right-wing forces need to be settled and stopped.

Turkish-German relations are well-studied. Earlier studies examined Germany and Türkiye's economic ties, alliances, and strategic collaboration throughout the refugee crisis. Studies have examined why Turkish-German ties are worsening or how strategic policy will influence if Türkiye and Germany retain tight cooperation due to migration. In Turkish-German relations, two perspectives compete. Few have utilized history and political philosophy to analyze how Syrian refugees may affect German-Turkish ties. Historical considerations have driven Germany and Türkiye to collaborate again since 2014, and these connections are expected to endure until 2021 or beyond.

Some links between Germans and Turks date back to the 16th century and have remained strong in various areas, including the military, diplomacy, and economy (YENEROĞLU, 2016). The Peace and Friendship Agreement between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia was signed in 1790. Therefore, after the Second World War, this relationship was maintained. Although Türkiye was on the opposing side of Germany during the lengthy conflict, this did not alter the fact that Türkiye and Germany have maintained tight and trustworthy ties over the long term.

Germany's perspective on Türkiye has influenced EU-Türkiye relations. According to the political thesis, "all government acts and institutions are political." Used in the entire discussion, Germany actively promoted the 'EU refugee pact' and signed it in 2006, while the German CDU opposes Türkiye's EU membership due to its lack of democracy. It views EU enlargement as a "huge bang" that will destroy regional social balance and quality of life. The influx of Muslims is expected to cause religious tensions and perpetuate prejudice towards Muslim countries, which will be used as a political instrument to worsen relations between Türkiye and EU countries and increase terrorism, which would damage individuals' daily lives. Türkiye's accession to the EU

is a politically charged issue, and the refugee crisis has brought the matter to a point where it cannot be ignored and must be resolved as soon as possible. Türkiye instead imposes its political goal of EU membership on refugee resettlement, which exposes the shortcomings of democracy and development and accelerates the breakdown of German-Turkish relations. As a result, Ankara's approach reinforces the EU's desire to stabilize border security only through massive financial support, rather than by launching new accession negotiations.

This essay only explored Syrian refugees and German-Turkish ties, although the Syrian civil war is a chain reaction; this study focused solely on Syrian refugees in Germany and Türkiye and did not evaluate or extend to other refugees. Furthermore, the Syrian war prompted hundreds of thousands of people to become refugees, and past conflicts have caused people to escape, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Future discussions must be held on the influence of these refugees on European political diplomacy. Therefore, for now, Syrians continue to make up the majority of refugees in Europe, especially Germany, ten years after the refugee crisis. Türkiye is the third safest country, with 3.6 million people ("Syria Refugee Crisis Explained", 2022). During the Covid-19, this situation would have increased unemployment and poverty, affecting Türkiye's social security and public health. So, as the responsible country, Germany should be worried about these issues and draw together to overcome this crisis.

1.2 Research question

The research question is “Why the Syrian refugee crisis will have an impact on Turkish-German political relations from 2015 to 2021, from a German perspective.”

1.3 Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that Türkiye was to allow a continued influx of Syrian refugees into the European Union, and Germany in particular. This would be detrimental to Germany's politics and economy and could result in the collapse of Angela Merkel's government and the rise of many supporters of the right. Therefore Germany, as the representative of the EU, has chosen to engage in economic and political-diplomatic

talks with Türkiye to ensure the humanitarian appearance of the EU.

1.4 Objectives

1. To explore the reasons why the Syrian refugee crisis can impact Turkish and German political relationships.
2. To examine why Germany can take a leadership role in this Syrian refugee crisis and Türkiye's specificity to the EU at the EU level.
3. To analysis Turkish and German political relationships tendency from German perspectives.
4. Summary and concluded that suggestions or recommendations on how Turkish and German cooperation in the new wave of the refugee crisis.

1.5 Scope of study

This essay aims to examine why the influx of thousands of Syrian refugees into Germany and Türkiye due to the Syrian civil war has led to more complex changes in political diplomacy and relations between Germany and Türkiye. The study will be divided into two main subjects, Germany and Türkiye. It will focus on the changes in German policy since the acceptance of Syrian refugees and the political changes in the attitude of German political parties towards migrants and towards Türkiye, as well as comparing the attitude of the new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz after he took office with that of the Merkel government regarding cooperation with refugees in Türkiye. However, the time frame is limited to 2015, when the influx of refugees begins, and 2021, after the epidemic.

1.6 Methodology

This paper investigates mainly using secondary data analysis. For instance, the EU and German foreign office agencies. By analyzing government documents on specific policies, such as those from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs or the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Action website, a more official assessment of the political relations between Türkiye and Germany can be made. This essay concludes from secondary sources, including published papers, research studies,

leader speeches, and official news from two governments, particularly studying historical changes in Türkiye and Germany to understand why German elections are relevant to the Turkish people. Furthermore, an in-depth investigation of German political parties as variables impacting Germany-Türkiye relations concludes that the Syrian refugee crisis led to more independent Turkish-German relations.

1.7 Expected Results

1. To comprehend the unique and complex political, historical, and social relations between Germany and Türkiye and why the Syrian refugee crisis can change political relations between the two countries once again.

2. To understand why Germany can be more inclusive towards Syrian refugees at the EU level and why it can be a leader or factor in the cooperation refugee deal with Türkiye, as well as why the EU has been cooperative towards Türkiye on the refugee crisis but has a crisis of confidence in other areas of relations and showed a dramatic downward trend.

3. To provide suggestions and recommendations for future Turkish-German cooperation on refugee issues to contribute to developing a relatively stable and harmonious relationship between Türkiye and Germany.

CHAPTER 2

SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

Background

Syria's conflict between al-Assad and domestic factions causes people displacement. By 2014, 7.6 million Syrians were internally displaced, and 3.7 million had fled since the crisis began (Ostrand, 2018). Millions of Syrian refugees have fled to the EU and neighbouring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Due to many refugees, these countries must spend a lot of funds and money to relocate them and ensure they usually live. This cash outflow burdens humanitarian countries and will lead to terrorism and polarization. The New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne and the Paris attacks in November 2015 directly contradicted the EU's embrace of refugees and strengthened support for right-wing parties. Due to these events, Türkiye, on the edge of the Middle East, has become the world's largest refugee camp. In 2015, over a million refugees invaded Greece, Italy, and other regions, causing the EU's border control system to collapse and increasing political divides (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2015).

According to the UNHCR's refugee statistics report, the number of Syrian refugees has been steadily increasing since 2015, along with a new wave of Covid pandemic refugees affecting European countries and other Middle Eastern neighbours. According to a report for 2021, there are currently approximately 6.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, which means that roughly half of the Syrian population has been forced to leave their homes and is living in host countries or EU member states ("Syria emergency", 2021), including Germany, the largest resettlement country in the EU. With the Covid-19 outbreak, most aid countries elected to restrict their borders to prevent the disease's spread. For example, Germany closed its border in 2020. In May 2022, the German government will again face an influx of refugees, this time from Eastern Europe, with more than 700,000 Ukrainian refugees registered in Germany, according to the latest report (Reuters, 2022). There is no doubt that the negative impact of Syrian refugees on Germany is still unresolved, the arrival of Ukrainian refugees might undoubtedly be worse.

This article focuses only on Syrian refugees, who have become a significant and necessary part of the EU and Germany. First, refugees from Syria represent the largest share in Europe; according to the report, the first of the top ten nationalities of refugees from 2011 to 2015 in Syria. Refugees form most current irregular migration flows into Italy and Greece, and their proportion has increased alarmingly over the last five years, from 33% to 76%. In addition, there are sufficient numbers of economic migrants smuggled across Europe's external borders, posing as asylum seekers. In this respect, it can be argued that the influx of Syrian refugees has helped the EU economy, especially in Germany, where heavy industry is the major contributor to the economy, thus reducing the negative effects of Germany's ageing society while also contributing to partisan strife among German political parties, leading to the drop in Merkel's popularity from 63% to 49% in 2017 election (Dostal, 2017).

Secondly, most Syrian refugees come from the middle class. According to 2016 data on the Syrian occupation in Türkiye and Germany, most refugees in Türkiye are labourers rather than professionals. In contrast, Syrian refugees in Germany are predominantly well educated yet are forced to travel due to conflict and other circumstances (Pearlman, 2020). So, with the influx of refugees comes a large middle-class population, a group that is an asset to EU countries and can even contribute to technical and professional careers. Educated refugees are, after all, the most coveted labour force for industrialized nations.

Last but not least, as the extent of the coronavirus increases, the possibility of Syrian refugees being lifted out of poverty or having security diminishes. Accordingly, the EU provides a large yearly grant to support refugee protection and resettlement in Türkiye. Especially as the number of refugees continues to rise and poverty increases, more and more refugees are forced to give birth and live on the borders, posing a major threat to Türkiye's border security. Furthermore, Germany has been forced to keep in touch with social and economic dialogue with Türkiye because Syrian refugees have successfully tied the EU and Türkiye together.

2.1 The emergence and development of the refugee crisis in Syria


Beginning in 2011, political and economic demonstrations erupted in Egypt and

Tunisia. The successful uprisings became known as the 'Arab Spring', and this uprising inspired people in the Arab world and encouraged them to pursue democracy and freedom. However, in March of the same year, 15 Syrian schoolchildren were arrested and tortured for being inspired by the Arab Spring and thereby writing graffiti on the walls that contained statements against the Syrian government, resulting in one boy being tortured to death as a result of the act. This incident prompted outrage and demonstrations throughout Syria, citizens are demanding the release of the remaining children and greater freedom for all people in the country. For instance, in the southern Syrian city of Daraa, massive widespread protests quickly turned into a political crisis, and long-standing sectarian tensions and political conflict quickly escalated into a war between the Syrian government and the opposition. At the same time, the US, known for its Western hegemony, and Türkiye, the representative country of the Middle East, successfully intervened and participated in the war triggered by the political crisis, which also created a democratic flaw in the subsequent negotiations for Türkiye's accession to the EU integration. Two camps were thus formed globally to support and overthrow the Bashar regime in Syria, providing the basis for an escalating and protracted war.


According to the UNHCR Global Forced Displacement Trends 2020 report, by 2020, 82.4 million people will be forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, or serious incidents. This number is increasing due to ongoing epidemics and civil wars in parts of the Middle East (United Nations, 2021). Since the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015, Syrian refugees have consistently been the most numerous. Figure 2 shows that the number of Syrian refugees has steadily risen since the Middle East conflict escalated and the disease began, no decline.

Figures 1

Major source countries of refugees 2014 - 2015 (end-year)

Source: UNHCR Global Trends 2015 P.16 <https://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf>

Figures 2



Source - UNHCR, Government of Turkey

So, it is fair to say that despite the political and military involvement of the Western powers and the leading powers in the Syrian civil war, if the Syrian government does not make its people feel free and equal, then both economic migrants and war-torn refugees will do everything they can to leave the country and thus trigger a refugee flow.

2.1.1 Cause of Syrian refugee crisis

Syria's civil war, turmoil, and chaotic condition are the underlying causes of refugees. A freedom march by the people was a game of political and governmental power in Syria between the Ba'ath party, commanded by President Bashar al-Assad, and anti-government and Kurdish factions. As the violence intensifies, it has caused many casualties and forced displacement of innocent people. As UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay said, "the entire death toll in the Syrian crisis may surpass 5,000, including at least 300 children ("As Syrian death toll tops 5,000, UN human rights chief warns about the key city", 2011). This number does not include active army, security, or coalition group members." Another report confirms this claim in the March 14, 2015, issue of the medical journal, indicating that After years of war that has taken a staggering toll on the Syrian health system, which was once considered one of the best in the Arab world: more than 600 medical personnel have been killed, half of the country's public hospitals have been badly damaged or destroyed, and there is virtually no ambulance service to speak of, in connection with what the author Sophie Cousins wrote before: "Hundreds of doctors, nurses, dentists, pharmacists and paramedics have been killed or have escaped to neighbouring countries or further afield, leaving a huge gap of experience and expertise that cannot be filled (Sarah, 2015)." Therefore, civil wars prompt people to seek aid.

