Governmentality in the context of Japan-Funded Farm-to-Market road (FMR) in Agdangan Quezon Province, Philippines

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Governmentality in the Context of Japan-funded Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) in Agdangan Quezon Province, Philippines

Miss Ma. Josephine Therese Emily Teves

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Development Studies
Common Course
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Chulalongkorn University
Academic Year 2021
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น.ส.มา โจเซฟิน เทเรส เอมิลี่ ทีฟส์

วิทยานิพนธ์นี้เป็นส่วนหนึ่งของการศึกษาตามหลักสูตรปริญญาศิลปศาสตร์ดุษฎีบัณฑิต
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Governmentality in the Context of Japan-funded Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) in Agdangan Quezon Province, Philippines

Abstract

Recent studies have focused on the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in financing infrastructural projects and rural development programs. This study demonstrates how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities facilitated a Japan ODA-funded Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) subproject as a solution aiming to achieve the Agrarian Reform Community’s (ARC) overall poverty reduction and rural economic growth agenda to contribute to this literature. Drawing on Foucault’s governmentality, Escobar’s development discourse, and Li’s “The Will to Improve,” this study shows ODA as an alliance emphasizing power relations and analyzing processes and interactions within the ODA-funded FMR subproject management stages. This study also examines the impact of the completed FMR on project beneficiaries, especially agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs). Finally, it suggests a need for the FMR subproject to foster mutual understanding, beneficial relationships, and more significant advantages among the non-poor sector, such as aid authorities, the poor sector, such as ARBs, clamor for further support to maximize FMR opportunities.
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Ma. Josephine Therese Emily Teves
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ACRONYMS

ARBs: Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
BSP: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
CARP: Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
CPMO: Central Project Management Office
DAR: Department of Agrarian Reform
DAR-FAPsO: DAR- Foreign-Assisted Projects Office
DAR-FAPsO FU: DAR- Foreign-Assisted Projects Office Financial Unit
DAR-PDMS: DAR Project Development Management Staff (PDMS)
DPWH: Department of Public Works and Highways
DPWH CARP-CLBUs: Department of Public Works and Highways-
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program- Central Labor Based- Units
DPWH-DEO: DPWH- District Engineering Office
DAR-MPMO: DAR- Municipal Project Management Office
DAR-PPMO: DAR- Provincial Project Management Office
DPWH-RPMO: DAR- Regional Project Management Office
DAR-FAPsO-PIO: of DAR-FAPsO-Project Implementation Officer
FAPs: Foreign-Assisted Projects
IDP: Indicative Development Plan
JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency
LBP: Landbank of the Philippines
LGU: Local Government Unit
NEDA: National Economic and Development Authority
NEDA-ICC: NEDA- Investment Coordination Committee
NEDA-ICC-CC: NEDA-ICC- Cabinet Committee

NEDA ICC-TB: NEDA-ICC-Technical Board

NGOs: Non-government organizations

POs: Peasant Organizations
Acknowledgments: This study was made possible through the ASEAN Scholarship, Graduate School Thesis Grant, and Support of Overseas Research of Chulalongkorn University and the Faculty of Political Science of Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand. The author wishes to thank her professors, Prof. Teewin Supputikun, Prof. Naruemon Thabchumpon, Prof. Carl Middleton, Prof. Bhanubhatra Jittiang from the Faculty of Political Science of Chulalongkorn University, Prof. Antoinette Raquiza from the University of the Philippines, Prof. Marcus Taylor, Prof. Bernadette Resurreccion, Dean Fahim Quadir from Queens University, and Sarah Grace L. Candelario, MAEd.

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Abstract

Recent studies have focused on the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in financing infrastructural projects and rural development programs. This study demonstrates how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities facilitated a Japan ODA-funded Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) subproject as a solution aiming to achieve the Agrarian Reform Community’s (ARC) overall poverty reduction and rural economic growth agenda to contribute to this literature. Drawing on Foucault’s governmentality, Escobar’s development discourse, and Li’s “The Will to Improve,” this study shows ODA as an alliance emphasizing power relations and analyzing processes and interactions within the ODA-funded FMR subproject management stages. This study also examines the impact of the completed FMR on project beneficiaries, especially agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs). Finally, it argues that while the FMR fostered mutual understanding, beneficial relationships, and more significant advantages among the non-poor sector, such as aid authorities, the poor sector, such as ARBs, clamor for further support to maximize FMR opportunities.

Keywords: Philippines, Japan, Governmentality, Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries, Farm-to-Market Road, Rural Economic Growth Agenda, Poverty reduction, Agriculture
Chapter I. Introduction

Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) charters from 1992 to 2015 are motivated by national interests (i.e., economic and commercial ones) (Menocal, Denney, & Geddes, 2011).\(^1\) It only supports projects likely to align with its interests and finance infrastructure projects in exchange for raw materials, enabling itself to obtain raw materials and stimulate its national interests in ODA relations (Kawai & Takagi, 2004). Purnendra Jain (2014) points out that its ODA discourse tended to skirt around the 'axiomatic relationship' between its development objectives and the pursuit of national interests, emphasizing that its ODA programs are motivated primarily by the self-serving purpose of advancing national interests while also providing their recipients’ development needs.\(^1\) For instance, its ODA allocations are motivated by commercial interests of promoting its recipient’s export-oriented sector, developing the project site, then engaging with trade or importation, so it could access essential raw materials and induce profits for Japanese companies. Likewise, David Potter (2018) presents Japan's White Papers reflecting national interest by employing ODA from a strategic perspective. Most especially in recent years, as Japan's economy remains under stress, some Japanese leaders have publicly acknowledged the primarily self-serving purpose of their ODA.\(^ii\) Japan pursues its national interest by carrying out development theories' vision and ideals, ensuring development practices' continuity, and arranging opportunities to make space for itself in the development discourse.

\(^1\) explicitly state ODA's business and economic interests
The Embassy of Japan shares various reasons for facilitating the ODA policy in the Philippines (Japan's ODA, n.d.). It has consistently used several narratives to be present in the field of development cooperation and emphasizes itself as the Philippines' "big brother," citing altruistic reasons for pursuing the ODA provision. First, it uses the Philippines' low productivity and low international attractiveness narratives, which shows that the Philippines was affected by the Asian Crisis, resulting in low economic growth and uncompetitive domestic businesses. Accordingly, it offers ODA to strengthen the Philippines' economic structure and remove economic growth impediments. Second, it also uses the poverty narrative to show its inclination to help the Philippines eradicate poverty through ODA provisions related to disaster prevention and agricultural productivity enhancement. These narratives demonstrated a situation where there is a country with needs and another country that can accommodate those needs. As a result, Japan has successfully turned itself into the Philippines' emphatic partner for development cooperation.

Japanese and Filipino aid authorities maintain preferential treatment with each other. They conduct simultaneous negotiations and interactions to create an accommodating environment and maximize their interests in achieving their international and domestic goals. They demonstrate their values, objectives, and interests to boost their relationships and align their strategies thru various interventions to satisfy each other's interests and entice future and sustainable partnerships. For example, Filipino aid authorities accommodate Japanese aid authorities to access appropriate funds for development projects. In return, Japanese aid authorities fund the Philippine ODA infrastructure projects because of their business and economic interests, with the project’s immediate and tangible benefits of providing raw materials.
and work for Japanese manufacturing companies and Japanese consultancy companies, respectively. This scenario shows that a mix of developmental and security goals motivated donors and recipients to develop their aligned and sustainable economic cooperation programs. It also explains why donors allocate a disproportionate share of their assistance to recipients and why ODA is deployed as a vital tool for commercial, diplomatic, and development goals.

However, Japanese and Filipino aid authorities’ interactions may involve formal and informal practices that could exacerbate the problem it tries to resolve. For example, their collaboration, compromise, and accommodation may result in adverse societal conditions such as inequitable distribution of project benefits due to the non-poor sector’s unequal asset holding concentration and maneuvering and opportunistic behaviors. They may also make the ODA-funded project process susceptible to donors’ influence through loan conditionalities. Thus, adverse effects may manifest since the governmental capacity is considerably compromised.

Japanese and Filipino aid authorities’ pursuit of their interests in ODA-funded projects may affect project beneficiaries and result in a negligible contribution to the overall welfare. To address the scenario empirically, this study intends to know how a Japan ODA-funded FMR subproject was implemented and impacted its intended project beneficiaries, especially agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs). Since investigating a completed Japan-funded agriculture project is suitable for the study, the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap in Agdangan, Quezon Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) infrastructure project completed in 2014 was selected as the case study. The particular FMR was selected because it represents the Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support
Program III (ARISP III), the first and most extensive and prolonged agriculture sector ODA loan provided by Japan in the Philippines. The study scrutinizes how the aid authorities implement the FMR subproject by analyzing their processes, interactions, and political settlements during the FMR subproject management processes. Specifically, it explores Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' rationalities and implementation dynamics. It also analyzes the perceived subproject's outcome and impacts on the beneficiaries. Finally, recommendations for enhancing the FMR’s governance mechanisms and accompanying agriculture-support projects in the future were created based on the study outcome.

a. **Research Questions**

The research has two main questions. 1) How did Japanese and Filipino aid authorities demonstrate the Silangang Maligaya-­Dayap FMR infrastructure project? It has three sub-­questions:

i. What was the rationale behind Silangang Maligaya-­Dayap FMR infrastructure project?

ii. How did the Japanese and Filipino aid authorities implement the Silangang Maligaya-­Dayap FMR infrastructure subproject? Specifically, what are the processes of community-­level ODA-­funded FMR subprojects, how political settlements and institutional structures facilitate the aid authorities' relationship, and the role of power in preserving that relationship?

iii. What were the outcome indicators achieved in the completed FMR?
2) How did the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR infrastructure project promote its benefits among beneficiaries, particularly ARBs?

b. Arguments

Argument i: The aid authorities’ rationale behind FMR is the poverty reduction and economic growth narratives that manifested a market-oriented discourse in the FMR project management process.

The governmentality approach demonstrates how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities produce and legitimize narratives in pursuing their objectives while exploring their motives in pursuing their political, economic, and business interests. Specifically, it pertains to the art of governing the ARBs and how aid authorities developed the ARBs for agricultural development.

This study represents the use of the governmentality concept, which shows how aid authorities intend the FMR to address the project site’s weak agricultural base and limited agri-industry linkage. For instance, aid authorities' use of poverty reduction and economic growth narratives show their market-oriented inclination to facilitate the FMR infrastructure project. First, they created market linkage to reduce transport costs, stimulate marketing, and increase productivity and income among ARBs by connecting agriculture production areas with valuable and high-value commercial crops and livestock to the market areas. Second, they also pushed for the agriculture sector’s traditional market outlets or value chain development and encouraged industrialization by enabling ARBs to participate and integrate into the market.
Argument ii: The aid authorities’ project management process demonstrates central constructs of development discourse.

Aid authorities facilitated the FMR through a salient transition from inception to maturity stages, also known as the project development cycle or project management process. Specifically, their use of the FMR project management process demonstrated the central constructs of development discourse during the project management process at the national and community-level, such as collaboration, participation, depoliticization, development planning, highway politics, and accountability, based on their interactions and relations within the FMR management process.

Argument iii: The FMR indicators show the project’s performance and success.

In this study, the FMR indicators show that it did not meet its original objectives. Project beneficiaries, such as ARBs, shared that outcome indicators such as the increase in average rice yield, increase in net annual farm income, travel time reduction, and transportation cost savings were insufficient to increase income and improve their productivity, hence ineffective in addressing overall poverty reduction and rural economic growth agenda.

First, the average rice yield (ton/ha) improvement was not proportional to the price increase on input costs and lowball offers among traders and landowner-subcontractor. Second, an increased net annual farm income (pesos/year/household) did not correspond with the price increase on overall production costs. Third, the reduction of travel time and transportation costs did not affect their overall income as most of them could not buy their business transportation. Hence only those who own
transportation gained from the FMR. Fourth, despite FMR investment, nothing significant happened to ARBs, the intended beneficiaries.