In addition, objective issues also affect Syrian refugees. First, from an economic factor, the Syrian civil conflict has made it difficult for the inhabitants to earn a living. Oil exports and trade services are the pillars of Syria's economic development and way of life because it relies on oil and agriculture. The Syrian civil war has caused the occupation of large areas of crops by opposition or extremist groups, a significant reduction in agricultural production and rising unemployment, a devaluation of the currency, a decline in oil exports and trade due to civil war and the involvement of various forces, and the widespread destruction of infrastructure, which has left people living in the war zone unable to secure a primary source of food. With many people were leaving Syria, worsening its economic stagnation or growth.

Second, Syrians' safety problems. The Syrian civil war is marked by rising religious tensions, which have led to violence, and continued war. Kurds make up about 10% of the population and Arabs 90%, and over 85% of the population is Muslim

(Darke, 2010). Muslims are extensively spread, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, but also in South Africa and Europe, where 6% of the population is Muslim (DeSilver & Masci, 2020). Sunni and Shia Muslims dominate. The former make up 80 to 90% of the Muslim population and have historically been part of the aristocracy, which has oppressed the Alawites for over a thousand years; the latter make up 10 to 15%, so religious conflicts and contradictions can fuel wars and perpetuate a state of conflict in which the Alawites are the majority. In 1996, the Alawites forced the Sunnis into power, and the arrangement was reversed (Fabrice, 2015). The Sunnis wanted to overthrow Bashar's authority. The rise of the people's struggle for democracy and freedom from a political coup to a military confrontation worsened the war on both sides, resulting in a steady influx of refugees, epidemics, and poverty.

The third factor is the forcible involvement of external forces in pursuit of geostrategic and national goals, leading to the perpetuation and escalation of the war. From the perspective of the United States, the Syrian government has long supported Palestinian extremist groups, undermining security and peace in the United States and the Middle East. Immediately following the events of 9/11, it was identified as a state sponsor of terrorism. Russia, in contrast, has supported the Assad regime during the Syrian conflict. Russia has opted to protect its access to the Mediterranean Sea and its bridgehead in the Middle East and oppose the United States-led West in the region for national security and economic and trade links overseas. The EU is aligned with the United States in terms of NATO, i.e. the goal of toppling the Assad dictatorship. Unlike the US, the EU wants to stabilize oil and gasoline export prices and promote Middle Eastern hydrocarbon supplies to the Euro. Türkiye aims to secure its regional position and gain a reputation in the Middle East. The West and numerous nations' involvement has deepened and complicated the struggle. It is a political and economic, not a military war.

2.1.2 Consequences of Migration

Many immigrants affect their home countries' economic, cultural, and social structures and the countries they migrate to. Exploring what causes migration can explain why immigrants select the country.

In the case of the Syrian refugee crisis, though the EU's refugee population fell in

2017, Syrian refugees remain the largest category of recipients. The persistent negative impacts of Syrians, such as terrorist attacks by refugees, drive the tightening of refugee policy in EU countries, and the growth of right-wing parties could hurt the EU's economic development. In France, refugee quotas were imposed to curb the influx of illegal migrants into the labour market. In Italy, the government strengthened control over the irregular entrance of refugees by rejecting access to unauthorized refugee boats in August. In 2020, Germany's government authorized 21% fewer refugee petitions than in 2019. According to German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), 145,071 asylum applications were decided in 2020, about 40,000 less than in 2019. Syrian refugees comprise most asylum seekers in Germany (30%) and Iraq (10%). ("Number of first-time asylum applications dropped significantly in 2020", 2021). Immigration can alter a country's policy, economy, and society. Broaden and redefine immigration.

Immigrant

An immigrant is a person who migrates to another country or location. Most immigrants migrate for economic reasons, seeking better economic conditions or better living conditions; these migrants may not be citizens of the country they move to. In contrast to a refugee, there is no coercion. Citizens of the country from which they have emigrated or the country from which they have emigrated are entitled to benefits and assistance from the state.

Refugee

Refugees result from wars, natural disasters, political persecution and religious conflicts, which result in difficult living conditions that force people to flee their homes. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, a refugee is a person who, for reasons such as religion, race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political views, is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin (UNHCR, p. 3). As the number of refugees increased, international refugee law had to be modified repeatedly to ensure that refugees' essential lives were better protected. The Convention was later refined considering the actual situation so that geographical and historical restrictions were abolished. However, Turkish refugee law is unique among international refugee law.

Türkiye signed an EU-Türkiye statement in 2016, changing Turkish law, so it only accepts European refugees, many of whom are from Syria. Moreover, refugees are more favourable in the international definition than ordinary foreigners. These refugees need special humanitarian assistance and special care in terms of basic living, so countries have gradually developed refugee zones to accommodate better and manage them.

Asylum seeker

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, an asylum seeker is a person who seeks international protection and whose request needs to be recognized and accredited by the country of safety. Suppose the government does not recognize the refugee's request to be deported or left behind through an illegal process. Therefore, not all refugees can become asylum seekers, but if the country of asylum recognizes their status, they are eligible for international legal protection.

Since the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015, being a legitimate refugee has proven challenging. Illegal refugees have disrupted social order and fueled populism in the EU. Although the number of asylum applications to the EU has been declining since 2016, the refugee issue continues to afflict EU members. Moreover, this situation has been increasing since the abolition of the Dublin Treaty and the refugee allocation process. This occurrence has intensified EU tensions by revealing member states' varied attitudes toward refugees.

2.2 The basic situation of Syrian refugees in Türkiye and Germany

Since the Syrian civil war, the minor increase in refugees before the war and the explosion in 2015 have impacted Türkiye and neighbour countries or Germany as a refugee-friendly EU country. Germany has had more drastic and noticeable changes than Türkiye. Because Turks and Syrian refugees are primarily Muslim, there is no fear of cultural clashes or collisions, and it does not alter people's lives and opinions. As the EU's representative country, Germany, although refugees are drawn by a generous refugee allowance and security of life, the new chancellor Scholz chose to follow Merkel's policies to handle refugees, exhibiting a welcoming approach toward refugees. The flood of refugees in 2015 impacted Germany's economy, political tendencies, society, as well as media and public opinion. To analyze the impact on Türkiye and

Germany, it is important to understand the situation of Syrian refugees in Germany and Türkiye.

2.2.1 The basic situation of Syrian refugees in Türkiye

Distribution of Syrian refugees in Türkiye and challenges faced


Türkiye, the largest refugee-holding country, responded quickly to the refugee crisis in 2015. A large part of the reason for this is Türkiye's unique geographical location, partly in the Middle East near countries such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq, which have been plagued by civil wars and war conflicts for a long time. Partly in the west, where the territory is connected to the European border, closely linked to Greece and Bulgaria. Thus, this particular geography succeeds in providing stability for the movement and security of refugees. Meanwhile, because of its geographical advantage of being conjoined with Western European countries to the west, Türkiye is a transit point for European refugees.

The number of Syrian refugees has surged since the start of the civil war, tripling between 2014 and 2016. (see Figure 3). In 2018, Türkiye housed 3.6 million refugees, 90% of them were Syrians (UNHCR, 2018). By 2022, refugees cannot enter Türkiye due to the Coronavirus outbreak. Hence the number of refugees hosted in Türkiye will remain consistent from 2020 to 2022. If the pandemic improves and the borders open, a new surge of refugees might affect Türkiye, Germany, and other EU countries.

Figures 3

Distribution of Syrian refugees in the scope of temporary protection by year

TEMPORARY PROTECTION




Source : DGMM.2022 “Temporary Protection Statistics

Geographically, the temporary settlement of refugees was initially concentrated in south-eastern Türkiye, near the Syrian border, and then gradually spread to all Türkiye's 81 provinces. The north-western city of Istanbul hosts more than three million Syrian refugees, while the provinces on the Syrian border also have more than three million, making these four provinces the largest hosts of refugees. As of April 2022, Syrian refugees are mainly located in the south-eastern provinces and parts of the north-western regions of Türkiye (see Figure 4). Istanbul, the southern city of Hatay, Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa, are the four cities with the largest refugee populations, while Ankara, Bursa and Izmir are the major cities in the country with large numbers of refugees.

Figures 4

Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees in Türkiye



Life and employment for Syrian refugees in Türkiye are also a worry. As Syria's neighbour, Türkiye previously sheltered many refugees from other countries. Later, the EU agreement forced Türkiye to host irregular refugees from EU countries again. The deal, therefore, makes the resettlement and management of refugees in Türkiye even more challenging. While Türkiye continues to expand its refugee camps after receiving humanitarian funding from the EU and UNHCR, according to the Turkish General Directorate of Migration Management (DGMM), only around 300,000 people live in camps that provide only basic food, water, and medical care), with almost 93% of Syrian refugees choosing to live in cities to obtain work in the city and earn a living wage and only 3% choosing to live in camps outside of cities (Kale, 2019).

The large-scale migration movements have led to an imbalance between men and women in Türkiye, impacting the Syrian community and marriage patterns between Türkiye and Syria. Syrian male refugees outnumber Syrian female refugees in all age groups from 0-54 years old, especially in the 19-24 age group, and this data set also counts around 32% of Syrian women living outside refugee camps. (Berra İnce & Üstübcü, 2020). While there is a tendency toward equilibrium between men and women as they age, the demographic gap between the ages of 19-24 is undeniably the biggest destabilising influence.

Most refugees still face challenges in terms of providing basic living conditions.

According to reports, 8% of refugees lack sufficient water for drinking and cooking, 28% do not have access to sanitation, and 23% do not have enough cooking gas for their meals. About 52.2% of refugees are poor, and 23.8% live in extreme poverty (World Bank, World Food Programme et al., 2019).

The last analysis in terms of employment is that the female employment rate among the refugee population is shallow. Research conducted by the World Bank indicates that only 7% of Syrian women aged 30-44 are employed. Syrian refugee women are therefore unable to integrate into the formal labour market and earn their living by working in the dark or joining family members already in Türkiye. At the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Security, the total number of work permits granted to Syrians in 2018 were 34,573, with only 3,047 going to Syrian women (Berra İnce & Üstübcü, 2020).

In addition, the high unemployment rate in Türkiye directly contributes to the poverty of Syrian women, which is why the Turkish government needs to focus on the issues facing Syrian women refugees. Generally, men earn around 20% more than women and have a higher employment rate. The Turkish government needs to address the income gap as a major domestic issue (Berra İnce & Üstübcü, 2020).

The reason for Syrians leaving for Türkiye

Türkiye has become the world's largest host country for Syrian refugees due to the influx of asylum-seekers. The main reasons include: First, Türkiye's "open door" policy and "temporary protection" regime in response to the instability in Syria and its friendly attitude toward asylum-seeking groups.

Secondly, concerning the country's economic development in 2022, Türkiye will rank 19th out of the top 25 economies in the world (CALEB, 2022). This is why refugees are attracted to such enormous economic power, especially since its industry, services, and economy are at the forefront of development in the Middle East. Similarly, Türkiye's strong trade relationships with the European Union, including its continuing friendly trade relations with industrial giants such as Germany, have contributed to Türkiye's rapid growth in industry and trade services. Hence, this may explain the influx of Syrian refugees, who have access to better employment opportunities and benefits.

Thirdly, Türkiye has had a tradition of providing temporary protection for refugees

in the neighbourhood. Türkiye has been a "camp" for refugees from the Balkans, Africa, Asia, and Africa. In the 1960s and 1970s, many workers from Türkiye to EU countries such as Germany, France and Austria often stayed in the country for long periods, even permanently.

Fourth, Türkiye and Syria have enjoyed a smooth flow of people since long before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and are free trade partners. Moreover, as one of the leading refugee countries, Türkiye plays a role in the 3RP - a partnership with five countries, namely Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, that provides humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in the areas of personal protection, food security, education, as well as protection of their basic needs.

2.2.2 The basic situation of Syrian refugees in Germany


The changing number of Syrian refugees in Germany and challenges faced

In the wake of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2015, the number of Syrian refugees applying for asylum in Germany has risen dramatically, along with political, economic, and Common European Asylum System pressure, resulting in a stricter approach to refugees' applications and control measures in Germany.

First, the influx of refugees into Germany has divided the German government. Analysing the total asylum application in Germany, after reaching a peak in 2016, it has continued to plummet, showing a downward trend from 2018 to 2022 (see Figure 5). However, in the UNHCR's 2021 report, Germany hosted around 1.25 million refugees and 233,000 asylum seekers, becoming the largest refugee-holding country in Europe, with nearly half of these refugees hailing from Syria (UNHCR, 2021).

Figures 5

Number of total asylum applications in Germany from 1995 to 2022



Furthermore, German financing for Syrian refugees keeps increasing, with 23 billion euros in humanitarian help for refugees in 2019, an increase of about 11 per cent from December 2017. Additionally, 7.9 billion euros were paid in 2018 to keep migrants outside the EU border and improve their living conditions, a 16 per cent increase from December 2017 (Nienaber, 2019). Alice Weidel, the leader of the far-right party, has directly criticized the administration of Angela Merkel for spending billions on refugees, stating, "it was an expensive welcome at the expenditure for citizens." In addition, Annette Widmann-Mauz, state minister for Migration, Refugees, and Integration, stated that it was "stupid". These issues have indirectly or directly led to the polarization of German political parties' sentiments toward Syrian refugees.

Second, in terms of policy analysis, Germany's sense of responsibility and friendly policies are the fundamental reason for the immediate attraction of refugees. On the one hand, since 25 August 2015, Germany has suspended the Dublin Treaty's system of allocating quotas for Syrian refugees (Ayoub, 2015). And Merkel's decision to increase the number of Balkan corridors and implement an open-door policy immediately led to a doubling of the number of Syrian refugees seeking asylum in Germany.

In contrast to the EU's regular refugee policy, Germany's welcoming refugee

policy contributes to its capacity to attract many Syrian refugees. The Asylum Act and the Residence Act express Germany's concern for Syrian refugees. Article 3 of the Asylum Act extends the 1951 Geneva Convention definition to include persecution based on sexual orientation to protect refugees. The article discusses the persecution perpetrated by state and non-state entities. The right to asylum is more limited, as it only applies to persons persecuted on political grounds by governmental actors. The protection grants the grantee a three-year residence permit that can be converted into a permanent residence permit, enabling family reunification. In addition, article 26 of the residency legislation states that a Syrian refugee may acquire a residence visa for two years or an extension, with the option to apply for permanent residence after seven years (Germany Asylum Information Database, 2019). As a result of this liberal stance, the German side has made Syrian refugees feel welcome, and Germany has become the country of choice for EU Syrian refugees seeking asylum.

Thirdly, the German refugee policy is gradually moving toward the common interests of the EU under the influence of the EU's common migration and asylum policy. The German government does not wish to solve the migration problem on its own, and the varying attitudes of EU countries have caused Germany to rethink whether it was the right move to open the refugee policy in the first place. At an EU level, the EU only wanted to keep refugees outside the country or in a third-country safe region, such as Türkiye, due to the cost and wealth involved in bringing in refugees. As a result, Germany seems to be more like a voice of solitude in the desert, as evidenced by the response of other EU member states to the refugees. The disparity in economic development and the diverse views of government parties in the EU has led to different responses to refugees, for example, the outright rejection by Hungary and Poland to cooperate with Germany in providing solutions for an EU refugee policy and the explicit admission by Austria's conservative Chancellor Sebastian Kurz that "not to follow the German path." On the opposite side, the Greens stood on the CDU's alliance line and supported the Merkel government's admission of refugees (Christoph, 2020). Because of the divergence of views on refugees from various EU countries, Germany has been forced to take a position at the EU level regarding the refugee issue.

The reason for Syrians leaving for Germany

Four factors also contribute to the large number of Syrian refugees seeking asylum

in Germany. Firstly, the Middle East region has reached its maximum capacity for receiving refugees for geographic reasons. Compared with Middle East countries, Europe, as the global actor with a stronger economy and high-quality life, attracted tens of thousands of Syrians, especially Germany, which became the first choice for Syrians.

Secondly, Germany's refugee policy is well developed and relatively friendly, with comprehensive assistance and social security system. Refugees prefer to enter high-income countries like Europe for better security and living conditions than Middle Eastern countries.

Thirdly, Germany is a country with a strong economy and one that is highly industrialized. In 2010, when the eurozone economy slumped, many young and skilled labourers helped spur economic growth. Also, the low birth rate in the European Union and the ageing society in Germany have created an opportunity for Syrian refugees, who are taking advantage of this opportunity to come to Germany. Germany was also offering considerable employment opportunities at that time, further enticing refugees from other countries to seek employment and livelihoods in Germany.

Fourthly, German society is relatively inclusive of refugees due to historical factors. Since the German people, who also experienced life as refugees during the Second World War, have empathy for refugees' plight, the government and the general public at the beginning of the European refugee crisis in 2015 demonstrated a greater willingness to accept refugees by society as a whole.

2.2.3 Effectively influencing EU and German refugee policies are Syrian refugees

A study published in 2017 on the compliance of German immigration policy toward Syrian refugees indicate that German immigration policy has been developed and evolved rigorously over the last 20 years (Diab, 2017). However, this does not exclude the fact that pressure from EU countries and cooperation with Türkiye regarding Syrian refugees has led to rapid and effective developments and changes in Germany regarding the integration of Syrian refugees into German society. It can be said that the Syrian refugees have driven the changes and developments in German refugee policy. Analysis on two levels:

Analysis in the context of the general EU response. The Greek border management system has suffered because of the massive number of refugees from Syrians who

entering from Türkiye or the Mediterranean. In response to and management of Syrian refugees, the European Commission adopted a new proposal for establishing a European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) in December 2015, successfully extending the powers of this Guard Agency, replacing FRONTEX to get more powers. It was established for the direct purpose of managing and intervening in the entry of Syrian refugees and analysing and assessing the vulnerability of EU borders (Peers, 2016). Therefore, The EU's "over-reaction" and disagreement with Syrian refugees has succeeded in increasing the EBCG's powers of intervention in the whole EU borders, particularly in the member states of the EU border. For example, the Greek side, which has suffered the most, prefers the EBCGA to take full responsibility for the movement of Syrian migrants and refugees, but this was not possible during the peak of the 2015 Syrian crisis.

Nevertheless, since Angela Merkel's intimately electoral victory in 2017, Syrian refugees have been closely linked to party competition and social conflict in Germany. Although Syrian refugees constitute a large percentage, according to official figures, 70% of all refugees in 2017 were granted temporary protection rights in Germany. However, the German government only permits 1,000 Syrians each month to apply for family reunification, making it even less likely for Syrian refugees to be reunited with their relatives (Hibrawi, 2019). Furthermore, still evidence that the German government has not been able to fulfil this commitment to Syrian refugees. Due to the fight and divergence between the Greens and the right-wing parties, the host power party-CDU implemented an immature regulation to ease anti-refugee sentiment and social tensions among the masses.

In addition, Germany is working towards better integrating Syrian refugees into society and the country. According to the latest figures, the number of Syrians receiving German citizenship triples in 2021, and this policy is only for Syrian refugees who fled the Syrian civil war between 2014 and 2016 (Richard, 2022). The reason why the German government has provided a reasonable explanation for its willingness to accept and recognize these Syrian refugees, according to analyzing the Federal Statistical Office report, these people have sufficient language skills, a secure livelihood and a long period of continuous residence as well as have shown a strong personal desire to become German nationals (Richard, 2022). Therefore, this German government

strategy signifies the country's steady metamorphosis into an immigration hub and demonstrates a stronger willingness to employ Syrian refugees as a catalyst for the continued advancement of German civilization.

Specifically, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Berlin has published a manual on self-care for Syrian men that aims to assist Syrian men living in Germany with assimilation into German culture and addressing psychosocial challenges such as loneliness, discrimination, language difficulties, unemployment, and family role changes. "The German immigration authorities have provided the best possible response to the cultural sensitivities and social complications that Syrians face because they make up one per cent of Germany's population," IOM Chief of Mission Jean-Philippe Chauzy said (The International Organization for Migration, 2021). It can therefore be argued that the execution and adoption of this policy represent Germany's high priority for integrating Syrian refugees, as well as the lessons and experience Germany has gained since the Syrian refugee crisis.

2.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, the war in Syria has lasted for more than 11 years, and the problem of Syrian refugees is becoming increasingly urgent, with Syria hosting the highest number of forcibly displaced persons worldwide for several years. The root cause of this is the continuation of the war and the increasing tensions between various powers. At the same time, the poor economic conditions in Syria, sectarian tensions, and the involvement of major powers in the conflict have also contributed to the escalation of the competition. Germany and Türkiye have become increasingly important and crucial for "hostage diplomacy" on the global stage. Meanwhile, Türkiye and Germany are the two largest hosts of Syrian refugees in the Middle East and Europe; the cooperation and conflict between the two countries over the Syrian refugee issue have provided the basis for changes in their political and economic and trade relations.

In addition, in a geopolitical context, most of those fleeing Syria have remained in the Middle East; the rest of the population moved mainly to Europe and a small number to North America, thus creating a pattern of distribution of Syrian refugees, mainly in West Asia, North Africa and Europe. This is because Syrian refugees differ from place to place in terms of living conditions, working conditions, and the level of allowances.

So, precisely this difference makes Germany a remarkable presence both within the EU and when it comes to diplomatic or political talks with Türkiye.



CHAPTER 3

TURKISH-GERMAN RELATIONS DURING THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS TO DEAL REACHED (2015 -2021)

Background

The relationship between Germany and Türkiye can be dated back to the 16th C. Since then, the relationship between Türkiye and Germany has been maintained and developed in different fields such as military, diplomatic, economic, and political talks and negotiations. The European crisis in 2015 has led to further development and diversification of Turkish-German relations (Yeneroğlu, 2016).

The first is the increasing and closer economic relations between Germany and Türkiye. The Ottoman State had suffered a land and power loss since 1871 when the German Empire was established. At that time, German economic relations blossomed. To develop its industry after the Second World War, Germany partnered with the United States and signed a labour agreement with Türkiye in October 1961, employing large numbers of Turkish workers to rebuild Germany's economy. Since then, the influx of Turks into the German labour market has contributed significantly to the economic development of developing Germany. Türkiye has also profited from the trade profits that have been piling up during this period of rapid economic growth. According to Yeneroğlu (2016), in 2015, trade between Germany and Türkiye topped \$35 billion. Nearly 100,000 Turkish businessmen made a profit of more than \$50 billion in Germany. These indices point to the growing economic ties between the two countries.