**Argument iv:** The more significant market-oriented discourse used in the FMR project management process the more it decreases its effectiveness among its intended beneficiaries, such as ARBs.

The FMR presented itself as a form of aid authorities’ power to facilitate change among project beneficiaries by redistributing its benefits through market participation. For instance, all landowners, landowner-traders, and landowner-subcontractor improved their income and economic status at the expense of ARBs by leveraging their asset holdings and power relations to maximize the FMR opportunities. On the other hand, ARBs and other small farmers did not have material benefits and failed to increase their income and improve productivity due to the unequal market mechanisms that exposed them to oppression, dispossession, and deprivation. For instance, the non-poor sector, such as the traders and subcontractors, executed opportunistic behavior, as demonstrated by weighing losses, price-fixing, and using English contracts, even if it is incomprehensible to the other parties.

FMR's failure to deliver its objectives, address the real problems, and pay attention to the current scenario may speak of a preset and implicit agenda aligned with the primary goal of market expansion—which conflicts or even skews with the needs of ARBs. However, the predominant structural problems (i.e., unbalanced social structure and unequal concentration of asset holdings and land distribution) were unsolved and had an immense bearing on defining how impacts occur in the ARC.

c. Objectives of the Study
i. To examine the rationalizations, interactions, and relations of Japanese and Filipino aid authorities in molding the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR infrastructure project

ii. To assess the impact of the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR infrastructure to project beneficiaries

d. Significance of the Study

Japan is the most active lender in Asia. It funds various sectors, with the most economic infrastructures (51.1%), such as roads, highways, and other infrastructure that promotes economic activities. It also funds social infrastructure (17.1%), industry and other production sectors (16%), program assistance (7.8%), emergency aid (4.8%), and agriculture infrastructure (3.3%) (MOFA, 2016). Its proactive lending activities in the Philippines intend to bring development, infrastructural projects, and foreign capital to create local employment.

Only a few pieces of empirical literature are available in analyzing Philippine-Japan ODA relations. For example, studies have shown that Japan provided 57% of the overall ODA commitments the Philippines received from 1966 to 2016, occupying the top spot of the 2010-2019 Philippine ODA Portfolio as it provided 45 percent of the overall Philippine ODA. On the other hand, the Philippines remained in the top 30 of Japan's bilateral ODA in 2016 and ranked 26th, 3rd, and 8th in grants, technical cooperation, and loan. However, limited studies focused on project-level interactions' critical analysis and politics. Hence, this pioneering study would address this gap by creating an in-depth case study at a community level in analyzing the Philippines-Japan ODA relations in Japan-funded FMR in infrastructure projects.
In International Development Studies, donor-recipient relations and inherent inequality have been sources of concern and debate. In theory, ODA is external support to low-capital states to achieve economic growth, hence should not interfere with recipients' internal affairs. However, donors tend to decide on ODA provisions based on their interests resulting in ODA recipients' unclear ownership. Hence, this study contributes to ODA's ownership paradox scholarship by providing critical evidence of Japan's active role in Philippine-Japan ODA relations in the FMR context-a serious development paradox. For instance, the FMR is a paradox because its ownership is contentious as the donor continues to exercise its influence over the project management guidelines. Specifically, this study analyzes how Japanese actors pursue their economic and business interests and arrange opportunities to consistently make space for themselves at FMR's macro and micro levels using the governmentality approach.

The aid authorities' insufficient attention to the sociopolitical and cultural context of the poor sector, such as ARBs and political structures, and the alienation of the actual beneficiaries in the decision-making processes may affect the project results. They need to be aware of the tactical nature of partnerships with local government units (LGUs) and the risk of neglecting the project if it is no longer the 'apple of their eye.' This study aims to help them understand the processes of community-level ODA-funded subprojects, how political settlements and institutional structures facilitate the aid authorities' relationship, and the role of power in preserving that relationship.

Furthermore, it provides donors with a better understanding of the domestic aid authorities' actions in an ODA-funded project, especially how local politicians
partake in alliances if their interests are parallel with those of the powerful in the community. Lastly, it provides an example of scrutinizing the power relations implied in ODA policies helpful to other ASEAN member states. ODA-funded project benefits tend to accrue with the non-poor sector, even though they are proposed for the poorest.

e. Limitations of the Study

The study focuses on the FMR as an agriculture support service for ARBs in Sildakin ARC, Agdangan, Quezon, Philippines. However, it faces several limitations that should be considered in terms of its generalizability:

First, it only provides recommendations related to FMR projects with vital considerations on the peculiarities of the project site. Second, it only covers a limited sample size among aid authorities involved in the subproject. For instance, Filipino aid authorities in this study only consist of bureaucrats from cabinet-level inter-agency coordination committees called the National Economic and Development Authority- Investment Coordination Committee (NEDA-ICC), project proponent, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), project partner agency Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and local politicians with the 'power of the purse' on the project site. On the other hand, the Japanese foreign aid authorities covered were bureaucrats from Japan International Cooperation Agency Officials (JICA) and project consultants representing the Japanese private sector. Third, it recommends concepts applicable to the peculiarities of FMR in the research project site and the corresponding Philippine-Japan aid authorities relations within the subproject management. Hence, the results may not be conclusive as the applicability of
recommendations only applies to the particularities of the research site. However, some recommendations could also be helpful with other infrastructure projects.

f. Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

This section presents the concepts used and their intended relationships in this study. It includes detailed discussions on how various theories were used to demonstrate how the Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborate to direct systematic improvements among their project beneficiaries and how their practices may result in negligible contributions to their overall welfare.

The theoretical framework uses three theories to show how the Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' ODA projects were used in the development discourse by improving the project beneficiaries' income and productivity. The study encompasses theories such as Arturo Escobar's development discourse, Michel Foucault's governmentality, and Tania Murray Li's The Will to Improve framework.

First, Arturo Escobar's (1995) development discourse framework refers to the process of articulating knowledge and power through which particular concepts, theories, and practices for social change are created and reproduced. In his words, Escobar stated that "this move (the development discourse) entails specific constructions of the “colonial and Third World subject” in discussion in ways that allow the exercise of power over the other," which relates to how development narratives, in terms of knowledge and power, were used to justify policy interventions.

The framework focuses on the details of interactions and relationships hence its suitability to explain how aid authorities arranged opportunities to include themselves in the development cooperation process and shaped ARBs' willingness to
be governed within the shared interests of improving their lives. Furthermore, it draws on the development discourse framework to analyze how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' ODA rationale and interactions between and among project actors affected the central constructs of development (e.g., poverty, country ownership, participation).

Second, Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality pertains to “conduct of conduct,” or the art of governing where the government has a wide range of control measures (Burchell et al., 1991). In his essays on Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault refers to governmentality as an activity that undertakes the conduct of individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and what happens to them (Foucault, 1997, p.68).vii Governmentality pertains to how governments and other actors use knowledge and discourses to create policies that control and produce subjectivities in which the subject is willing to be governed (Bevir, 2010).

Foucault’s concept of governmentality focuses on the relational conceptualization of power, hence presenting its relevance in the study to understand how FMR presents itself as a form of power to change the behavior, knowledge, attitude, skills, aspirations, economic and social conditions, and asset holdings among project beneficiaries. Within the governmentality approach, the FMR is perceived as an attempt by the Japanese and Filipino aid authorities (i.e., governors) to shape and direct project beneficiaries (i.e., governed) behavior to achieve their overarching economic growth and poverty reduction objectives.

Tania Murray Li's (2007) The Will to Improve framework refers to persistent determination to improve people's conditions and conducts (Kumar,2021). Her
framework is suitable for study in several ways. First, it helps analyze the FMR project management process and its impact on project beneficiaries by demonstrating how the FMR is entangled with formal and informal practices and knowing the difference between FMR’s plan and what it has accomplished. According to Foucault, as Tania Murray Li narrated, practices are fragments of reality. They "induce a whole series of effects in the real, crystallize into institutions and act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things (Li, 2007). Lastly, it also scrutinizes how FMR reduced socio-political issues in mere technical and apolitical terms and failed to consider core political-economic questions.

This study reflects on Li’s Will to Improve framework to examine the operations of governmentality in attempting to modernize the agriculture sector through FMR and to provide an approach to how authorities assume their authority and commitment to developing and improving overall welfare.

These theories fit the study for the following reasons; First, they explain how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities’ framed the problem and aligned with their rationale of improving ARBs' income and productivity to push for their interests. Second, they give specific attention to the informal and formal practices during FMR project management processes that could explain the inevitable gap between the desired FMR's plan and what was accomplished.

On the other hand, the conceptual framework explains various concepts in the theoretical framework used and their anticipated relationships. It shows aid authorities’ practices in the FMR to reduce poverty and promote economic growth discourses as problems that could be framed within a common language to make a governmental solution possible.
Using Foucault's governmentality framework, Nikolai Rose & Paul Miller systematized the mode of analysis on governing economic life and problematics of the government (Miller & Rose). They share that within governmentality, conduct is perceived as being susceptible to regulation, controlling, shaping, and turning to specific objectives related to governmentality's programmatic character. In studying political power, they share three distinct aspects of the problematization process of the government, such as rationalities, programs, and technologies. These analytical levels form the framework are used in the study as seen in Figure 1:

![Figure 1: Conceptual Framework](image)

The definition of terms used in the conceptual framework are as follows:

1. Problematizing Process: This approach assumes that problems must be constructed and made visible (Rose & Miller, 1992). It shows how problematic conduct is created and made thinkable through discourse to make an identified problem amenable to technologies or interventions. The problematizing processes lead to the specific conceptualization, which involves investigating how problems of poverty and economic growth related to ARBs were constructed, made visible, and addressed.
2. Rationalities: This term refers to the idealized representation of the world, voiced out in ethical imperatives by making problems thinkable. Rose & Miller (1992) identified its main characteristics as moral, epistemological, and articulated in a distinctive idiom. The study's rationalities relate to poverty reduction and economic growth promotion narratives. The arrow refers to the process of converting it to programs, which could be framed within a common language to make the technology or the actual governmental solution or intervention possible.

3. Programs: This concept refers to approaches governing authorities in guiding people toward the constructed rationalities. It seeks to govern people's behavior in ways thought desirable by the governor, links rationalities with technologies and makes problems responsive to technologies/interventions. In this study, it refers to the link improvement between the production areas and markets to reduce poverty and promote economic growth. The arrow refers to converting it to actual technology and intervention.

4. Technologies: These terms pertain to actual mechanisms, also known as interventions, through which authorities have sought to shape and instrumentalize the conduct to achieve the desired objectives. Rose & Miller (1992) stipulate that it represents a complex assemblage of diverse forces that ensure that decisions are implemented within the governor's criteria. It refers to the informal and formal practices aid authorities conduct to implement the FMR project in this study.

5. Technologies' Effects: This relates to the impact of technologies. In this study, it refers to the impact of FMR on its beneficiaries
The conceptual framework above shows the recipient and donor aid authorities’ inclination to problematize and shape knowledge and objects to produce and legitimize discourses in the FMR project management process. For instance, the framework intends to demonstrate how aid authorities interact in reframing the problems and facilitating technical and apolitical interventions aligned with their interests. Furthermore, it explains the processes and actors in the FMR project, provides an understanding of interests, processes, and interactions among aid authorities, and identifies impacts to project beneficiaries. This study merits careful reflection within the development studies field as it analyzes development discourses as part of a systematic political economy that shapes ODA relations.

**g. Literature Review**

The literature review provides critical sources for this study's two main concepts: ODA and FMR infrastructure projects. First, it provides an overview of the literature regarding the ODA projects in general and the FMR subproject in particular. Second, it discusses four (4) main sections: ODA background, the ODA debate, ODA motivations, and ODA project assessments. The last part pertains to FMR as an infrastructure development priority within the scope of current ODA projects.