Regarding cultural ties, Türkiye and Germany have always been out of balance due to their various cultures and religious beliefs, which has resulted in a great deal of conflict and contradiction. The Turkish community was initially excluded from the Common EU Values Framework because, during the negotiations surrounding Türkiye's accession to the EU, more and more MEPs realized that Türkiye's own political and democratic shortcomings would cause many conflicts in the future if it joined the EU. Using the role of law and human rights, as an illustration, the European Parliament has concluded that Türkiye is distancing itself from the EU due to the failed 2016 military coup, ongoing tensions with Greece, and the problem of recognizing

Cyprus's dominance. These values and standards, which included the entire EU value system, were unfortunately unattainable in Ankara. People's only naive association between terrorism with the Islamic faith, an excessively xenophobic attitude, and persistent stress on "European Identity" have prompted the European Union to recognize that cultural concerns are more important than economic ones during the integration process. Even while Ankara considers itself to be of Western European culture and is capable of adapting to it, the racism and Islamophobia of European nations may have contributed directly or indirectly to the long-term deterioration of relations between Türkiye and European nations. On the German side, the CDU party shares a positive attitude toward collaboration in resettling migrants and economic trade with Türkiye, but the cultural dimension, which cannot be disregarded, is the "untimely bomb."

In terms of political relations, the attitude toward Türkiye has been either lukewarm or hot since Chancellor Merkel's succession. Most of the reasons for the lukewarm attitude towards Türkiye are that since 1997, Türkiye's strategic importance to Germany has decreased, and the Germans' cooperation with Türkiye has been more economic than political. The government of Germany's attitude was reversed after the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015, since the government of Germany felt unprecedented pressure and had to look for a common solution at the level of EU countries. Türkiye is the best alternative for asylum seekers in Germany. The strongest evidence of this may be that Angela Merkel's frequent negotiations and discussions with Türkiye are not limited to economic cooperation but also include cultural communication and improving the refugee resettlement and management methods, adding a new dimension to the German-Turkish relationship.

3.1 The refugee issue triggered a political crisis of confidence within the EU

In the EU, the political crisis of confidence caused by the refugee crisis was a debate about the German government's ability whether it can manage the problem of refugees and questioned the EU's reaction and different attitudes toward refugees. This resulted in media, political parties, and public opinion doubting whether the EU's

comprehensive Dublin System and the EU's common migration policy effectively met humanitarian aid obligations because the system failed initially. In July 2015, for example, the EU Member States adopted the Scheme of European Resettlement to prevent refugees from falling into dangerous situations such as crossing the sea or exposing themselves to smugglers. This agreement focuses on resettling 22,504 refugees so they may receive international protection. Nevertheless, it only achieved roughly two-thirds of the agreed targets by April 2017 (European Commission, 2017). Indeed, the Scheme is inefficient for Syrian refugees.

The fragility of the EU's border management capacity is also evident in the range of weak EU systems, including the hotspots strategy, the first entry principle and the refugee sharing system. Despite the EU being the first to implement a reasonable refugee distribution, the shortcomings were evident with the influx of Syrian refugees. Typical of the EU's hotspots approach, it ignores that Greece and Italy have inadequate refugee management systems of their own. Those two countries both hold the primary responsibility and have promoted a hotspot approach, making it even more challenging to register refugees in those countries. Regarding the rule of solidarity (Dublin III Regulation), it is also critical to note that not all countries share Germany's desire to maintain a welcoming and open policy toward refugees such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.

Nevertheless, the assistance provided by Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) for managing refugees, the huge number of refugees reaching the EU's 'frontline countries' has made registration and resettlement much more difficult. In addition, even though the EU fingerprint database (EURODAC) rules regulate refugee resettlement, the system cannot prevent nations from still wanting to maximize their profits from resettlement services. According to FRONTEX (2016), in 2015, smuggling networks profited over €4 billion, successfully transporting one million migrants to the shores of Greece and Italy. This act successfully undermined the fundamental human rights of refugees. As a result, the policies and actions of EU countries are increasingly being questioned by the international community and member states.

A recent debate has focused on whether the Syrian refugee crisis is responsible for the political turmoil within the EU. Considering the unique nature of the EU and its soft

power influence, the world has long viewed the EU have a robust Common Market, which has always been associated with social, humanitarian, and stability factors. However, as the European Union continues to expand its integration process and embrace neighbouring countries as part of its pursuit of becoming the world's leading power, led to divisions within the European Union resulting from the unequal development of each country's economies, cultures, and political orientations. So, the emergence of the refugee crisis of 2015 only accentuated the evidentiality and instability of the crisis of confidence.

In summary, the EU wanted to demonstrate that it had effective and responsible policies to deal with the refugee crisis; however, the EU overrated its abilities and spurred serious discussions that resulted in a political crisis of confidence within the EU for an extended period.

Germany's responsibility to alleviate political divisions within the European Union

The German refugee policy differs from the common European Union refugee policy. Merkel understood that Germany needed an opportunity, and she could exercise her political leadership to create it. From the beginning, Chancellor Merkel took the initiative to suspend the Dublin regulations and offered a warm welcome to refugees, and the people responded in kind. Since Merkel's speech, Germany has become the most appealing country for asylum refugees. Moreover, Germany's robust national security system, excellent social welfare system and developed economy have laid the foundation for attracting many refugees. Considering Sola's recent cases, it can be seen that the proportion of German responsibility for relocating and resettling asylum seekers dramatically increased after Merkel's speech, rising from an average of 29% in February 2016 to 66% in February 2016. Moreover, when only considering Syrian refugee applications, the share increased considerably, reaching 90 per cent in 2016 (Sola, 2018, p. 8).

German hosting of most refugees has greatly helped reduce EU divisions and eliminate individual countries' distrust of the EU in this regard. Meanwhile, as a unified leader and single voice, Germany successfully signed the refugee agreement with Turkish, preserving the interests of the EU and the stability of relations between the

two countries.

3.1.1 Germany's position in the refugee deal with Türkiye

In the summer of 2015, Chancellor Merkel had already become a prime supporter of strengthening solidarity between member states and achieving the safe relocation of refugees from frontline countries (Turhan, 2018). Germany plays a vital role in the refugee deal, but also Germany's attitude towards Türkiye influences the diplomatic relations between Türkiye and the EU.

The significance of Germany's participation in addressing the refugee problem is emphasized. Since August 2015, the German government has suspended the Dublin system, instituted an open-door policy, and accepted most refugees voluntarily. The number of refugees climbed from 476,649 in 2015 to 745,545 in 2016 (see Figure 5), indicating that Germany's share of the overall number of first-time asylum seekers in the EU-28 rose from 35% to 60% in 2016 (European Commission, 2017). The ability of Germany to do this is contingent not only on its economic structure, which is dominated by heavy industry and can support a huge labour force, but also on its successful political strategy. To gain the trust and support of local Turks, the German government immediately needs a favourable refugee image.

Additional, Germany aggressively urged EU nations to stand united and provide a positive example for other member states. While some EU member states, including Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, opposed this suggestion and kept mute, others, like Finland, Sweden, and Luxembourg, took the initiative and reacted. Without question, Germany has a unique influence and attraction within the EU.

In 2016, the EU experienced a period of extreme political, economic, and social disruption. This is one of the most essential factors easily overlooked. The wake of the 2016 UK referendum that decided the United Kingdom would leave the EU again led the EU into trouble. On the one hand, there was how to manage the refugee crisis and resolve the eurozone crisis. On the other hand, there is the issue of dealing with the political and economic uncertainties arising from the UK's exit from the European Union. It is noteworthy that Germany, one of the countries with the most significant economic impact on the EU, has been more dedicated than France or the United Kingdom to finding a consensus solution to the refugee issue to prevent further

disruption of the EU. So, in the face of the rise of right-wing parties and anti-immigrant sentiment, Chancellor Merkel also continued to push for a refugee agreement with Türkiye on behalf of the EU in return for temporary peace in the EU. As a result, Germany was an indispensable player during this period, contributing to the EU's economic development and political stability.

3.1.2 The challenges of the refugee crisis in Germany

From the following perspectives are analysed the real challenges that Germany must face. Discuss the political aspect of this issue first. Although Germany has generally handled the refugee issue positively, the CDU party in power under Chancellor Merkel faces many political challenges: One of the biggest challenges is the threat from anti-immigrant movements such as the Pegida and the AfD (Akin, 2017, p.89), which was one of the biggest obstacles for Merkel or the new Chancellor Scholz. The AfD represents right-wing forces and populism, which is unsettling for Germany and the European Union. The AfD party was created in 2013 to oppose the euro and EU integration. They believe it damages the German democratic and legal systems and even threatens the market economy. Simultaneously, the AfD was trying to legitimize its discourses regarding terrorist attacks, anti-asylum policies, anti-foreign, and even Islamophobia. Additionally, this series of objections, coupled with the increasing number of refugees, terrorist attacks occurring frequently, and the increasing crime rate, has provided the AfD with the fuel it needs to grow.

In the 2017 German federal election, Merkel was re-elected for four consecutive terms. It is evident from this result that although Germany initially announced that abolition of border controls would permit refugees to remain in the country, then due to pressure, Merkel underwent a sudden change of policy to work with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which resulted in the signing of readmission agreements, it means that Merkel made a compromise and abolished these rules after April 2016. SPD and the public opinion forced the government's hand by setting refugee numbers of restrictions that stabilized and consolidated the chancellor's position. Although the number of asylum applications raised from 2015 to 2016 has increased, it has eased. Chancellor Merkel's vote share in 2021 decreased from 32.9% to 24.1% after the refugees influenced the 2017 elections in Germany, while The SPD party's vote share

increased from 20.5% to 25.7% (Bundestag Election 2021: The Results, 2021).

During the six years since the successful signing of the refugee statement with Türkiye, the German government gradually understood that the refugee agreement might be a double-edged sword. For instance, the intensification of political dialogue between Germany and Türkiye has prompted Germany to oppose Türkiye's accession to the European Union, as the German government is aware that Türkiye's democratic deficiencies and ties to terrorism could disrupt the EU has already fractured "false solidarity." Considering the failed military coup in Türkiye in 2016, the violation of human rights, the ongoing conflict with Greece, and the issue of territorial recognition in Cyprus, Germany concluded that the Turkish ally could not be trusted, despite the agreement's success in achieving a degree of peace along the EU's borders. Additionally, it has become a weapon for Turkish blackmail. German political parties are hesitant to debate in depth the issues of handling and resettling refugees and growing the EU's influence in Middle Eastern nations, maybe because of the unfavorable image of Türkiye in Germany (Günter, 2021).

Second, Germany faces economic challenges. Due to the influx of refugees, Germany spends a great deal of money on resettlement, training, and education. These solutions are intended to help refugees integrate into the German community. Germany spent 0.5% of its GDP (around € 16 billion) on the resettlement of refugees in 2015, and this expenditure is continuing to rise. According to experts, German federal and state governments spend up to 20 billion euros annually on housing, food, healthcare, education and German language courses for refugees and migrants. The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin estimates that the state pays around 12,000 euros per refugee (Ulrich, 2015).

Alternatively, does Germany's single-minded cost investment in refugee management and resettlement projects not return? It has been demonstrated that Germany's high investment has led to an economic boom. A study of the age group of refugees in Germany indicates that young people are arriving. Compared with the ageing society of the past, a younger workforce is more energetic and cheaper; this stimulates the economy to a certain extent. As the head of the DIW indicates, he is not the only one who views the influx of young refugees as an opportunity for Germany to boost its economy and reduce its ageing population. Following David Folkerts-Landau,

head of research at the Frankfurt-based think tank Deutsche Bank, Germany's GDP would shrink from 1.5% to 0.5% annually without immigration (Ulrich, 2015).

The third concern is the difficulty of internal stability and the rising crime rate in Germany. German public attitude has gradually shifted from embracing Syrians to being cautious and wary. After the horrific sexual assaults on New Year's Eve in Cologne, which triggered anti-Islamic and anti-racist feelings, this has been clear. Incompetence on the part of the German government immediately contributed to a disturbance of the country's social fabric, as fear and tensions led to xenophobia and prejudice against foreigners and refugees, increasing the risk for refugees residing in Germany. In addition, the escalation of the conflict and the impact of Internet discourse led to a surge in terrorist acts and criminal activities in Germany.