**I. ODA Background:**

ODA is a set of interventions designed to enhance recipient countries' socioeconomic and political development. It is aid from donors to recipients in terms of finance and investment cooperation, grants, or disaster relief from donors to recipients. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) conceptualized the term in 1969 to streamline aid flow and highlight its official and concessional portions. OECD-DAC describes it
as a financial flow promoting low- and middle-income economies' development and welfare. It is concessional (e.g., grants and soft loans) and usually course through government-to-government fund transfers, while minimal amounts are course through non-government organizations (NGOs). OECD-DAC members allocated 0.7% of their gross national income to ODA and provided necessary aid to 150 recipient states with per capita incomes below USD 12,000 in 2010. The Philippines adopted the ODA-OECD definition. The Philippine Republic Act No. 8182, also known as the ODA Act of 1996, stipulates that the ODA proceeds shall attain equitable growth and development through priority interventions. This research focuses on Japan's bilateral ODA loans in the Philippines. Specifically, it is interesting to see how project implementors and beneficiaries perceive ODA-funded FMR existence, as there is no generally accepted notion of how beneficiaries feel and see development projects.

I.a. ODA Debate:

The ODA debate has two significant sides held by its supporters and critics. Supporters see it as an aid to developing states, while critics recognize it as a form of development apparatus that benefits few and elite members of society.

i. Favoring ODA

ODA plays a significant role in development discourse by creating nation-states after colonialism and shaping international power relations. Economically, it provides external support to low-capital states to achieve self-sustaining development. It is supported by Walt Rostow’s modernization theory and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s Big Push hypothesis, which stipulate that developing countries need a “push” through external and additional investments in various sectors of the economy to attain economic growth.
Rostow’s modernization theory pertains to a development that connotes growth and material well-being on a linear path (Rostow, 1973). First, it works on the assumption that traditional societies could achieve development through a strong relationship and assistance from Western countries and their allies. Second, it is aligned with the diffusion theory that former colonies, also known as developing countries, can only develop through exposure to the same growth dynamics developed countries had. Third, it is assumed as a psycho-cultural change as it works on the assumption that developing countries could replace traditional values with modern ones and follow the same growth dynamics that European countries had after World War II. Fourth, the concept of modernization uses the development discourse to create contingent convergence between recipients and donors to mainstream both informal and formal development agendas. Finally, it is a complex sociopolitical relationship characterized by power relations with strategic actors demonstrating systemic interdependence and particularistic interests operating within the complex global financial system. In this theory, ODA became a tool for predicting and managing developing countries' economic transformation. It reduced development discourse into a technical and scientific practice that can only be evaluated and handled by authorities and experts and employed a top-down approach executed by the bureaucrats between the West and developing countries. For instance, the US used the successful results of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe reconstruction to encourage developing countries to pursue development by transforming from traditional society to modernity.

Moreover, Farah Abuzei (2009) supports Paul Rosenstein-Rodan's Big Push hypothesis, which states that developing countries need a "push" through external and
additional investments in various sectors of the economy to create an efficient infrastructure that expands the domestic market for domestically produced goods. However, due to risk-averse investors and imperfect international finance markets, developing countries cannot attract investments nor borrow from global markets. Since then, ODA has become a tool to overcome the financing gap. Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout (1968) assume that it provides additional resources to facilitate economic growth in several ways. For instance, it expands funding resources that improve investments, savings, and capital accumulation. It also increases sector-specific technical assistance funds, programs, and projects that allow recipient countries to mobilize domestic and foreign-funded investments, eventually leading to recipients’ economic growth, self-sufficiency, and expansion. Jeffrey Sachs (2008) believes that ODA is a tool for solving developing countries' economic needs by encouraging capital accumulation and socioeconomic growth. Finally, Girijasankar Mallik (2008) endorses ODA to fund productive sectors advantageous and needed for economic growth.

ii. Critiquing ODA

ODA has been critiqued on various levels. Globally, it is denounced for upholding the capitalist system's world economic order. For instance, it supports the concept of trusteeship by claiming that authentic development is based on developed countries' experiences, experts' general views, and maternal attitudes. Relatively, it influences recipients' socio-political and economic judgments conditioned by donors' economic capability embedded in a larger political hierarchy, constructing hegemony historically contingent and dependent on power relations and reflecting the environment's social, political, and economic conditions.
For some institutions, such as World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), ODA becomes policy-based lending aimed at subjecting recipients to the free-market paradigm and transforming its political and economic structures. For instance, before giving ODA, or structural adjustment loans (SALs), the WB demanded that borrowers pursue policies that pursue market forces and minimal state intervention. Hence, this scenario emphasizes the needs and peculiarities of various institutions to incorporate rational values and norms and shows another technic to control and manage developing states. First, this scenario shows that the external view of an agency of higher-level authority would be an excellent perspective for attaining economic growth and development. Second, it intends to legitimize colonialism as a trustee to advance the races and develop resources. For instance, scholars such as Teresa Hayter and Catherine Watson (1985), Mann & Poulantzas (1977), and Louis Althusser (1969) perceive it as an attempt by the “First World” to preserve the capitalist system in the "Third World" by providing the regimes and elite with resources needed to exploit the poor continuously. Hayter and Watson (1985) suppose that ODA is an imperialist conspiracy that rewards recipient states' political, economic, and bureaucratic elites for agreeing to exploit their resources. Cowen and Shenton (1996) denote that the scene still exists today as part of the discussion of development aid and other agencies implementing “development” projects with specific ends.

On a bilateral level, leftist critics see ODA as a soft option that alters the recipient’s development process due to wealth polarization towards elites by supporting and encouraging their activities. It becomes a temporary substitute resource that benefits the non-poor sector. John White (1974) describes it as either a
soft option that pushes for the relaxation of domestic investment export or a distortion of market forces.\textsuperscript{xvi} On the other hand, Keith Griffin & John Enos (1974) believe that aid authorities' savings mobilized through the rich's domestic taxation would be more productive if ODA were unavailable due to its adverse impacts on growth and inequitable redistribution effects among the non-poor sector. \textsuperscript{xvii} Therefore, critics oppose its existence, as donors and recipients enjoy a conducive mutual alliance, resulting in an inequitable distribution of benefits towards the non-poor sector and has become a technical and scientific practice that could be handled only by donors, development experts, and bureaucracy for controlling and managing recipients' social, political, and economic transformations. Hence, the poor sector bears the modernization or development costs while the non-poor sector realizes the gains, showing its shortcoming focus on the economic side rather than including the ODA's socio-political issues.

I.b. ODA Motivations

i. General Motivations of ODA Provision

Donors’ motivations, such as national interests, commercial considerations, historical affinity, political motives, and humanitarian acts, affect ODA provision. Academics use International Relations (IR) approaches (e.g., realism, liberalism, and constructivism) to explain various motivations. The first proposes including ODA as part of their national interests (e.g., defense, economic or political motives). In contrast, the second assumes that ODA improves recipients' socioeconomic and political development (e.g., humanitarian motive). Finally, the third surmises that it is a versatile and flexible foreign policy tool to prioritize and intensify the donor's status.
and influence, making it susceptible to the donor's interests depending on the prevailing framework and scenario.

Realist: The realist approach shows ODA as a policy tool that started during the Cold War to influence recipients' socio-political judgments. This approach presupposes that donor-states are the main actors pursuing these goals and are accountable for securing their international and national interests. Hence, they protect their security, act to pursue their own national and political interests, and expect security or economic-related returns to their investment.

Alfred Maizels and Machiko Nissanke's (1984) analysis of bilateral and multilateral ODA flows of 80 developing countries in 1969-1970 and 1978-1980 demonstrates that bilateral ODA is designated based on the perceived donor's economic, political, and security interests. Robert Gilpin (1987) asserts that "the primary motives ODA donors have been political, military, and commercial." Steven Hook (2015) defines ODA as money transferred from rich states to poor ones in concessional terms and shares that ODA practices are motivated by national interest. Likewise, Steven Hook & Guang Zhang (1998) expounds that Japan's ODA allocations are inspired by its interests rather than alleviating the recipients' economic conditions.

Japan's diplomacy is a clear example of this paradigm. It uses ODA to display national interests with commercial and mercantilist motives by securing natural resources, promoting its business interests and open markets, and maintaining strategic and comprehensive security. Muhindo Mughanda (2011) analyzes that this paradigm highlights the centrality of ODA relations' economic interests. His study includes concepts about the role of capitalist exploitation in encouraging elites on
both donor and recipient sides to take a proactive part. He demonstrates the highly exploitative North-South relationships that either preserve or widen economic disparities between wealthy states and Third World countries.\textsuperscript{xxiii}

Liberalist: The Liberalist approach assumes that ODA is a set of programmatic measures to enhance recipients' socioeconomic and political development (Hattori, 2001).\textsuperscript{xxiv} This approach shows ODA relations as a product of mutual interests beneficial in achieving economic growth. For instance, Guy Arnold (1985) interprets that mutual interests could help developing states reach their preconditions for the economic takeoff stage to facilitate the enhancement of their standards of living, expansion of their infrastructure, the formation of their industrial sectors, and establishment of their social services, which would help consolidate their development.\textsuperscript{xxv} A.J. Pierre and David Lumsdaine (1993) confer how moral values could change the tenor of international affairs by explaining ODA's roots and evolution. They explain that ODA is pursued for humanitarian reasons, not by interest.\textsuperscript{xxvi} Finally, Carol Lancaster (2007) provides a constructivist definition of ODA as a relation between rich and developing countries wherein the former should help the latter achieve economic development.\textsuperscript{xxvii} Its distributive aspect presents ODA as a resource that could alleviate developing countries' current situation through income transfer from developed ones. Its allocative aspect suggests that ODA smoothen and creates recipients' capital investment and loan finance environment. Finally, its stabilizing aspect demonstrates that ODA could supplement aggregate demand and increase employment.\textsuperscript{xxviii}

Constructivism: The constructivist approach believes that ODA’s objectives change over time due to prevailing circumstances. This approach assumes that donors
have flexible objectives guided by the international norm to create a specific identity, intensify their status reputation, influence their targeted regions, and maximize their soft power by advantageously distributing their ODA to recipient states.

Donors assume that ODA is valuable for creating relations with developing states. For instance, they give ODA due to several conditions such as security or economic interest to sustain liberal democratic order or for other ideal reasons such as enhancing their international status. Unfortunately, the multidimensionality of the concept of "interest" makes it difficult to know the real motivation. On the other hand, the recipients use their negotiation, bargaining, and manipulation skills to persuade donors. Understanding Japan's basis could eventually change, improve, or maintain existing relations, and it would be worthwhile to identify its overall paradigm in the ODA provision.

II. FMR

FMR is an infrastructure development priority within the scope of current ODA infrastructure projects. Its official goal is to provide access for agricultural producers, especially for the market entry of smallholders, while simultaneously easing the flow of goods and services to formerly isolated rural regions. It is an infrastructure development priority as it gives access to both markets for agricultural output and input, especially for the market entry of smallholders, hence, intensifying the exchange of goods and services. Lastly, it allows manageable, efficient, and diversified input and output markets (Jari & Fraser, 2009)

FMR proponents argue that it increases market opportunities for rural producers who can utilize improved connectivity to avail themselves of new markets in urban centers. Koch & Movenzadeh (1979) reflect older assertions that promoting
road building as part of rural development objectives can improve target populations’ productivity, employment, and income. They use five criteria for evaluating rural road projects using technical terms: economic benefits, costs, distribution, accessibility to social services, and employment. Ulimwengu & Funes (2009) and van de Walle (2002) use quantitative methods to show that FMR encourages agricultural development. The former uses Geographic Information System (GIS)-based data to evaluate the impact of market access on agricultural and rural development (ARD), while the latter utilizes data to create measures of poverty, inaccessibility, and economic potential of the research sites. Jouanjean (2013) on the other hand, uses hybrid road investment appraisal methods combining the usual cost-benefit methods with cost-effectiveness calculations that include determinants such as geographic, community, and household factors – explaining the variations in the impact of rural road rehabilitation on market development in rural Vietnam. Gerbremedhin & Moti (2010) show, via an empirical model, that FMR reduces marketing costs, thus encouraging market participation that utilizes the determinants of market orientation of households in their crop choice and crop output as sellers and input markets as buyers.

Accordingly, Lokesha & Mahesha (2016) share that FMR investments facilitate rural growth and poverty reduction initiatives by linking communities and agricultural fields to the central transport system and markets. Gilbert Llanto (2011) stipulates that high-quality road improvements expand opportunities for rural producers to utilize improved connectivity to avail themselves of new markets in urban centers at the local level. Therefore, FMRs are suggested to be more favorable for poverty reduction planning than investments in the national road network alone.
Both studies use the qualitative method by facilitating documental analysis in articles and manuals. Khandker (2011) shows that FMR could also improve farmers’ productivity, employment, and income by 10 percent. He uses a household survey and dynamic panel model to estimate the returns of public road investments. Furthermore, Casaburi et al. (2012) and Dercon et al. (2009) recognize FMR as farmers’ tools to reduce travel fares, increase travel speed, and enable smallholders to drastically reduce the input costs of fertilizers, seeds, and extension services. Both use quantitative methods, wherein the former uses Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to measure changes in prices and transport costs, while the latter uses generalized methods of moments using longitudinal household survey data.

However, not all analysts are in favor of FMR's benefits. Several studies raise concerns about how infrastructure projects in general – and the FMR in particular – are prone to elite capture and provide insufficient benefits to improve income and productivity among marginal groups. For example, Jacoby's (1998) research in Nepal indicates that, although FMR-type projects could benefit poor households, they were ultimately inadequate to drastically reduce income inequality as their benefits accrued more to wealthy landowners. He uses the distributional consequences of rural roads using the qualitative nonparametric method to estimate the household-specific benefits from road projects using the information on the value of farmland and distance to agricultural markets. Lyngby (2008) stipulates that FMR promotes material inequality, with landowners and political elites benefitting from the right-of-way (ROW) compensation payments and taking the risk of elite capture over the project development process. Lyngby uses multivariate regression analysis and national household data on the period 1998-2005, which contain general survey
information about the state of rural roads to examine to what degree rural roads influence several socioeconomic factors in Nicaragua.

Furthermore, Dasgupta & Beard (2007) express that it presents unequal benefits due to elite capture in community-level planning and governance. They use a case study analysis of a community-driven poverty alleviation project in Indonesia via focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, and structured and unstructured household and individual questionnaires. Lastly, Anton Lucas (2016) presents an aid authorities capture scenario in Sumatra, Indonesia, wherein official development assistance (ODA) benefits were rechanneled to village elites while demanding kickbacks and illegal payments in a development project. He surveyed 40 households and covered basic demographic and socioeconomic information for each household, probing attitudes toward local government and natural resource management issues and assessing levels of participation in decision-making and conservation and development program interventions. Moreover, he also uses in-depth interviews with key informants representing the community's range of social groups and leadership positions.

The study provides an opportunity to investigate issues and challenges with a completed FMR that has not yet received sufficient attention in the Philippine infrastructure literature. It also intends to contribute to these debates through an in-depth case study of an ODA-funded FMR project in Agdangan Quezon, Philippines. Drawing upon qualitative methods and a close analysis of project planning documentation and community-based observation demonstrates how various aid authorities and stakeholders interacted during the FMR subproject management
stages. It sheds light upon the uneven impacts of the completed FMR among ARBs. The study argues that by using governmentality analysis, the FMR fostered mutual understanding and beneficial relationships among aid authorities. As a result, the non-poor sector accrued advantages while ARBs clamored for further support to maximize FMR benefits. It also promotes the growing literature on the interactions and processes in an FMR subproject management and the impacts of a completed FMR on the poor sector.

Chapter II. Historical and Conceptual Backgrounds

This chapter presents an overview of the historical and conceptual background of the FMR development project and the Philippine and Japanese relations in development cooperation. For instance, the first part deals with the transition from war reparations toward systematic ODA provisions in the Philippines. The second part concentrates on the Philippine presidents’ FMR narratives, vision, and development ideals. In support of the Philippine presidents' narratives, Japanese aid authorities were constantly present across the political landscape and strategically
aligned their ODA provisions to the country's needs. Finally, the third part discusses the interests, relationships, tactics, practices, and cooperative mechanisms that sustain governmentalities in the Philippine-Japan ODA relation.

a. Historical Background

a.1. Japan's Impetus for ODA Provision

Japan’s ODA is motivated by its pursuit of economic and strategic goals, as shared by various Japanese academicians. It uses ODA to lessen its vulnerability to resource inadequacy, foreign critique, and shifts in the “international economic climate.” Along with trade and investment, it also utilizes ODA to create an “honored place” in the international system, as evidence of the relationship between its aid-giving and its national image.

Masahiro Kawai and Shinji Takagi (2004) share that Japan's ODA national objectives, such as economic and commercial objectives, are its leading motivation for giving aid. They believe that Japan uses ODA to secure sources of raw materials for its industry, promote Japanese business interests, and open markets for its exports. Alina Menocal, Lisa Denney, and Matthew Geddess (2011) agree that the Japanese government considers ODA necessary in its foreign policy as an alternative compensation for those states affected by World War II (WWII) and a gift to win back confidence and trust in Japan. Further, they share that Japan considers it an economic and business interest and part of its strategic post-war development trajectory. Similarly, Elyzabeth Cureg and Maricris Santos (2012) share that Japan's ODA was driven due to security reasons, mercantilism, and the ambition to be a regional leader when it started making dollar targets because its ODA has increased steadily since 1977. The ODA annual report of the Economic Cooperation
Bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ECBMFA) (1994) exhibits the so-called "economic and business interests" objective that creates long-term commercial interests and indirect benefits. Japan assumes that ODA and diplomatic efforts would boost friendly bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{xxii} In return, domestic business pressures secure considerable aid to advance its geo-economic interests (Trinidad,2017). Hence, the combination of trade, ODA, and investment remains a prominent feature of Japan's ODA policy from the 1960s onwards.\textsuperscript{xxiii}

\textbf{a.2. Japan ODA's Expansion in Southeast Asia}

Keiko Hirata (2002) shares Japan ODA's history into distinctive phases from the 1950s until 2000. The first period is the Japanese economy-first policy (the 1950s-1964) (Yoshida Doctrine Period). The second is the beginning of ODA ASEAN expansion, diversification, and politicization (1974 - the 1980s) (Fukuda Doctrine Period), while the third is the further diversification and politicization of the ODA (the late 1980s - 2000).\textsuperscript{xxiv} Finally, the fourth part pertains to a discussion regarding 2000 and beyond and shows how it maintains and expands its national interests. These periods show that Japan believes that initial reparations and ODA are the way to improve its status in international society, normalize its diplomatic ties, and pursue economic development.

The first period of expansion pertains to the Yoshida Doctrine period. In 1954, Japan signed the Agreement on Reparations and Economic Cooperation in allegiance with Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, and the Federated States of Micronesia as mandated in the Colombo Plan and San Francisco Treaty.\textsuperscript{xxv} Due to prevailing anti-Japanese sentiments, because of their participation and military alliance with Germany and Italy to facilitate "New Order in
Greater East Asia during World War II, across Southeast Asia (SEA), Japan followed low-profile diplomacy toward alignment with the international community (Iokibe, 2016). Makoto Iokibe (2016) argues that Japan's role as a US representative in SEA was to respond to burden-sharing in Asia, repress growing communist resurgences resist gravitation, and create proactive mechanisms aligned with Western geopolitical objectives. Back then, Prime Minister Yoshida (1954) envisions the SEA as Japan's potential market and natural frontier. He reinforced that SEA was a potential market for its economic and business interest expansion, and its cooperation is aligned with the Income-Doubling Plan.

The subsequent period (1974–1980) marked the beginning of ODA expansion, diversification, and politicization (Fukuda Doctrine Period). The Japanese economic cooperation policy started in 1958 when it provided the first yen-tied loans and secured commercial markets in India's domestic industries. Then, it was primarily led by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), currently known as the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).

ODA became a vital tool to assist Japanese heavy industry firms in finding large markets in Asia and was essential to promoting Japan's export-based growth. During the Fukuda Doctrine Period, Japan's ODA increased in the Philippines due to Japan-Philippine bilateral relations following the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation ratification in 1973. The first yen credit in the Philippines commenced in 1971 and was allocated for infrastructure development, contributing to the construction of dams, irrigation, public school buildings, FMRs, and energy production.
Japan expanded its ODA in SEA and became a member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). Through time, Japan recognized the positive impacts of this cooperation and actively extended yen loans to other Asian countries in the 1960s to secure raw materials and expand its export promotion policy. Jain (2014) explains how Japan started ODA provisions with economic and commercial objectives targeting Asian nations. In 1958, Japan provided a high-interest rate ODA loan to India and Pakistan through Japan Export-Import Bank as it assumed that the recipients’ abundant iron ore reserves would boost the development of its steel industry, signifying reciprocity in such interaction. The Japan-India trade relationship expanded as India’s share grew from 2.6 percent of Japan’s total requirements in 1950 to 14.5 percent in 1959 (Jain, 2017). Alan Rix (2010) stipulates that one of the manifestations of its interests is the use of the concept of "Keizai kyoryoku" (economic cooperation), denoting reparations, technical collaboration, and Japanese companies' assistance in official documents. In this partnership, there is an assumption of reciprocity, wherein recipients would supply raw materials and develop economically to receive Japanese investments, goods, and services. The request-based policy benefitted Japanese companies by including them in the system, creating economically attractive projects and commercial opportunities. Likewise, Carol Lancaster (2007) observes that Japanese construction, engineering, and consulting companies facilitated ODA projects, promoting Japan's business and economic interests. In addition, Kazuo Sumi (1990) discusses that though Japan's emphasis is on ODA's humanitarian aspect, it is still driven by business and economic interests, so its ODA brings returns for Japanese companies.
The third expansion pertains to ODA's further diversification and politicization (the late 1980s-2000). The fall of the Soviet Union enabled Japan to open its ODA programs to other emerging recipient states as it supported Central Asian republics such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Cambodia. As a result, it expanded and remained a significant ODA provider in the 1990s, with Asia receiving a considerable percentage at 98.2 percent of Japan's bilateral ODA, while Africa received the least.

Japan implemented two (2) ODA Charters in 2003 and 2015. The latest was entitled Development Cooperation Charter 2015. It emphasizes that the national interest includes the prosperity of the Japanese people. Misako Kaji (2018) argues that although the current charter has a broader reach than previous ones, the pursuit of economic and business interests is still explicitly stated as the main objective of cooperation. Japan's Task Force on External Relations and prominent business circles advocated strengthening ODA and national interests' linkage, which created the "Special Term for Economic Partnership (STEP)," a tied ODA loan for promoting Japan's comparative advantage in technology. In addition, it enhanced its domestic companies' business opportunities by encouraging consultancy firms to participate in various processes involved in ODA projects.

Japanese companies always win the international bid procurement process due to untied loans. In this case, the bidding procurements are inclined toward Japanese goods and services, as the recent charter highlights the preference for Japanese standards (e.g., quality infrastructure, quality growth, and quality partnership) for ODA projects' technology, design, and construction processes, therefore, it facilitates increased business and economic opportunities for Japanese companies. These
pronouncements support the idea that economic and business interests were still the ODA’s primordial objective during this period.