In the war of civilizations, Germany faces the fourth obstacle. The greatest group of refugees in Germany are Middle Eastern Syrians. However, due to disparities in perceptions, beliefs, and lifestyles, prejudices against Islam are increasing, and the collision of cultures and economic suffering has led to the destabilization of society, the growth of terrorism, and increased crime. In the past, Turkish citizens in Germany, despite having deep relationships with German residents, were forced to undergo bigotry and Islamophobic attacks on religious monuments to vent and express their opposition to German inhabitants. The German government successfully placed populism on the political scene by remaining mute on this subject and claiming that it is the result of the rise of radical right-wing parties or that Germans are acting this way out of fear. In conclusion, cultural disintegration is commonly exploited as a reason to initiate partisan political conflicts.

The findings of this study indicate that Germany faces economic, political, cultural, and even societal issues due to receiving refugees. In order to fulfil the aims of social stability and stable economic development, Germany must devote more resources and focus than other EU nations. After the Syrian refugee crisis, the German success experience could be an excellent example.

3.2 Reason for Germany and Türkiye's cooperation on the refugee crisis

The refugee issue's detrimental impact on Türkiye and Germany is the primary

reason for their successful cooperation. Since April 2015, a massive influx of refugees via sea and land routes in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean into the countries at the forefront of Europe's borders has placed a significant strain on the Greek and Italian border control systems and refugee registration systems, resulting in an influx of illegal refugees. In April of the same year, three refugee shipwrecks happened in five days. The UN refugee report reveals that 3,740 individuals have perished since 2016, just a few fewer than the 3,771 who perished in 2015. (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). Thus, the influx of refugees and the failure to implement the EU's shared migration strategy have contributed to widespread questions about the endurance of societies and nations, and this is just the beginning of the negative effects migrants have.

This paper explores the parallels and differences in the detrimental impacts of refugees on both countries and the reasons for their cooperation. Merkel's position was stabilized after the CDU and SPD signed a new refugee pact to reduce the number of refugees in response to a significant decline in popular support during her election in 2017. In contrast, right-wing parties have gradually legitimized terrorist attacks, despite garnering substantial support. The opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) stated that there would be no peace if Syrian refugees did not return home, causing Erdoğan's party to lose many votes similarly. The Babat report echoes the theory that Syrian refugees directly influenced the outcome of the election (Babat, 2019).

Both nations have seen terrorist assaults, and the Turkish government continues to deal with the YPG, PKK, and DHKP-C terrorist organizations. To build a safe corridor for Syrian refugees in its geographical location, Türkiye acted militarily against the Syrian government. Türkiye's strategy is centred on developing a significant presence in the Middle East and securing its borders. Similarly, Germany has to face terrorism due to refugees or immigration. Locals are frightened for their safety due to Islam's rising criminality and terrorist assaults, such as the recent truck attack in Berlin, because of social tensions and cultural disparities. These reasons contributed to the growing popularity of right-wing parties, and xenophobia and Islamophobia increased among the populace.

The cost of resettling refugees is enormous in terms of health, security, basic needs, and training and in building refugee camps. Thus, the two nations that have the

largest refugee populations are overwhelmed by the costs, and Germany is even more helpless since a number of EU member states have remained unwilling to pay for or resettle refugees, leading Germany to be in a situation similar to a desert dweller in search of water. Germany is not the only one in this dilemma but also the Turkish government's ever-increasing spending. Germany and Türkiye are two countries where the harmful effects of refugees can be observed, such as increased unemployment among locals, and economic imbalances, among many other things. Therefore, Germany and Türkiye need to work together to alleviate the economic pressure on both countries.

From a different perspective, the impact of refugees on the cultures of the two countries is quite distinct. Germany has a majority of Christians and many Syrian refugees, which has led to religious and cultural shocks and increased crime rates. Turkish culture is also challenged by language differences, such as in the case of the Turkish-Syrian border city of Kilis. Approximately 120,000 people reside in Syria, while the city's total population is only 129,000, so the city brings together the cultures of both countries and is more like two separate communities that speak different languages and have distinct cultures. The Syrian refugees have impacted both countries, but the pressure of culture shock on Germany was much stronger than on Türkiye, which held the same religious beliefs.

3.2.1 Why does Türkiye have to cooperate with Germany as the third safe country

The EU's exceptional policy toward Türkiye

The EU's conditions are generally favourable for the economic development of Türkiye and show the EU's respect for Türkiye and desire to establish a long-term strategic relationship regarding refugee issues.

A comprehensive review of the EU-Türkiye deal demonstrates why several EU nations consider it contentious and unreliable. Since March 20, 2016, illegal refugees who have travelled through the Greek islands shall be returned to Türkiye, and the EU will assist Türkiye with relocation funding to alleviate the load on refugees. With the deal in effect, the number of illegal refugees daily has decreased from 1,150 to 160, effectively alleviating the burden on the EU's borders. However, this has resulted in an

infinite and constant cash outflow from the EU. To support the planning and initiatives of the Turkish Refugee Fund, the EU provided Türkiye with 3 billion euros, while 16 EU member states contributed 1.61 billion euros (European Commission, 2016a). Although just 15 per cent of Syrian refugees have been accommodated and supplied with a minimum standard of living, the EU intends to continue improving conditions for 4,1 million refugees in Türkiye until 2021 and will invest more and more to sustain progress. The European Commission is allocating €560 million to support inclusive quality education and access to higher education for refugees today. Between 2021 and 2023, according to President von der Leyen, another support programme will contribute an additional €3 billion to bolster migration and Turkish border security (European Commission, 2021). The EU has provided Türkiye with a significant financial contribution through this deal.

The EU promised visa-free travel as a mark of respect for the Turkish people. According to discussion with legislative institutions, the EU was required to suspend the requirement for Turkish citizens to obtain a visa to travel freely because the Turkish problems related to corruption, data protection, the law of rule, and human rights raised the EU government's concerns.

To conclude, Türkiye is a reliable strategic ally for the EU regarding refugees, and the EU has spent capital to find peace on its borders. However, the EU must admit that maintaining stability and economic development in the EU requires using Türkiye as a third safe country.

Why Türkiye accepted EU-Türkiye deal?

Based on the above information, Türkiye and EU countries, especially Germany, have been adversely affected by refugees, yet Türkiye's border is already connected to Syria due to its geographical location. So, compared to Germany or other EU footprint countries, Türkiye would suffer more. Türkiye agreed to such an arrangement because only by relying on one country's efforts refugee problems could not be resolved immediately, even with the support of the international UN refugee agency, but still necessary the assistance of neighbouring countries and international organisations.

Following are some key arguments for why Türkiye is willing to accept the EU-Türkiye Statement:

Türkiye is in a sensitive position which dictates that it needs to work with the EU to have hope. Syria's refugees do not directly threaten the borders of the EU frontline states, and most of the pressure falls on the Turkish border. As refugees must transit through Türkiye to reach EU frontline countries, the pressure on Türkiye is much greater than on EU countries. According to UNHCR Türkiye, Syrian refugees registered in the southeast of Türkiye, closer to the Syrian border, occupied more than 13152 camps in each Turkish province, with the greatest concentration of refugee camps in Adana at 20,916 (UN, 2020).

An opportunity for economic stimulation. By generating a mobility factor in the labour market, refugees improve the output value of the Turkish textile sector and other industries, hence accelerating Türkiye's economic growth. Due to the enormous influx of refugees, demand for food, accommodation, and consumption is rising. In 2015, government officials projected that economic expansion in 2016 would climb from 4% to 4.5%. Therefore, one of the most important elements propelling Türkiye's economic growth in 2015 was the government's spending on the Syrian refugees it accepted (Devranoglu, 2016).

The EU has stated a desire to actively support the development of Türkiye's infrastructure and regional economy through financial assistance. In response to EU member states' humanitarian aid, the European Commission will finalize the contracts for the €6 billion operational budget of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye in 2020, providing substantial funding for refugees' basic needs, education, and assistance with medical care, and protection. In response to the basic requirements of refugees affected by the epidemic, the EU has provided an additional 780 million euros to assist around 1.7 million refugees in receiving monthly benefits. In addition, vast amounts of humanitarian aid have contributed to the Turkish economy and infrastructure expansion, which Syrian refugees in Türkiye have facilitated (European Commission, 2020).

The above indicates that the EU had proposed conditions that Türkiye could not refuse and that Türkiye had its ambitions, which led to natural cooperation. As of the end of 2021, Türkiye's long-term cooperation on refugee issues had gradually exposed its democratic shortcomings and continued to challenge EU countries' interests. In 2020, for example, Türkiye directly challenged the maritime rights of Cyprus, and

Türkiye has increasingly engaged in provocations against Greece. This behaviour led Türkiye's EU accession plans have been stalled consequently. Despite this, Türkiye remains one of the EU's key trading partners.

3.2.2 Analysing the attitude of German political parties to the relationship between Türkiye and the EU and to refugees

In the election of 2021, the German parliament Bundestag have six political parties. After a final count, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), with the highest turnout was the winner with 25.7% of the vote, followed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the sister party Christian Social Union (CSU) with 24.1% of the vote, then in third place were the Greens, followed by the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Lastly, only 4.9% of the votes were cast for the Left Party.

The SPD is one of Germany's oldest parties, and it was in power until 2005, when Angela Merkel, a member of the CDU, overturned the status quo because she believed Germany needed a more significant labour force and an economic boost. Because SPD continued to cut welfare and pensions, the public was popular with the CDU party. A leader's decision may influence the entire political orientation of a party or perhaps of Germany.

The SPD appears to be in a debate concerning the refugee issue. The party is pleased with the arrival of refugees as they can stimulate German economic development. However, the influx of large numbers of refugees could create social disorder. In their view, solving these refugee issues at the EU level is more desirable, despite agreeing that high-quality refugees contribute to Germany's growth. Moreover, they hope the EU will establish a comprehensive European humanitarian asylum system and reform the Dublin Regulation to protect and control refugees. Legal migration paths are created so that immigration policies are regulated (Bathke, 2021). The party believes that targeted migration and equal distribution mechanisms have economic and social benefits. A policy of migration that follows the rules indicates successful integration and the party's desire for a controlled flow of refugees that does not threaten social stability.

As a strong supporter of the EU, the SDP believes that social and economic

stability is more important, so keeping cooperation with Türkiye is a wise choice. The party regards that the EU needs to reform and innovate over time while maintaining cooperative relations with Türkiye, as well as placing the common interests of the EU ahead of bilateral relations (Aydın Düzgit, 2011, p.59-60). Thus, the issue of Türkiye's accession is not of concern to them since Türkiye's accession will promote more excellent protection and integration of the interests of both sides. However, Scholz, representing the SPD, the new German challenger on the stage shifted this optimistic attitude.

During Merkel's tenure as Chancellor, the CDU/CSU was at the peak of power. However, with the results of the 2021 elections, it appears as though Merkel's time has ended, and the CDU/CSU has suffered its worst political impact since the Second World War, with a direct drop of 8%, compared with the 2017 results. The issue is not to rule out that Merkel's announcement that her "open door policy" for refugees had severe negative consequences on socioeconomic disruptions; it is not surprising that Merkel's support rate was already trending downwards as of 2017.

The CDU party has always been a kind friend to refugees and welcomes quality refugees. As represented by Chancellor Angela Merkel, the "welcoming culture" for refugees is in place. Merkel's friendly policy does not entail accepting refugees but providing a "double layer of protection" for national interests, which can benefit from accepting refugees. In 2013, the CDU publicly announced that it rejected immigrants who sought dual citizenship to protect German interests and demonstrate loyalty to the country. And the CDU party also welcomes and supports economic migrants and refugees with a high level of education. In addition, CDU provides refugees with assistance, including language and technical training, to ensure their successful integration into German society and the labour market. Generally, the CDU is inclusive and friendly toward refugees.

According to the party leader of the CDU in 2014, Türkiye joining the EU would impede the EU's political union due to its high population, specific geographical location, different cultural characteristics, and even economic development and political aspects (Aydın Düzgit, 2011, p.57). Therefore, the CDU opposes Türkiye from joining the EU. However, the situation has improved due to the passage of time, economic growth, and political and diplomatic shifts. However, tremendous opposition

comes from conservative CDU members who would rather see Türkiye as a strategic ally than an EU member.

Since 1980, the Green Party has advocated environmentalist, anti-nuclear, and anti-war causes. The only political party concerned with climate change and environmental damage are the Green Party. As public awareness of the need to safeguard our only planet grows, the Green Party's influence slowly expands.

Regarding refugees, the party promotes a multicultural immigrant society and expects that refugees and immigrants will contribute to Germany's labour market and education system. The party agrees that Germany is naturally a country of immigrants and supports clear laws for refugees that protect them from political persecution and do not violate their human rights. Therefore, the party is refugee friendly.

Concerning Türkiye's relationship with the EU, the party believes that the EU is meant to be a democratising, modernising, pluralistic representation and that Türkiye should not be prevented from joining the EU under the pretext of a culture war or for other perceived reasons, as the EU is not a Christian cultural bloc. Therefore, the party is neutral regarding Türkiye's accession to the EU from this perspective.

The central ideology of the FDP is "freedom" and "liberalism", including social economy nationals and individuals, which are synonymous with capitalism, while the party is more like a "kingmaker" in determining the outcome of German elections.

Liberals emphasise the need to distinguish between politically persecuted individuals, refugees from civil wars, and permanent immigrants. As the humanitarian country only provides temporary protection to those suffering from the war, people will have to leave Syria if the Syrian civil war ends. The FDP is in favour of reforming the CEAS system to protect war-affected groups who pose a severe threat to refugees and to whom humanitarian visas ought to be provided by the EU. Therefore, the Liberals will only provide care and support to groups of refugees whose lives are "seriously or specifically" threatened (Bathke, 2021). In general, the FDP is friendly to refugees.

Regarding the EU-Türkiye accession process, the Liberal Party also supports the idea of Türkiye joining the EU. Not only because of their mutual business interests but because the Turkish position is vital for EU cooperation on refugee issues. Although Türkiye's rule of law and democracy have been lacking, its image of a modern Muslim country is why the United States has supported it, and the EU should also.

A significant percentage of votes for the AfD party came from supporters who had previously voted for the CDU party. It seems it formed in response to Europe's refugee issue and the 2008 economic crisis. These phases, symbolizing the 'incompetence' of the EU, led to a lack of local confidence in successful EU integration, a perceived inability to bring stability and peace to life, and social tensions fuelled by the refugee problem. The party thus succeeded in turning its anti-Islamic policy into a manifesto. Considering that this party was founded in 2003 and its rapid growth, it deserves special attention. Depending on future developments, it could overtake the Greens as the most dangerous party in German politics.

The AfD party opposes refugees, hates them, and hopes the EU will take action to leave the UN Migration and Refugee Act. After the euro crisis, the AfD started focusing on refugees' negative effects on their socio-economic well-being. Today, they are solely xenophobic and Islamophobic. Therefore, the inclusion of refugees within the German circle community would make the local community feel tense and frightened due to the multicultural nature of the community. Moreover, the Islamic terrorist attacks have further radicalised German culture with their racist rejection.

Right-wing populist parties in Europe are typically passionate about preserving "cultural security": traditions, languages, religions, and customs indigenous to a particular society (Stec, 2002). This allows the two perspectives of "local" and "foreign" to be easily distinguished. Türkiye's accession was regarded as "foreign", and the party considers both refugees and Türkiye's decision to join the EU the greatest threat to "cultural security", which undermines national cultures' homogeneity and distinctive structure (Williams 2006, p.70). To protect the uniqueness of European culture, the party has enacted restrictions and bans on any activity that could undermine "cultural security".

The Left was founded in 2007 as a merger of the PDS and Labour and Social Justice (WASG). The party's main objective is democratic socialism, i.e., allowing children to live in a society free from poverty, peace, dignity and welfare and decide their way of life.

Refugees are mentioned in the party's credo, which supports an international migrant society with global action and equal rights for all; thus, the party's positive attitude towards refugees because of equal rights is the greatest kindness to refugees.

It is cautious about Türkiye joining the EU, being neutral but still supportive. The party also warned the EU not to see Türkiye as ‘the West's gendarme in the fight against Islamic terrorism (Ermağan, 2013).’

The large number of migrants welcomed by Türkiye and the agreement with the EU have contributed to a decline in favourable opinions of refugees in recent years, particularly after 2016. People became concerned about the negative impact of future Syrian refugees on Türkiye, such as the exposure of Türkiye's ambitions and its authoritarian political climate, the ongoing economic crisis, and the continued control of free speech and presidential dictatorship by the Ankara government (Kınıklıoğlu, 2020), which contributed to an increase in ambivalence towards refugees. In addition, the opposition's criticism of Ankara's Syria stance has caused substantial political tensions. Since the outbreak of Covid-19, more questions have been raised about the AKP government's rhetoric that it is willing to accept more refugees to maintain Turkish power and international standing, while the community's attitude toward refugees is one of rejection and silent opposition due to the economic crisis and high unemployment.

CHAPTER 4

REFUGEE CRISES RESPONSES FROM TÜRKIYE AND GERMANY IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL STRATEGIES

4.1 Germany's political strategic to Syrian refugee

German society and government's attitudes were divided toward Syrian refugees, and this division of consciousness extends to the political-strategic level. It has led to a dynamic process of fluctuation in German refugee policy, from "negative response" to "welcoming culture" to "limitation".

From January 2015 to August 2015, there was a time of passive response before the crisis. As a core member of the EU, the German government had to consider its national interests and Europe's political and border security; thus, the German government took a more hostile stance regarding the refugee crisis. Because Germany was supportive of the programme in May, while the action was not taken until September, demonstrating that the Merkel administration has been hesitant to implement it and believes that EU-level solutions to the Syrian refugee crisis are preferable to domestic ones. In this regard, it can be observed that the Merkel administration's reluctance to act in the first term persists.

The 'willkommenskultur phase'. Germany declared that it would no longer deal with refugees following the Dublin Convention and that refugees would not be returned to their first country of entry. This action was strongly supported by the EU immediately, with a spokesperson for European Commissioner Avramopoulos saying: "Germany's approach to the refugee crisis has always been and continues to be a manifestation of a European spirit, and it has been claimed that Germany is a shining example of openness and solidarity, which are values that underpin the European Union (Dambach, 2019)." Meanwhile, Angela Merkel, the highest political power in Germany, created a culture of welcome with the slogan "Wir schaffen das (We can do this)", allowing the people to embrace the large number of refugees entering Germany in a short time with a welcoming attitude. CDU party also gained popular support and popularity in a short time, while Merkel's strategy during this period also echoed the

fundamental values of the EU while showing excellent political and strategic coordination.

Germany's openness and welcoming policy at this stage were mainly due to several factors: the first and most significant factor is that it is one of the most economically powerful countries in the EU and, unlike the United Kingdom, which is preparing to leave the European Union and unlike France that is unable to accept refugees in total, only Germany can provide economic security for refugee resettlement. Using the Königstein Quota System - EASY improves the confidence of the German side to manage refugees. As this system is an appropriate weighting of the population (1/3) and tax revenue (2/3), so this model can bring the best fit for refugees (Thym et al., 2013) because the suitable native populations and financial powers can stimulate refugee protection and social integration significantly. Furthermore, Merkel's strategic influence in motivating people to gather at train stations to hold banners welcoming refugees spontaneously proves that public opinion supports the "open-door policy." Second, Germany had no extreme solid right-wing forces compared to other European countries.

Additionally, Merkel's experience during the war and flight made her kind. Having grown up in East Germany, she and those who suffered through the war were more sympathetic and tolerant of the refugees' situation. In conclusion, the entire country of Germany creates an atmosphere of welcome, with Syrian refugees being willing to learn and study German to integrate fully into its society.

The phase of limitation. Since 2015, Germany has received many refugees, which has had serious negative impacts, including the Paris terrorist attacks and the New Year's Eve 2016 sexual assault case in Cologne. As a result of this sequence of terrorist acts, Merkel had to change her Syrian refugee policy by gradually increasing limitations at the start and close of 2015 to reclaim popular support for the 2017 elections.

Four variables can assist in evaluating Merkel's refugee restriction strategy. Firstly, reducing the number of approved applications by asylum seekers. In 2015, over 1.1 million persons sought international protection, but Germany accepted just 477,00 to ensure they could receive complete protection (European Commission, 2016b). To make refugee law more reasonable, the German Federal Legislator passed a law granting asylum applicants essential legal rights on July 8, 2016. According to the

legislation, asylum-seekers are eligible for employment possibilities and protection, although federal states have the authority to assign them to specified places for the first three years. Second, expanding the scope of the "safe country" and reducing the number of refugees following the first refugee policy package announced in September 2015, Germany classified Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro as "safe countries of origin". Thirdly, the resumption of border checks will speed up refugees' repatriation. Based on BBC news in September 2015, German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière said that Germany would restart border checks as well as suspend rail services between Germany and Austria, which will serve to directly influence other EU countries to accept refugees, which is a sensitive political strategy on the part of Germany. For migrants, this action signifies that Germany will no longer have an open-door policy but will continue to comply with the Dublin regulations (BBC News, 2015). The fourth goal is to cooperate with Türkiye to resolve the refugee crisis. Since the outbreak of the refugee crisis, Germany has maintained close ties with Türkiye, ultimately leading to an agreement in March 2016 to keep refugees away from EU borders in replacing them with financial support from the EU.

We have seen a transition following the refugee agreement with Türkiye in 2016. Germany is in the process of rationalizing the handling of refugees within its borders. Germany has continued to accept a small number of refugees, a period when it has made careful choices regarding asylum seekers. The German government is also obliged to combat smuggling people in illegal transit through the Mediterranean and the negative effects of terrorist attacks. Consequently, at the end of 2016, Germany imposed more specific restrictions and stricter controls on the admission of refugees. Two terrorist attacks in 2016 alone have increased Germany's refugee application restrictions. An Afghan asylum seeker knifed twenty passengers in the southern city of Würzburg. A Syrian asylum seeker detonated a bomb nearby Ansbach, killing himself and injuring 12 others. A truck attack killed 12 people at the end of December and injured 56. The recent series of terrorist attacks has increased people's fear of refugees and raised questions about Chancellor Merkel's open-door policy and welcoming culture. Furthermore, the German government reached an agreement with Tunisia in March 2017 to return 1,500 migrants, showing Germany's toughness. Germany tightened and standardized its immigration procedures (Wesley, 2017).

Between 2018 and 2021, the refugee issue contributed to Merkel's election in 2017 and the party's defeat in 2021, consequently increasing support for the anti-refugee party. When she was sworn in for the fourth time in March 2018, Merkel was again under pressure to announce and pledge directly that she would speed up the process of deporting rejected asylum seekers and migrants. In the meantime, German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer warned that a coalition government in Berlin would cut the number of migrants permitted into Germany in 2018 from 180,000 to 220,000. This allocation cap was achieved before the end of the year, resulting in a decrease in the number of migrants awarded asylum at the start of 2017. (Hibrawi, 2019). This highlights Germany's refugee policy to enhance control, decrease the number of migrants, secure a high degree of integration, and stimulate the German economy. To prevent the spread of Covid-19 and safeguard the safety of its population, the German government closed its borders in 2020 and refused admittance to any migrants to halt the disease's spread.