The table below shows Japanese lending activities in Southeast Asia. The Philippines has consistently received ODA, while Indonesia and Vietnam were the top recipients.

Table 1: Japan's ODA in Southeast Asia from 1985 to 2017

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Based on Japan’s Official Development Assistance to the Philippines (Trinidad, 2021) and Japan White Paper

The Philippines' economic stability is essential for Japan's freedom of navigation and geostrategic goals (Trinidad, 2007). Therefore, Japan's lending activities in the Philippines intend to bring development, infrastructural projects, and foreign capital to generate local employment. As a result, it provided the Philippines with $9.9 billion in ODA loans between 1960 and 2019, higher by 39 percent compared to the United States during the same period (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,2019).

a.3. History of Japan's ODA and FMR Investments in the Philippines

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2 limited to grants, technical assistance, and loan parts of the Japan ODA
FMR is part of the aid authorities, particularly the Philippine president's agricultural development strategy. It is incorporated in the national development plans wherein the words FMRs, rural roads, and feeder roads were used interchangeably. A review of various Philippine development plans shows that current and past government administrations facilitated FMR to increase farmers' income and harness farm-level productivity. However, issues regarding FMRs' political patronage, induced cost overruns, and minimal benefits were recurring.

The discussion below shows that the president's FMR initiatives and consistent discourse on market-oriented agricultural development and private investment-conducive environment shaped the FMR evolution in the Philippines.

**FMR Projects in the Philippines**

This part provides an overview of the FMR projects in the Philippines from 1986 to 2016 and deals with aid authorities' relations and interactions in the Philippines-Japan ODA relations. It uses Escobar's (1995) developmental discourse in scrutinizing authorities’ varying road initiatives and their consistent development discourse on pursuing market-oriented agricultural development and a private investment-conducive environment. It shaped the FMR development in the Philippines as Crawford (2000) describes authorities as those in power as shapers of politics who invest their emotions and passions into their development strategies.

This section also shows Philippine presidents' narrative framing to include FMR in the development discourse envisioned in their State of the Nation Address (SONA) and development plans. However, on the other hand, it also contains how Japan ensures continuity of development practices and ideals and makes space for itself as the Philippines' "big brother" through ODA provision.
FMR projects at the Onset of the Comprehensive *Agrarian Reform Program*  
(CARP)

President Corazon's national development strategy plan (1987-1992) reflected her narratives that FMRs are necessary and sufficient conditions to facilitate market-oriented agricultural development. During her term, she approved the Comprehensive *Agrarian Reform Program* (CARP) as part of the agrarian reform program, which now includes reforms on lands planted with rice, corn, coconut trees, and sugar cane, with less than half of the target farmer-beneficiaries benefitted (de Lataillade et al., 2006).\[^{xlvii}\] As part of strengthening her CARP’s land reform program, she also facilitated other agricultural support services and envisioned the FMR as significant support for agricultural production; her 1988 SONA pronouncements showed her inclination to pursue it as a development program for multifunctional road use in an agricultural landscape, to wit:

... entire road network will be all-weather... a multipurpose concrete road in each of the 46,000 barangays [village] in the country, serving not only as a road but as a grain drying surface; a recreation area as the first solid evidence in these difficult to reach places ... (Aquino, C., 1988, para. 62)

Further, she said that FMRs served as a vital linkage in facilitating spatial integration in products and factors, reducing growth gap, and strengthening sectoral connections, to wit:

... The government has improved or constructed 1,124 kilometers of major roads and 7,821 kilometers of secondary and feeder roads to bring markets and producers closer... (Aquino, C.,1989, para. 30)
Though she initially recognized the importance of agrarian reform as a development strategy for the country’s rehabilitation, her administration faced several challenges in implementing her agrarian reform program. First, it lacked clear-cut guidelines addressing land-use conversion challenges while minimal efforts were exerted to prevent land conversion. Second, it had a minuscule budget due to low remittances from the Asset Privatization Trust and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, with only 8.78 percent of the overall budget devoted to the agrarian reform fund (Ballesteros et al., 2018). For instance, she allocated PhP 50 billion; however, only PhP 24.01 Billion was made available (Leones & Moreno, 2011). Third, it experienced constant changes in DAR leadership, which resulted in a lack of continuity of priority programs and projects related to support services. Fourth, it lacked political will, leadership, and genuine commitment to implement agrarian reform (Wurfel, 1989). However, the main challenge lies in land ownership. Most peasants do not own the land they till. Instead, they have to fork out a significant portion of their harvest to their landlord, who mostly has little or no input into the land. According to Padilla (1988), tenancy problems were still an issue of which 1.6 million families directly engaged in crop farming, 35 percent tilled lands of less than one hectare, five percent had farms of over five hectares, and 43 percent were leaseholder tenants. On the other hand, Padilla (1988) also mentioned that World Bank Professor Roy Prosterman, who designed the US-sponsored land reform program of South Vietnam and El Salvador, called CARP an “unworkable program” and an “accord of the elite” as the government is a middleman between the landowner and farmer during acquisition which distorts the land market and makes it financially expensive.
Japan's ODA became part of agrarian reform initiatives as it cushioned the Philippines from the impact of economic recession (Burges, 1986) and funded support services for CARP initiatives. It provided commodity and infrastructure loans to support CARP beneficiaries, stimulate regional economic growth and transform the involved Philippine provinces into export-oriented foreign direct investment hubs. As a result, the Philippines accumulated US 4098.51M ODA investments, of which the majority was allocated to the transportation sector (e.g., roads, FMRs, etc.). It also supported President C. Aquino's regional development strategies by funding Rural Roads Program to reduce interregional growth gaps and strengthen sectoral linkages in transporting products from excess production areas to those with a deficit. For instance, it supported the Philippines' region IV-A to pursue an Agro-modernization strategy to capacitate the non-urban growth corridor and the resource subregion to focus on commercial farming of high-value crops and undergo sustained food and raw material production requirements in the growth corridor.

Unfortunately, these interventions were limited in addressing smallholder farmers' challenges; poverty, income inequality, and skewed land ownership among farmers were still unaddressed under her administration (Quinlan, 1992). Moreover, the income disparity widened as the top 10 percent earned an average income 19 times larger than the bottom 10 percent of the population in 1994.

President Corazon Aquino's FMR projects only intensified the landlord's power and failed to exert political will to address the needs of Filipino farmers. Coming from the so-called landed elite family, her administration included a stock distribution option as an alternative land distribution option that was purportedly designed for her clan's own Hacienda (ranch/plantation) Luisita, which denied the
farmers of actual land distribution. Hence, her inability to solve the significant issue of rural poverty and farmers' landlessness was the central obstruction to her agricultural development program (Padilla, 1988).

**FMR Projects in Supporting Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC)**

**Development Strategy**

President Fidel V. Ramos launched the Philippines' 2000 national development strategy (1993-1998), highlighting market reforms and private-sector-led development. His strategy back then was to reduce the government's role to mere private sector participation framework provider by strengthening and linking market agents and accelerating development from industrial centers to other regions.

His narratives show that FMRs were a vital component of agricultural productivity: "In agriculture, to guarantee productivity and profitability of our primary producers, we must speed up building irrigation systems, farm-to-market roads…" (Ramos, 1996, para. 4). His FMR development program complemented the needs of land reform beneficiaries by including them in a market-oriented agricultural sector loop. He asserted that FMRs symbolize economic development, progress, and modernity narratives. His program called Agrarian Reform Community (ARC) Development Strategy provided chosen rural communities with basic infrastructures, such as FMRs, to improve agrarian reform beneficiaries' productivity and income, to wit:

We increased agricultural support services and livelihood assistance to CARP beneficiaries. We encouraged them to organize cooperatives and take advantage of economies of scale to enhance their productivity... where
farmer-beneficiaries can better feel the impact of localized support services in terms of higher incomes. (Ramos, 1993, para.62)

Though FMR was provided at the CARP’s onset, the ARC program and the Philippines' participation in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade formalized FMR’s inclusion in the agrarian reform program’s support services vital for agricultural development. For instance, President Ramos’ Memorandum Order 367 in 1996 institutionalized its construction at the local level (Official Gazette, 1996). This scenario strengthens it as a support service to attain a market-oriented agricultural infrastructure, create efficient agricultural transport systems and achieve competitiveness. For instance, in his 1996 SONA, he shared: "In agriculture, to guarantee productivity and profitability of our primary producers, we must speed up building…farm-to-market roads" (Ramos, 1996, para.4).

During his administration, a considerable ODA was provided for his agrarian reform program called Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC) development project, up to PhP22.5 billion. The ARC was formulated by then agrarian reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao partly to tap external funding to develop redistributed farms and partly to showcase successful land reform enactment (Borras 2008). The ARC intended to strengthen farm productivity thru sufficient support service delivery such as FMRs, irrigation, credit, and technical assistance to a cluster of areas advancing a threshold number of ARB and non-farmer beneficiaries. In addition, his administration acquired more lands (41,000 ha) than his predecessors under the

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Landed Estate program, wherein distributing public lands was initiated during his administration to increase the number of accomplishments.

Despite positive feedback on his agrarian reform program, some issues were not resolved—first, cancellation of certification of land transfer and certificate of land ownership award. Second, landowners’ resistance due to the DAR and Landbank of the Philippines’ low land valuation. For instance, occurrences of pockets of resistance from influential families as the courts and enforcing authorities were attentive to the program hampers land distribution. Third, land title selling but to the extent of which could not be monitored considering the sales are not registered. Fourth, failure to install the ARBs in the award lands due to weak enforcement (Moreno & Leones, 2011). Critics say that the “non-physical” installation of ARBs has been the norm rather than the expectation. Some also complained about his administration’s slow acquisition and distribution of privately owned lands. Finally, although he was credited for having significant accomplishments in agrarian reform, critics say this is due to the land acquired and distributed being on public lands.

On the other hand, the Japanese ODA increased to help attain the Philippine president’s agrarian reform program and facilitate economic development and welfare improvement (Contributions Made, n.d.). For example, it funded agricultural reform-related projects, such as the Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support Project (ARISP) and the Rural Farmers and Agrarian Reform Support Credit Program (Rivera, 2003), to expand agriculture support services, such as FMRs. However, the road quality did not change despite hefty road investments under this administration, as most roads were no match for vehicles that have also increased. Moreover, though FMRs comprise most total roads, only around six percent were paved as of 2001.
Specifically, FMRs were primarily crushed stone (macadam) type surfaces that cannot hold the wear and tear of many vehicles, making them costly to maintain in the long run.

**Expanding FMR Projects to Cover Additional ARCs Created**

President Joseph Estrada embraced FMRs as inevitable and vital in achieving social and economic development goals like his predecessors. However, he had a short-lived development plan (1998-2001). He justified his FMR development program by using it as a symbol of progress towards a better future, to wit:

> We continued to lay the groundwork for future growth with continuing advances in the construction and completion of major roads…There are also development funds abroad that can be made available, provided they are used for major road projects here in Luzon. (Estrada, 2000, para. 94)

He utilized FMRs as the vital link between agriculture growth-rural industrialization and a vital tool in his poverty reduction initiatives. He implemented his FMR development program in a two-pronged approach; first via maintaining and improving existing ones, while the second was via expanding the FMR network in far-flung areas, to wit:

> Our war on poverty is also in the emphasis on expanding the linkages between farms and markets, and between rural and urban areas, through roads…Last year, we built or upgraded 582 kilometers of roads..(Estrada, 1999, para. 71)

Under his administration, an additional 391 ARCs were created, making 1,360 ARCs nationwide, wherein 65 percent are funded through ODA while the remaining are domestically funded. Also, he implemented measures to push agriculture to a higher growth path through investments in infrastructure such as FMRs. As a result,
the agriculture sector had substantial growth in the production of rice (38%), sugar (24%), and corn (20%).