4.1.1 Germany's attitude for Syrian refugee Crisis

The influence of political parties determines Germany's stance toward Syrian refugees, and most Germans are kind and helpful. However, the negative effects of the refugee crisis have continued to grow, negatively affecting local employment, economic development, social structures, and even religious culture. As 2016 was the peak year for right-wing forces in Germany, the attitude towards refugees has shifted from openness to caution and fear.

According to an examination of the German parties' perspectives on migrants, 2015 was a positive year for refugees, both for the parties and the public. This is primarily due to Chancellor Merkel's political persistence and repeated assurances to the populace that we can manage refugees. As a result, mainstream media and major social media sites have presented refugees in a positive light.

In Germany, 2016 and 2017 were distinguished by a period of political civil war and failing foreign policy, as terrorist incidents were blamed on Syrian refugees and Merkel's welcoming policy was questioned. The rationalisation of the AfD's anti-immigrant rhetoric made the party a formidable force in the elections, whereas the CDU and SPD experienced a marked decline. The AfD, an opposition party that obtained

power during this period for its critical rhetoric, leveraged the refugee situation to achieve political influence. The emergence of racist, anti-Islamist, and xenophobic sentiments among the populace temporarily. Furthermore, the German public's doubts and misgivings about Merkel's ability to deal with the refugee issue.

With Germany's well-managed refugee system, the appropriate Königstein Quota System, and Türkiye's willingness to accept significant numbers of refugees, the number of refugees has declined since 2018. That, combined with the stabilisation of the social structure and employment, allowing the German government to transition gradually into the post-migration era. Germany has begun to prioritise social issues such as protecting the employment rates of women and children in vulnerable groups and higher education and has invested heavily in funding and policies to support this, successfully transforming the refugee workforce into an economic driver, and promoting demographic balance in an ageing society.

4.1.2 The development of after Merkel government the refugee issues

Following the end of the Merkel era, the party manifestos for the 2021 elections have been a subject of intense debate in the media and the public sphere, as have the hot topics of pensions, taxes, climate change, and immigration. As the ninth Chancellor of Germany, Scholz was able to sign a coalition agreement with the Greens and the FDP, becoming known as the "traffic light" team, and thus their high degree of coherence on the social policy level provided the possibility of progress on the refugee issue and foreign policy for Türkiye.

According to SPD Youth Wing member Jessica Rosenthal, Germany is a nation of immigrants. Significant progress has been made because the German population shares this opinion (Chazan, 2021). The "traffic light" government has pledged to build a more welcoming system for migrants, make obtaining residence permits and eventual German citizenship easier, and make it simpler for talented foreign workers to enter the German labour market. Refugees living in Germany can also anticipate the fulfilment of this pledge. Because Afghanistan already has a significant population of refugees, the Chancellor is advocating for a common EU solution to the refugee crisis. To protect the refugees in Germany, it is vital to examine and monitor the serious crimes committed by refugees in Germany. Germany has implemented a system for measuring

and assessing refugees to preserve social harmony. Concerning the admissibility of Afghan refugees into Germany, the Chancellor stated that Germany and the EU do not pay sufficient attention to refugees in terms of the admittance of refugees by neighbouring nations and the actual quantity of migrants. Before the influx of new refugees, Germany feels that the EU should focus on integrating and cooperating with Asia, South America, and Africa as its next objective (Kasper & Abdul Karim, 2021).

In summary, it is evident that since taking office, the new chancellor has prioritised a pluralistic and inclusive society. Regarding refugees, he is inclined to continue Chancellor Merkel's prior attempts to remain cautiously and modestly hospitable to refugees. In addition, he hopes that the common policy for refugees will be revised at the EU level and that a humanitarian example will be established regarding the refugee situation in neighbouring nations.

4.2 Turkish political strategic to Syrian refugee

Türkiye's location is particularly significant to EU countries and Middle East countries, especially Syria. As a neighbour of Syria, Türkiye shares an 822 km land border and six provinces with Syria; as a neighbouring country, Türkiye has quickly become the leading country of migration for Syrian refugees because of the Syrian civil war. The country's geographical location on three continents - Europe, Asia, and Africa - has also attracted many refugees worldwide. It is considered the best transit point to join the EU due to its superior position.

Türkiye hosts the most significant number of Syrian refugees, with over 3.6 million Syrians under temporary protection and over 330,000 refugees and asylum seekers under international protection (3RP Türkiye, 2021). Further analysis reveals that Türkiye's geographical location and strategic relationship with the EU have influenced a political policy toward refugees that international organisations and EU agreements have influenced.

The successful readmission agreement between Türkiye and the EU in March 2016 enabled Türkiye to resettle refugees mainly near the Syrian border, although in huge numbers, with most of the funding coming from the European Commission and other EU countries. Turkish policy necessitates the readmission of Syrian refugees arriving in Greece and the EU's commitment to resettle 72,000 Syrians in Europe. In addition,

the EU gives financial and technical aid to the Turkish government to strengthen border control procedures and safeguard the safety of the EU's border states. The EU Facility for Refugees in Türkiye has invested almost €3 billion in six significant areas: humanitarian assistance, migration management, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socioeconomic support (Tsourapas, 2019). To deepen the strategic cooperation between the EU and Türkiye on the refugee crisis, the EU will need to consider Türkiye as a refugee-related partner. However, the EU consistently views Türkiye's refugee policy as blackmail due to increased collaboration and financial assistance. It is clear from the menacing language used by Ankara's leadership toward Brussels and EU member states. During their meeting in February 2016, Erdogan, Tusk, and Juncker publicly threatened to flood Europe with Syrian refugees. According to the Turkish prime minister (Reuters, 2016), "We have approximately three million refugees in our country. Türkiye has kept its word, but you have violated our statements. If you cannot demonstrate your seriousness, the doors will be opened for EU nations." (Pitel & Beesley, 2016) This comment exemplified the Turkish government's inability to address domestic issues and precipitated a crisis of confidence with the EU.

At the same time, Türkiye's political policy on refugee admissions has gradually tightened. As a friendly neighbour, Türkiye shared pressure and persuaded Bashar's government that it could end the conflict with a chain reaction in the early days of the Syrian war. Despite the failure of diplomacy, Türkiye provided humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees and maintained its supplies. However, as the number of Syrian refugees has grown, the camps in Türkiye have become overwhelmed. The country has hosted nearly 4 million refugees from its neighbouring countries since 2012 and continues to do so due to its continuing refugee crisis. Unlike Germany, Türkiye has no own system regulating border security and is only regulated through the laws on foreigners and international protection processing to protect and manage border security. Firstly, refugees are required to hold valid identification documents; secondly, refugees who have been repatriated from EU countries are accepted; and thirdly, Syrians must enter Türkiye only by land and undergo post-certification, which is intended to be a sound security barrier.

Even though both Türkiye and Germany have maintained relatively rigorous and procedural refugee policies, Türkiye's strategic differs from that of EU nations.

The first is that Türkiye is more concerned about expanding its international influence and image in the Middle East through military intervention. The main reason for this is that Türkiye's proximity to the Middle East and the proliferation of terrorist organisations such as ISIS and PYD pose a serious threat to the security of its borders; therefore, Türkiye has chosen to intervene militarily in an attempt to establish a safe corridor along the Syrian border to safeguard the stability and image of Türkiye's borders. As a NATO member, it also demonstrates Türkiye's military influence.

Secondly, Türkiye is inextricably linked with Syria, influencing its policy regarding Syrian refugees. Türkiye's predecessor was the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the Arab region for 400 years between the 16th and early 20th centuries. At that time, Syria was the cultural and economic centre of the Arab world. However, British support for Arab revolts in 1917 forced Türkiye to declare an end to its rule over all of Arabia. As a result of this historical connection, Türkiye initially welcomed Syrian refugees with open arms.

Third, to bring in the Sunnis in Syria and prepare for future regime change. Since 1970, the Assad government has been consolidating its rule by fighting other parties and, eventually, gaining a centralised system of power with the Alawites on the political stage, thus realising its desire to rule the majority with a minority. Hence, Sunni Islamists in Türkiye deem the new Syrian party illegitimate, and since the main opposition force in Syria and the ruling party in Türkiye are both Sunni, Türkiye is more than willing to accept Syrian refugees and prepare for a post-Bashar era.

In conclusion, Türkiye's refugee policy results from a combination of humanitarian and political objectives. The Turkish government uses the threat of refugees as a negotiating tool in exchange for massive EU funds for humanitarian assistance. In the meantime, it uses refugees to advance its political objectives and expand its discourse within the Middle East

4.2.1 Türkiye's attitude for Syrian refugee Crisis

According to the analysis, as stated above, Turks are initially welcoming towards refugees to later panic and rejection.

Recent analyses indicate that the AKP party suffered a historic loss in the 2019 local elections, similar to what occurred in Germany in 2017 when most cities,

including Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya, voted for the opposition. The fundamental cause of this loss was the fear of Turkish citizens toward Syrian refugees. Therefore, the authorities had to close the camps and reduce the population progressively. Moreover, as 98 per cent of the population resided in cities (Lowndes, 2020), these refugees became "urban refugees," and the negative impacts of the refugees were steadily amplified, such as the rising unemployment rate and the continued economic crisis. Hence, AKP supporters are leery of the initial refugee acceptance strategy.

The large number of migrants welcomed by Türkiye and the agreement with the EU have contributed to a decline in favourable opinions of refugees in recent years, particularly after 2016. People became concerned about the negative impact of future Syrian refugees on Türkiye, such as the exposure of Türkiye's ambitions and its authoritarian political climate, the ongoing economic crisis, and the continued control of free speech and presidential dictatorship by the Ankara government (Knkloğlu, 2020), which contributed to an increase in ambivalence towards refugees. In addition, the opposition's criticism of Ankara's Syria stance has caused substantial political tensions. Since the outbreak of Covid-19, more questions have been raised about the AKP government's rhetoric that it is willing to accept more refugees to maintain Turkish power and international standing, while the community's attitude toward refugees is one of rejection and silent opposition due to the economic crisis and high unemployment.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

Turkish-German relations have fluctuated over the last decade, following the changes every time. Nevertheless, it could not be doubted that the country of Türkiye, whether the location or economy has a vital position for Germany and the whole EU level. Türkiye is a cultural bridge between Western and Islamic civilisations from the geographic location to analysis. The country is connected to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, which creates a chance can obtain admission by European countries to strategic regions and significant energy resources. With Türkiye hosting more than 3 million Syrian refugees, Germany and other frontline countries would suffer a lot if the Turkish government did not control refugees and kept silent on irregular trade. For the economic development to be discussed, Germany and Türkiye are more closely tied than before as far as economics and tourism are concerned. According to the Germany Travel Association (DRV), Türkiye was a favourite German destination in 2021. Additionally, Germany is one of Türkiye's biggest trading partners, and foreign investors and bilateral trade in 2020 will reach 36.6 billion euros (Amt, 2022).

It should be noted that Turkish-German relations are not limited to trade alone but also include military cooperation and common foreign policy objectives, such as collaboration in the fight against terrorism and management of illegal refugees. Because both countries belong to the bloc NATO and Germany is an EU leader on the Syrian refugee issue, cooperation on Türkiye's side. Thus, the refugee crisis provided another opportunity for German-Turkish relations to improve.

5.1 What is the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on German-Turkish political relations

In the context of globalization, Türkiye's strategic location is crucial for Germany and the EU; an outbreak of the refugee crisis in 2015 allowed Germany and Türkiye to moderate relations and strengthen their cooperation. At the same time, the Syrian refugee crisis has also contributed to the escalation in the differences between Türkiye and Germany in foreign policy and refugee policy due to economic, social, and cultural

influences that are not comparable.

From the German perspective, at the very beginning, Türkiye, as a member of NATO, directly expressed its military intervention in the Syrian civil war, also revealing its ambitions, stressing the need to remove the Assad regime and breaking off diplomacy with Damascus (Öniş and Kutlay, 2017). Compared to Germany's restrained, cautious approach to refugee issues, the Turkish approach is particularly aggressive initially. Hence, the German government maintained a wait-and-see attitude and preferred to let Syria's immediate neighbours accept the refugees rather than opening up unilaterally. In other words, the Syrian refugee crisis did not fundamentally affect the interests of Germany. Nevertheless, as the Syrian refugee crisis and illegal immigration continued to pour into the EU, the shortcomings of the EU's common migration policy started to have negative effects on the EU's solidarity as well as on the whole EU Member States; it was during this time that Germans began to realise the significance of Turkish's position regarding the EU's border and security.

Between 2016 and 2019, Germany and Türkiye's political and diplomatic relations were again at a low ebb, primarily due to two events. Initially, a German investigation into a Turkish organisation in Germany made a negative impact on relations between the two countries because the Federation of Associations of Turkish Democratic Idealists (ADÜTDF), an ultra-nationalist group in Türkiye, succeeded in attracting the German attention of politicians and called the Turkish regime a supporter of terrorist organizations. Furthermore, during the military coup in Türkiye, the Ankara government expressed anger at the inaction of the EU government, which caused the dismissal of many civil servants and the detention of 35,000 people, including German journalists, under the State Emergency Law of the time. German policymakers criticized Turkish policymakers due to a series of domestic political turmoil. A recent German election drew international attention as the ally Turkish government banned Turkish election rallies in Germany, and Ankara called the ban "Nazi parties" (Turhan, 2019). As a result, Germany again vetoed the negotiations for Türkiye's accession to the EU in 2018. As an influential member of the EU, France was required to express hope that Germany would be sensible in this case and consider Türkiye's importance to the EU economy and border security.

On the occasion of President Erdogan's visit to Brussels in March 2019, German

politicians expressed various views regarding Turkish relations. A member of the FDP, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, asserted that Türkiye has a strategic position and plays an important role in Europe and Syria, while a member of the CSU, Manfred Weber, stated that Türkiye should improve its rule of law and human rights and refrain from intervening on the coast of Cyprus. Meanwhile, the Greens also commented on Turkish behaviour and the EU itself, reminding us that Europe is responsible for addressing Türkiye's human rights abuses. The European Parliament passed a symbolic resolution suspending formal Türkiye's accession during this time. So, as a member of the EU, Türkiye is far removed from its former state (Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, 2021). And the EU chose to employ a transactional approach to deal with and cooperate with Türkiye rather than regard Türkiye as a member state.

Generally, the Turkish-German relationship has maintained a positive attitude since the Syrian refugee crisis. In his study, Büşra (2020) examined the conversation between President Erdoğan and Chancellor Merkel from 2011 to 2020 to highlight the interdependence of the two nations. The evidence showed that the two leaders used positive words such as 'support', 'refugee', 'bilateral relationship', and 'cooperation' to demonstrate the importance of the relationship in the official conferences. Although the political intentions relations between Türkiye and Germany increased, both leaders also maintained a positive attitude toward Syrian refugees.

5.2 The development of German-Turkish political relations during the Covid-19 period and after the ending of the Merkel government

Analyzed in terms of the Turkish state, Covid-19 has hurt Syrian refugees living in Türkiye. During the outbreak, they faced unprecedented challenges and stress. According to the report, the Turkish economy experienced the largest drop in GDP of 11% in the second quarter of 2020 (Staff, 2020), and the Syrian refugees were the most affected. For example, as prices rise and refugees cannot make a good living from their jobs, the issues of children's education and women's employment are coming to the fore in the long run, leading already struggling refugee families to take their children out of school. The Turkish government's approach in the face of such pressure has been to use the threat of Syrian refugees to demand more economic aid from the EU.

Although the EU disapproves of Türkiye's "hostage diplomacy" and condemns Ankara's assertive foreign policy, the EU is still helping Türkiye manage its refugees with financial support. During this period, the EU mobilised savings and emergency measures are only possible to activate the emergency funding support from DG ECHO, 4,75 million euros to be distributed by the Ministry of Health to assist refugees in Türkiye (European Commission: Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2021). But the request for this funding has been delayed by the European Commission. And partly because of the slow initial impact of Covid-19 and the extreme volatility of the loan facility. However, this action by the EU implies that the EU does not regard Türkiye as a candidate for the EU but more as an alliance to cooperate on refugee and economic trade.

On the German side, the EU Council in December 2020 expressed its willingness to provide funding to Türkiye for its continuing cooperation in the refugee field. However, there is much analysis in political circles and mainstream media regarding the political relationship between Ankara and Brussels. As a leader of the EU community and guided by common foreign policy, Germany attaches great importance to integration into the foundation of the European Union: peace and security, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and multilateralism. However, as outlined in the latest election manifesto, Türkiye's continued democratic deficits and centralized dictatorship have prevented Germany from taking a further step in its political relations. All political parties speak in general terms regarding relations between Germany and Türkiye; only the Greens oppose and question the European Commission's decision to suspend the accession of Türkiye to the EU.

It is noteworthy that the SPD remained supportive of the accession issue during the 2017 elections but mentioned it as a non-essential option in 2021 as the winner (Seufert, 2021), choosing to align itself with the previous Merkel-era views on the issue and expressing its strong opposition to Türkiye's accession to the EU. Therefore, German politicians did not state a clear position on the necessity of further strengthening political relations with Türkiye but instead emphatically stated their desire to assist in strengthening economic trade and border security. In parallel, Germany did not evade or deny that Türkiye's sovereign harmful to the rule of law and respect for human rights is not in the common interest of the EU and would only trigger

an Islamic crisis. If the Ankara government continues to ignore political communication, the German government is prepared to replace the democratic deficiencies of Türkiye with an economic and trade-oriented approach rather than developing an appropriate policy for Türkiye to solve the problem.

5.3 Recommendations

In 2015, the Syrian refugee crisis stunned the EU's common refugee system but provided Germany with the image of a world leader with strong leadership and coordination, one with a prominent worldwide position. The ensuing refugee accord of 2016 successfully placed Türkiye and Germany on the global political map. Whether in the 2017 or 2021 German elections or the 2019 Ankara elections, the refugee crisis has altered both nations' political ties and leadership.

Following a comprehensive examination, this report provides some recommendations for the future development of Germany and Türkiye's political ties.

Although Türkiye is not a member of the European Union, connections between Germany and Türkiye should be reinforced in terms of refugee issues and the fight against terrorism and creating mutual trust. This is not only because Türkiye plays a critical role for the EU or Germany but also because Germany and Türkiye have a unique historical foundation that has led to the effective integration of almost three million Turks into German society. Germany must recognize and accept Türkiye's commitment and efforts regarding refugees cordially and deepen the dialogue between the two nations to build confidence.

The German government should contribute to the maintenance of relations between Türkiye and the EU, despite its opposition to the accession of Türkiye to the EU, particularly since the post-Merkel era. However, the bilateral relations between Germany and Türkiye should be reinforced to create positive economic and trade relations for the good of the EU.

Türkiye and Germany are responsible for keeping an eye on the hosting of refugees in their neighbouring countries and taking steps to ease the burden placed on refugees in their adopted countries. In its role as a leading example of good refugee management, Germany is also able to share its experience and policies to assist neighbouring countries in the Middle East to resettle better and manage refugees. Moreover, Germany

will strengthen its position as an influential country in the Middle East while at the same time setting an example of a humanitarian nation by cooperating with Türkiye to manage better and resettle refugees.

The German government should act as a facilitator and moderator. Germany should recognize that Türkiye's weaknesses in democracy and the rule of law may damage EU interests. Therefore, it is essential to remind the administration of Ankara to take the rule of law and democracy seriously and to make constructive proposals. It is essential to protect the freedom of the press and political opinion and to prosecute corruption vigorously. Ankara should be permitted people to express themselves and engage in national activism openly. In addition, as a mediator between Türkiye and France, Cyprus, and Greece, it is essential to remind France that Türkiye has strong commercial and economic relationships with all EU member states and maintains a neutral stance toward Cyprus and Greece in order to preserve good relations.

As previously discussed, the Syrian refugee crisis indeed offers prospects for reducing tensions between the two countries, and again, both sides have shown a willingness to trust one another. However, in the post-Merkel era, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive analysis of the refugee issue or Turkish relations with only brief statements and without more follow-up. It is vital to investigate and discuss this issue in the future. In addition, this paper focuses only on Syrian refugees rather than exploring how Afghan or African refugees affect Turkish-German relations or the economy.

In addition, in the current situation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Syrian refugees are used as an example to divide further the EU's dilemma and turnaround in the face of the refugee influx in Ukraine and to give some suggestions.

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has alarmed surrounding countries and Europe, forcing Ukraine to spark a massive influx of refugees. This is the second mass migration into Europe this century, following the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis (Yilmaz, 2022). According to the UN report, four million Ukrainians have fled to neighbouring European countries such as Poland and Romania to escape the violence. Nevertheless, for specific reasons, most refugees are women and children, and this is a problem for the EU once again (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022). The EU's reaction to the Syrian refugee problem is "different." Since the outset, the EU and the

public have given the most direct and highly united support to the Ukrainian refugees from its members. The Polish state, for example, showed strong opposition and rejection of non-EU refugees, but after the crisis in Ukraine, Poland has shown a warm welcome and willingness to accept only refugees from Ukraine (Martin, 2022). The contrast in attitudes has led directly to accusations of double standards and hypocrisy in the Western media about Ukrainian and Syrian refugees, sparking heated debate and criticism from politicians and figures of "racial bias" in the portrayal of "white refugees" and refugees of colour (Khalid, 2022).

While the EU has responded positively to the Ukraine issue and the enormous number of migrants, the EU has necessitated considering the challenges refugees confront when integrating into their new societies. The Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 may have provided the experience and recommendations for the EU on how to manage the integration of refugees into the labour market, as well as guidance for new refugees in acquiring language and technical proficiency. With the lessons gained from the previous refugee crisis, it can be argued that the EU is fully aware of the challenges it will face after accepting many refugees, such as psychological issues, education for children, language barriers, and how to train refugees to acquire skills effectively. Even if Ukrainian and Syrian refugees are under the temporary protection policy of the EU, there is a high degree of cultural interaction and religious belief integration between the EU and Ukrainian refugees, which is also a great EU inner integration.

At the same time, because of the previous experience with Syrian refugees, the EU has a well-established system and technical support for the orderly movement and effective management of 2 million Ukrainian refugees in just two weeks. The questionable statement that the EU cannot handle more than a million refugees in a few months was dismissed outright. There are three suggestions for this Russian-Ukrainian crisis (Khalid, 2022).

1. The EU should not discriminate and be racist and treat all refugees equally. EU and non-EU citizens should be treated equally to avoid triggering religious and societal tensions and sparking terrorism.

2. Attention should be paid to the psychological changes of Ukrainian refugees, communication and language training should be enhanced, and refugees

should have timely and effective labour information. Allow refugees to integrate better and avoid poverty's detrimental effects

3. EU countries must distribute refugees wisely, rather than the same as Germany's previous policy. This might reduce refugees into a political instrument.



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
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