His administration utilized PhP 18,618 Billion for this program, leaving PhP 36,657 Billion for the remaining years of CARP implementation. After his short stint, he distributed 415,149 hectares of titled land to 191,319 ARBs, equivalent to five percent of the total CARP scope.

His agrarian reform program also faced some challenges. First is substantial landowners’ resistance since the covered land was small and predominantly privately owned. Second, dwindling funds due to limited budget allocation for land tenure improvement to avoid coverage of lands owned by politicians. Third, many ARBs, particularly coconut and sugarcane farmers, still lived below the poverty line (Moreno & Leones, 2011).

Japanese ODA remained supportive of the Philippines' pursuit of economic and regional development narratives under his administration (Japan Bank for International Cooperation, 2000). Accordingly, it offered economic structure strengthening, poverty alleviation, regional disparities’ mitigation, environmental conservation, disaster mitigation, human resources, and institution building, with gross ODA disbursement remaining significant at US 2031.27M during his term despite setbacks in national politics.

**Demonstrating Highway Politics in FMR Projects**

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Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo immediately took over when President Estrada stepped down. She was known for her neoliberal economic philosophy supporting neoliberal agricultural policy and deepening and widening such reforms (Juego, 2008). Her Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (2001-2004) emphasized FMR as a necessary tool for the poverty alleviation narrative by supporting agriculture modernization.

Accordingly, her road network plan was consistent with Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) for the recognized Strategic Agricultural and Fisheries Development Zones. She focused on FMR investments in regional growth centers, key tourism development areas, and economically lagging regions, especially Mindanao, where road densities and paved road ratios were below average. Hence she conveyed increasing FMR share in the budget pie and allocating at least P6 billion in 2007, significantly higher than the previous year (Arroyo, 2008, para.62). However, data shows otherwise that the Philippines had minimal rice production, enabling her administration to depend on rice importation, despite hefty FMR investments (Alave, 2011).

She also asserted that FMRs are a significant component of rural development in stimulating local growth and helping integrate the rural economy into the whole economy. Her FMR development program was under the Rural Industrialization Program and Rural Road Network Development Project, so linking the production areas to major markets, to wit:

We are constructing farm-to-market roads across the archipelago to increase our agricultural produce, and we would not need to import from overseas. Due
to the budget allocation for farm-to-market roads: two thousand kilometers in Mindanao; two thousand kilometers in north Luzon, since there are agricultural areas; one thousand kilometers in Central Philippines, Bicol, and Visayas; one thousand kilometers here in Luzon, in Southern Luzon, Southern Tagalog and in Central Luzon in Bulacan. These farm-to-market roads will be constructed because we have allotted 7 billion pesos for farm-to-market roads. (Arroyo, 2008, para.15)

She expanded agrarian support services delivery to ARCs and their eventual transformation to agrarian reform zones and progressive farming, as seen in DAR Memorandum Circular 06-06 2006 (DAR, 2006), showing her inclination to further market-oriented activities for ARBs and their ARCs. She also combined her agriculture projects to support her BAYAN-ANIHAN program to facilitate agriculture development and the expansion of the Philippine Road network (Llanto, 2002). For instance, she prioritized agricultural FMR construction while maintaining the existing road network in ARISP implementation to promote her partnership and convergence strategy, resulting in 1,300 kilometers of national roads and 19,771-meter line bridges. As a result, the agricultural sector expanded as the 2 million hectares of land were developed into agribusiness, complemented by the regional road framework plan execution. In addition, the local and regional development councils, the Department of Agriculture (DA), and DAR constructed and rehabilitated FMRs that complemented the national roads to facilitate the agricultural produce market and distribute farm inputs.

Bayan means people while Anihan means harvest and Bayanihan means working together. This program pertains to a united people working together for successful implementation of agrarian reform. It aimed for the transformation of the Philippine Countryside into vibrant and dynamic communities through focused intervention under the ARC Strategy.
She also used FMRs as a political resource. She facilitated her FMR development to support her "super regions" program. She increased local politicians’ Internal Revenue Allotment- local funds- with 20 percent devoted to development funds specifically for infrastructure and social services to give incentives to pursue FMR development in their area, to wit "The Internal Revenue Allotment for local governments from the fiscal budget is P210.7 billion ($3.8B). I hope that local officials, including the different barangays, would utilize 20 percent of your development funds for infrastructure and social service" (Arroyo, 2008, para.21).

The Japanese ODA supported her FMR economic growth, institutional building, disaster mitigation, and infrastructure development narratives for its ODA provision in the Philippines. Its ODA projects included Development Policy Support Program III (DPSP III) and Post-Disaster Needs Assessment. Though the Arroyo administration tried to diversify ODA sources and accepted China's assistance from 2008 to 2011, Japan still provided 49 percent of the ODA loans (NEDA,2019).

Her administration could be characterized by some improvements in agrarian reform with 23 percent of the share of land distribution output and the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program with Extension and Reform (CARPer), which expanded agricultural land distribution for additional five years. However, her reforms remain inadequate, with social inequities largely unaddressed (Manahan,2013). Despite her rhetoric and Japanese aid authorities' development projects, the income disparity between the rich and the poor widened under her administration. In 2003, the top 10 percent received an average income 20 times greater than the bottom 10 percent income deciles, higher than the 1994-level, leading

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6 NEDA ODA Portfolio Reviews, Average of the percentages from 2001 to 2010
to further marginalization of the poor (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2003). In addition, she was jailed after her term due to several corruption cases, including allegedly mishandling funds allocated to farmers' support service assistance (Fertilizer Fund Scam) to aid in her candidacy in the 2004 elections (Holmes, 2011).

**FMR Projects in Addressing Constraints to Agricultural Productivity**

President Benigno Aquino's narratives continued his predecessors' development strategy. He used FMRs as a vital tool for agricultural productivity and its linkage with industry and services. He pinpointed that one of the constraints to agricultural productivity and market expansion was inefficient connectivity. So, he rehabilitated FMRs to strategically connect rural and agrarian areas with markets and distribution centers, pursue agricultural efficiency, and develop the domestic market faster. He also reiterated that FMRs are a vital part of a market-oriented agricultural development with a promise of economic growth to smallholder farmers while strengthening his anti-corruption measures, to wit:

> We will not build our road network based on kickbacks or favoritism. We will build them according to a clear system. Now that resources for these projects are no longer allocated haphazardly, our plans will no longer end up unfulfilled—they will become tangible roads that benefit the Filipino people. When we assumed office, 7,239 kilometers of our national roads were not yet fixed...We are even identifying and fixing dangerous roads with the use of modern technology. These are challenges we will continue to address every year so that, before the end of my term, every inch of our national road network will be fixed. (Aquino, B., 2012, para. 57)
Like previous administrations, his development strategy was also towards regional infrastructure development and agrarian reform programs to enhance agricultural produce inflow and outflow. For example, the priority programs included rural road programs, with 97.19 percent of national highways, 61.80 percent of city roads, and 28.65 percent of FMRs paved. On the other hand, he also had substantial agrarian reform initiatives, with 39 percent budget allocated to the agrarian reform fund, the highest since 1986 (Ballesteros et.al., 2018), and at least 46 percent of the total agricultural land for distribution and significant reforms in legal services were given to ARBs (Mendoza, et.al., 2018).

During his term, the Japanese aid authorities elevated bilateral relations into a strategic partnership to support the Philippines' pursuit of economic and security cooperation and infrastructure development narratives. As a result, Japanese ODA disbursement was US 2,261.9M, which enabled them to provide 35 percent of the Philippine ODA loans from 2010 to 2015. The other security cooperation was in response to China’s assertiveness, which threatened Japan's freedom of navigation and geostrategic goals.

Despite significant strides in his FMR investments, the farmers' situation did not change. His agrarian reform was still a sham, as land distribution was still challenging. He could not push for land distribution due to complex issues in land valuation among private lands and influential families’ control, even on the significant size of private lands. For instance, the issues related to the high land evaluation of his own clan’s plantation constrained smallholder farmers from getting their awarded land. Moreover, poverty incidence was highest among farmers at 41 percent.

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7 NEDA ODA Portfolio Reviews, Average of the percentages from 2010 to 2015
compared to the national poverty incidence of 27 percent, while the land inequality ratio increased to .57, up from 0.53 in 1960. Unfortunately, interventions did not translate to farmers' efficiency as the agricultural sector's labor productivity is only 16 percent of industrial workers and 31 percent of service workers (Tadem, 2015).³

b. Conceptual background

b.1. Japanese and the Filipino Aid Authorities' Institutional Setting and ODA Policy

Foreign policy has continued within the aid authorities' scope everywhere and across centuries. In terms of ODA, it usually involves detailed steps constructed by the head of the government and implemented authorities to achieve their interest and even complex agendas. For instance, Aria Wibisono (1973) shares that it has been within the field of the highest-ranked authorities, such as the heads of state, heads of the government, foreign ministers, and defense ministers.³ Studies have supported the claim and demonstrated authorities' dominant role in policymaking activities. For instance, Charles Keagley and Shannon Blanton (2007) interpret that the authorities' decisions, both in a democratic and authoritarian government, constructed the course of history.³ Subsequently, David McLellan and Charles Woodhouse (1960) recognize authorities as a status group that influences government policy formulation and believe it is efficient to gain insights into how these elites exercise power over foreign policymaking. Finally, Luis Angeles and Kyriakos Neanidis (2006) explain that the attitude of aid authorities is crucial for making ODA work. These studies have shown that aid authorities' interactions and relations play a primordial role in ODA policymaking; therefore, scrutinizing governmentality in the Philippines-Japan ODA
relations is imperative. The following section discusses the Japanese and Filipino aid authorities.

b.2. Japanese Aid Authorities’ Bureaucratic Polity

Chalmers Johnson (1995) and Eamonn Fingleton (1995) stated that Japan is a "developmental state" where private sector representatives, economic bureaucrats, and politicians perform crucial and aligned functions in the national economy to encourage economic growth. The Japanese government stimulated overall economic growth during the post-war Japanese economic miracle. First, it instituted regulations and protectionist policies that effectively managed economic crises and later concentrated on trade expansion. According to Jain (2016) it had to streamline its foreign policy to promote diversified overseas raw material sources via international aid and economic cooperation to attain economic growth and expansion. As a result, the Japanese private sector supplemented government efforts and initiatives, facilitated intraregional trade, and complemented regional action and business cooperation.

Further, they expanded in Asia, particularly to states within Southeast Asia, by supplying the needed goods and services to the Japan ODA recipients. Sumi (1995) supports this observation and states that the Japanese government quickly approves projects aligned with Japanese companies' knowledge and expertise. In Micheline Somcynsky and Chris Cook's (1999) analysis of Japan's political economy and ODA policy, Japanese aid authorities created inter-institutional cooperation by linking bureaucracy, politics, and the private sector through various formal and informal mechanisms, institutions, and institutionalized beliefs and practices collectively referred to as the "Iron Triangle," which suggests vested interests and partnerships
among institutional actors. In this setup, Japan's powerful ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance (MFA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), and influential political parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party and powerful and large corporations are primary actors in the Japanese ODA provision and implementation.

According to Alena Rakhmanko (2015), the significant component of the Japanese postwar political-economic system is the "1955 system" or "Japan Inc." which pertains to a scenario wherein bureaucrats, politicians, and business leaders are closely related to each other through similarities in background and collaboration to attain high-speed economic growth as a sense of mission in protecting the interests of the nation. Richard Colignon and Chikako Usui (2001) interpret how Amakaduri literally means descent from heaven. A practice in Japan whereby senior civil servants move into large private organizations after retirement. They facilitate the formation of interconnected informal and formal networks of cooperation and an essential mechanism among aid authorities comprised of politicians, bureaucrats, and business people. They also reveal that this group's diversity replicates cohesion and inter-institutional cooperation within society, as Japan's political and socioeconomic stability allowed this group to lead and incorporate their economic and business interests domestically and internationally. Carmen Schmidt (2005) notes that this group is held together by select but open recruitment patterns, shared interests, interrelationships, consciousness, and connections with all elite groups on the same power level. Hence, this inclusivity manifests in how bureaucrats, politicians, and business people create and facilitate the ODA policy.
In terms of institutional setting, Japan is predominantly following a bureaucratic polity. Menocal, Denney, and Geddess (2011) interpret that its ODA policy resides in the bureaucracy. Moreover, they share manifestations of bureaucrat dominance since they usually research, initiate, and draft all the legislation while the Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature, only approves. Japan’s institutional setting shows that bureaucracy continues to take the lead in facilitating and ensuring the state’s optimal and sustained economic and business interests, and coordinated mutual interests among the non-poor sector, including politicians and business sectors, are still pursued. The bureaucracy drafts most Japanese legislation and then submitted to the parliament by the cabinet. Politicians rarely amend bills and have a small staff incapable of drafting legislation. Rix (1980) discusses that bureaucratic interests determine the Japan ODA policy’s articulation as he observes the bureaucrats’ organizational structure in the decision-making process. In the postwar period, bureaucrats predominantly created and implemented the ODA policy decision and served as "smootheners" and "consolidators" of national interests towards recipient states.

b.3. Filipino Aid Authorities’ Proprietary Polity

Dante Simbulan (1965) explains that Philippine policymaking revolves around affluent families. They are wealthy people who occupy favorable and significant government positions to receive and perform favors for all kinds of people aligned with their interests. They profoundly affect domestic policies by steering policymaking towards providing material incentives and holding socioeconomic power that monopolized policymaking over the years. Benedict Anderson (1988) states that these politicians or the rural few come from elite families' continuing from
the Spanish Caciquism to the American electoral. He also notes that the Caciques (native chief) to political dynasties' transformation occurred during the American colonial period when they were voted into public office and practiced a patron-client system by filling the government with their relatives and supporters. Alfred McCoy (1993) shows that "the rise of "rents" as a substantial share of the nation's economy" contributed directly to the formation of powerful political families.

Unlike Japan, the Philippines' ODA policy institutional setting follows proprietary polity. Antoinette Raquiza (2013) defines proprietary polity as an institutional setting wherein the aid authorities come from family networks that combine social and political power, suitable for fast-moving short-term commercial interests. These politicians usually recruit technocrats from the private sector, subordinating bureaucracy to political leaders. However, proprietary polity ushered national and local politicians to take the primary role in the Philippines' developmental functions and economic planning. They hold socioeconomic power and monopolize policymaking processes enabling them to gain control of the Philippine policymaking apparatus and facilitate a developmental state subjected to elite capture that protects their interest and opposes any significant attempts to address social inequalities. Bing Brillo (2012) conveys that policymaking and decision-making become preoccupied with accommodations and concessions since the predominant objective is to sustain their power and interest and satisfy their needs and patrons' demands.

The current setup shows the Philippines' proprietary polity's susceptibility to accommodate and collaborate with anyone who would help them maintain the status quo. For instance, in terms of ODA, Sonny Africa (2005) believes that it has been
used to create policies that benefit only a few and are opposed to general Filipino interests. He asserts that it furthers foreign and elite policy interests and only addresses their substantial business and economic needs. He also shares that foreign and domestic aid authorities create planning documents (e.g., the Philippine Development Plan and Public Investment Plan) and policymaking processes that embody their business and economic interests.

The discussion above has covered a substantive area of Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' institutional setting and their inclination to accommodate and collaborate to maintain the status quo. In this light, it is imperative to discuss their agency's values, interests, and objectives that maintain and preserve the current ODA relations.

c. The network of Relationships Among Social Actors

Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' bargaining and adapting processes acting in their own interests in foreign-funded projects seem to contradict the ODA's social equity aspect as they tweak the rules of the game to determine policy formulation and implementation. Various studies have shown that ODA has benefitted the aid authorities and non-poor sector rather than the intended recipient's overall populations (Howard Pack and Janet Pack 1993; Peter Boone 1995; Tarhan Feyzioglu, Vinaya Swaroop Min Zhu 1998; Stephen Kosack and Jennifer Tobin, 2006). They use their economic and decision-making powers, influence ODA policies, support, coordinate, and commit to one another to increase their net gains and determine outcomes. Joseph Hanlon (2010) shows how donors promoted corruption by choosing recipients amenable to put market-friendly policy changes through state corruption through predatory factions, led by a group of dominant
ministries. He ends his analysis regarding how recipients, through predatory factions, could still manage the usual corrupted government processes via consistent backing from the donor community and international financial institutions. For instance, donors were unwilling to challenge the appointment of corrupt authorities and reluctant to flex their economic muscle to force investigations into their corruption activities. This is also consistent with a study of M. Mossadeq Bahri (2004), who finds that Japanese ODA in Indonesia works only in the interests of the powerful non-poor who have parallel views and work within the same capitalist ideology of production conferring on the donor’s pronouncements.

Relatively, several assertions show that the non-poor sector hinders positive ODA impacts. Pete Bauer (1972) shares that when ODA is coursed through aid authorities, the non-poor sector would only promote inequality and enrich and propagate benefits. For instance, Japan's ODA policy benefitted the non-poor sector in donor and recipient states. The Japanese aid authorities, who pay great attention to Japan's ODA, expect to reap benefits if they partake in large-scale ODA projects. Non-Japanese corporations compete for projects, but Japanese companies dominate procurement through de facto-tied conditionalities. Related studies demonstrate similar claims. Jorgen Andersen, Niels Johannesen & Bob Rijkers (2020) find evidence that economic and political aid authorities capture ODA as increased ODA disbursements coincides with the sharp increase in bank deposits offshore financial centers. In connection to this, Alesino Alberto and Beatrice Weder (2002) present that many countries that obtain ODA have corruption issues and fear that ODA flows may only benefit the ruling politicians and their cronies.
Further, Jakob Svensson (2000) shows that the non-poor sector's ODA capture is consistent with rent-seeking economic theories. In addition, Robert Klitgaard (1990) identifies narratives about failed development projects due to self-interested aid authorities. Lastly, Michael Todaro and Stephen Smith (2011) claim that ODA enriches the aid authorities in recipient countries, diverting ODA resources for their personal benefit.

The discussion regarding cooperative relationships in economic settings is significant given the imperative implications of how aid authorities' agency and formal and non-formal practices affect overall ODA relations.

c.1. Strategic Selection

Strategic selection refers to a situation wherein one country is interested in the other. For example, in the case of Japan and the Philippines relations, Japan sees the Philippines as a trading partner because forming alliances with its Philippine counterparts assures their survival in some commodities. Therefore, both sides are inclined to collaborate as Japan's one-dimensional approach to the non-interference narrative strengthens and maintains the ODA relationship and looks for opportunities where its target "partner" perceive a need for external assistance in micro-political practices and relations. Moreover, Amanda Licht (2010) also observes that ODA donors have benefited from survival-driven aid authorities by converting some ODA into reduced risk by reinforcing their recipients’ loyalty. Indirectly, donors look for opportunities where targets perceive a need for external assistance in micro-political practices and relations. Consequently, receiving aid authorities are most receptive to the requests of donor nations, maintaining and preserving the ODA policy framework.
c.2. Systemic Interdependence

Systematic interdependence is a scenario wherein both countries collaborate due to reciprocity. It is seen in situations wherein the donor demonstrates its economic power while the recipient shows its so-called commodity power (Spraos, 1984). The main objective was to promote the export-oriented sector of the recipient by giving aid and investments inclined provision of infrastructure to develop the project site and its productive capacity, then engage with trade or importation. On the other hand, the recipient is developing and expanding potential export markets while securing safe markets for those resource-hungry donors who need raw materials for industrialization. This complementarity and reciprocity maintain and strengthen the ODA relations between the two. This systemic interdependence would help the recipient achieve economic growth. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) The State of Commodity Dependence Report (2012) states that 100 out of 151 developing countries depend on commodity exports for at least 50 percent of their earnings. It shows that having a close affinity with donors would ensure economic growth on the recipient's side, wherein its commodity sector creates vital economic activities such as foreign exchange earnings, fiscal revenues, income growth, and employment creation. Bruce Koopel and Michael Plummer (1989) see ODA as a tool for a donor to strengthen economic binding, bolster external trade, foster the Jmarket abroad, and increase domestic companies' leverage against recipients.

In Japan's case, ODA is treated as a future investment to achieve its long-term national interests, denoting what Yasutami Shimomura and Ping Wang (2013) called 'trinity development cooperation' of aid, investment, and trade.
(2010) shares that this relationship significantly contributes to recipients' social and economic development, enhancing the donor countries' national interests. Akiko Nakaya (1996) conveys that Japan's ODA model started through this relationship wherein the recipient supplied raw materials and secured commercial markets for Japanese industries. Aware of this effect, the Japanese government actively extended yen loans to Asian countries throughout the 1960s to improve the latter's infrastructure and export promotion policy. David Arase (2012) describes Japan's ODA profile as Asia-oriented, production-sector-oriented, and loan-dependent. The PARC Position Paper supported these claims on 50 Years of Japan’s ODA (2005), which stipulates that Japan benefitted from the ODA mechanism because it sustained to obtain raw materials, trade market share, and acquire an inexpensive labor force from its ODA recipients. This claim was also supported by Gerardo Sicat (1973), who shares that as Japan industrialized, the Philippines became its raw material supplier, particularly in mineral resources such as copper and iron, which accounted for one-third of the Philippines' export value.

c.3. Contingent Convergence

Contingent convergence is a scenario wherein recipients accommodate donors' policy objectives as ODA relations serve each other's interests. Wil Hout (2015) elucidates that this setup available to recipient governments was evident during the Cold War when allegiance to one superpower brought advantages in ODA allocations.

Recipient’s ODA delivery mechanisms usually replicate donor countries' strategic interests and preferences. It could come from institutional arrangements that impact everyday politics and the recipient state's policy options. Recent studies by Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright (2015) share that ODA delivery patterns in
recipient states align with donor countries' ODA policy orientation. Hence, knowing
the ODA relations' political dimension is imperative before any fundamental
understanding of ODA agreements.\textsuperscript{xcvi}

Filipino aid authorities collaborated and crafted accommodating policies and
advocated for the statutory provisions that cater to Japan's ODA loan conditionalities.
For example, Japan has been active in the Philippines' development sector agenda. It
participates in the Philippine Development Forum (PDF) for monitoring agreement
targets. Ex-post Evaluation of Japanese ODA Loan Program "Philippine Development
Policy Support Program (DPSP) (II)(III)" report shows that JICA participated in
creating the DPSP by having an active role in the policy dialogue and providing
funding and technical assistance.\textsuperscript{xcvii}

d. Governmentality Approach in the ODA Field

Governmentality pertains to how the government manages the population. It
demonstrates the government's understanding of the population/governed and how its
governing process is rationalized and implemented.

Governmentality is visible in the ODA relations because actors complement
and create an intricate weave of power relations to supplement and maintain the donor
and recipient relationship. For instance, in this study, Japanese and Filipino aid
authorities used poverty reduction and economic growth narratives through
infrastructure development and trade engagements to create market opportunities and
secure the supply of raw materials. Some studies have shared the same observation.
Marc Dubois (1991) shares that the donor's dominant position over the recipient
creates various development tactics and practices that legitimize the donor's
interventions and weaken the recipient's negotiating power. Donor's interventions
denote an abstract system of ordered procedures for regulating, circulating, professionalizing, and institutionalizing statements' processes and operations.\textsuperscript{xcviii}

This study uses the governmentality framework because it helps analyze how power relations between aid authorities and beneficiaries are reproduced and transcended in the development projects to change the behavior, knowledge, attitude, skills, aspirations, economic and social conditions, and asset holdings. Wanda Vrasti (2013) claims that governmentality analysis could show the importance of "everyday practice" and "subjectivity" to global power relations. She contributes to an emerging literature that engages with further development of global governmentality analysis based on empirical research in the global South. She argues that Foucault's governmentality approach could invigorate and add a historically rich and empirically grounded IR scholarship dimension.

On the other hand, Rita Abrahamsen (2004) uses the governmentality approach to show partnership in the ODA discourse. She shares that these ODA partnerships are voluntary and forced to produce new forms of agency and new forms of discipline. She argues that as a form of advanced liberal power, partnerships work not mainly as direct domination and imposition but through assurances of incorporation and inclusion. Donors derive their power by excluding those who do not help pursue their business and economic interests and incorporating those who stimulate them. Using freedom as a formula of rule partnerships helps produce modern, self-disciplined citizens and states by enlisting them as responsible agents in their development. Both studies show that the governmentality approach is appropriate for studying ODA relations.\textsuperscript{xcix}
The Philippines-Japan ODA relation is an example where ODA dependency indicates global power inequalities; however, resistance is minimal as Japan has a "responsibilization package" that regulates the behavior of its recipients and encourages them to comply with norms. In this study, Japan outlines a group of techniques that subjects the Philippines’ to self-regulation and treats it as an autonomous actor in power relations while simultaneously prescribing procedures designed to lead and control it from a distance.

**d.1. Governmentality Framework as Used by Various Scholars**

Charles Agyemang (2017) applies governmentality to interrogate the power relations that underlie practices, techniques, and rationalities of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank's structural adjustment framework. In his study, he shares the structural adjustment policies with the neoliberal governing ethos, transforming Ghana's government into a self-disciplined neoliberal subject. He analyzes how interactions are embedded within a discursive formation and concrete practices that establish personal views of 'a problem' and mobilize authoritative actors, techniques, and truth forms as solutions. He also explores how the IMF and the World Bank (WB), through their loan conditionalities, have sought to govern, remake, and regulate recipient states' economic, political, and social institutions. These ideas were seconded by Stiglitz's (2002) statements that IMF and WB were unclear and unaccountable because their policy decisions are made behind closed doors, without consideration beyond their own interests. Finally, Marjolein Derous and Frederik De Roeck (2019) demonstrate governmentality's advantages as a tool for studying the European Union (EU) external relations by sharing that governmentality helps
understand the current EU's power relations through analysis of discursive constructions and micro-political practices.\textsuperscript{ciii}

In contrast, some academics, such as David Chandler (2009) and Jan Selby (2007), were skeptical of governmentality's IR capability. For example, Selby (2007) contends that using governmentality to deconstruct international realist theory and develop novel accounts of the contemporary global liberal order is problematic and should use a Marxist framework. They believe that using the Marxist framework is suitable as it is conscious of both the power's structural dimension and IR's specificity and irreducibility.\textsuperscript{ciii}

The governmentality framework in this study provides an in-depth analysis of the general politics of the Philippines - Japan ODA relations. It describes how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborate and use FMR to facilitate ARBs' improvements and pursue their interests by including them in the market economy and aligning them to the capitalist standards of competition, accumulation, and progress. For instance, Shimomura and Ping (2013) claim that Japan's development trajectory has led its recipients to follow and internalize the same development discourse that Japan had in its early development phase.\textsuperscript{civ} Consequently, Kohei Hashimoto's (1999) study shares how the Philippines willingly collaborate in Japan’s country-focused research group study among 16 countries between 1986 and 1998 to show the positive impacts of Japanese ODA on its economy. These studies show donors' and recipients' aid authorities' inclination to collaborate and arrange opportunities to make space for themselves consistently and sustain their beneficial relationships.

d.2. Japanese ODA's General Tactics and Practices
Japan uses the economic growth and poverty reduction narratives to emphasize itself as the Philippines’ "big brother," implementing active ODA provisions. It creates its tactics and governing processes for its recipients. It ensures that the policy-level direction is geared towards pursuing business and economic interests. For example, the 2003 Japan Bank for International Cooperation Report shows that the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund started preparing "Country Papers" that include appropriate implementation policies for each recipient. It conducts annual individual third-party evaluation reports and an annual White paper on Development Cooperation to emphasize the ODA's overall focus and thematic priorities among its recipients. Both documents include lists of Japan's ODA projects with the corresponding third-party evaluators' perspectives. It also provides ODA type and funding sources, precise and complete information about the recipient's economic conditions, and necessary frameworks to entice private sector collaboration.

On the other hand, the ODA approval stage shows Japan's proactiveness with its prospective ODA recipients. Somcynsky and Cook (1999) express how Japan demonstrates its influence in the decision-making process in an ODA approval process. They argue that JICA approves economically and financially viable projects during project appraisal, considering its recipient's favorable macroeconomic outlooks and development agenda initiatives. During project approval, JICA sends a mission to the borrowing country and engages in comprehensive discussions from a broader perspective of national development, including macroeconomic conditions and the project's relevance in the country's development policies and plan. It then decides
whether the project is suitable for ODA loan financing, determines the loan amount and terms, and ensures that the project would pursue both sides' national interests.

Lastly, the project level stage demonstrates how Japan exercises significant power and control over the project management process. For instance, JICA Project Cycle Report shows that it conducts periodic reviews during the implementation and evaluation stages stipulated in the loan agreement. In addition, its Special Assistance for Project Implementation Study and Special Assistance Facility may also assist the recipient during project implementation. Furthermore, in the Ex-Post evaluation stage, JICA requires the recipient to submit a project completion report. These processes show how Japan flexes its power to affect its recipient's domestic policies.

For instance, Japan's 2010 Country Assistance Evaluation of the Philippines shows the uneven distribution of its ODA projects. This unevenness is attributed to Japan's inclination to fund economic infrastructure instrumental in inviting foreign direct investment, which would boost local production and export capacity and eventually aid the recipient in its industrialization process. Japan ODA's general tactics and practices are aligned with its economic and business interests. Accordingly, it significantly interferes with the recipient's ODA policies and projects to ensure its overall interests and initiatives are institutionalized.

This chapter contains the long relationship between Japanese and Filipino aid authorities and the appropriate framework to analyze its issues and challenges in the context of ODA-funded FMR. It contributes to the historical analysis of how Japanese aid authorities carry out the vision and ideals of development theories, ensure the continuity of development practices and arrange opportunities to make space for themselves in the development discourse. However, it also contributes to how the
Filipino aid authorities use their accommodating and strategic approach to cater to the Japanese' ODA and their national interests within bureaucratic and policymaking capacities and interests and maintain cooperative mechanisms.

**e. Research Methodology**

This part contains the study design, instruments, participants, data collection and analysis procedure, study locale, and proposed schedule.

**i. Study Design**

The study focuses on three things to realize the objectives. First, the study explores the recipient and donor aid authorities' discourse, rationale, problematizing, and decision-making processes that lead to the FMR as a solution. Second, it analyzes aid authorities' interactions and political settlements by scrutinizing the difference between the FMR's outcome and the original plan. Specifically, it presents ODA relations per project development stage in the context of an FMR, exploring aid authorities' roles and interactions while analyzing relationships. Third, it identifies policy actors and networks involved in the FMR project development process and selected organizational actors such as bureaucracy, private sector (i.e., domestic or foreign), politicians (i.e., national and local), and project beneficiaries reflected in the discussion. The FMR subproject management process depended on the actors involved and their power in pursuing these interests and preferences during the process.

This study uses qualitative mixed methods such as semi-structured interviews, structured questionnaires, documentary analysis, and FGD to provide crucial contextual understanding and insights concerning the interactions and interests between aid authorities and other actors. Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber (2010) explains
that qualitative approaches present various insights concerning research paradigms, issues of power, and authorities. It also shows a multilayered view of social reality's nuances and encourages deep listening between the researcher and the participants.\textsuperscript{cvi}

First, it uses documentary analysis of quotations from official reports and interpretations of practical texts to study the Philippines-Japan ODA relations in studying the aid authorities' interactions and answering study questions about existing power relations in a Japan ODA-funded FMR project. It includes government reports such as Philippine national and local development plans, evaluation reports, Japan ODA Charter and Country Assistance Policy, and other pertinent documents to know the initial issues and challenges. The reports show how aid authorities' thinking process reflects and uncovers the government's rationalities and ideologies and analyze quotations from official reports and text interpretations to study the Philippines-Japan ODA relations.

Second, the study uses semi-structured interviews with institutions' representatives to create social relations patterns between interdependent actors. The semi-structured interview gave an overview of various actors' insights, observations, objectives, goals, targets, rationale, interaction, and political settlements during the project development process and understanding of the relation's complexity, issues, and challenges and supplemented the documentary analysis. In addition, it allows the researcher to ask experts and actors to specify the influential individuals and groups in the FMR project development process and ask questions about power relations.

Third, the study uses a structured questionnaire by asking four (4) questions to gauge the power among actors, such as who the most powerful actor in this project was, whom they think received the most benefits, who prevailed in the decision-
making process, and who were marginalized and failed to get access to the opportunities and benefits of the project. It gathers evidence of the actors' power based on a reputation for being powerful, as revealed by other actors (Hunter, 1959; Moore, 2019). However, International Developing Economies- The Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) representatives opted not to answer as they see these questions as internal matters within the Philippine national government agencies and other project actor participants. IDE-JETRO and JICA’s reaction is consistent with its apolitical façade and approach of veering away from any political issue related to its project (Luyt, 2007). Hence, ignoring complex questions of resource dependence and power relations.

Fourth, it also uses FGD to analyze the FMR impacts on its beneficiaries to get their insights and observations on the ground’s realities and the FMR's impact on their living conditions and livelihood activities. Participants share their answers in terms of four indicators stipulated in the FMR's subproject results matrix: average yield per cropping season (ton/ha), net annual farm income (pesos/year/household), travel time, and transportation cost, enabling them to share their constraints and challenges about the FMR. Finally, it is worth noting that official documentary requirements (e.g., evaluation reports and other documents related to FMR contract variations) were unavailable during the data collection process.
ii. Study Instruments

Before the screening, verbal and written consent to undergo this research process was requested from prospective participants. The cover letter also ensures that they are adequately informed about the study's purpose and data privacy protocol. They were well-informed that the personal information they provided would be used for selecting participants, demographics, and preparing a general description of the beneficiary respondents in this study.

Study instruments include archival documents and government sources, interview schedules for participants, and background information sheets.

1. Archival documents and government sources: Initial issues and challenges were identified based on reviewing policy documents and notes from meetings
and workshops. These entail various documents produced by authorities and well-placed members within the aid authorities' network. These documents show aid authorities’ thinking process, rationalities, and ideologies highlighted by developmental governmentality, uncover the government's rationalities and ideologies, and represent some of the tools they used to inculcate discourse in public (Wolff, 2020).

2. Interview schedule for participants: The interview questions demonstrated participants' role, perception, and knowledge in the aid authorities' interaction and relations during the FMR infrastructure project management processes and explained the complexity, issues, and challenges of the relation to supplement the documentary analysis. The list of questions was sent via email during June and July to the intended participants who provided comments and feedback.

3. Structured Questionnaire: The four questions would gauge the power among actors, such as who the most powerful actor in this project was, whom they think received the most benefits, who prevailed in the decision-making process, and who were marginalized and failed to get access to the opportunities and benefits of the project.

Both interviews and questionnaires were used to identify authorities' interactions in the FMR subproject management stages, understand the relation's complexity, issues, and challenges and supplement the documentary analysis.

4. FGD Key Questions for beneficiaries: The FGD's key questions show beneficiaries' standpoints on the actual project implementation processes and
the latter's impact on their living conditions and livelihood activities in terms of four indicators stipulated in the FMR's subproject results matrix, such as average yield per cropping season (ton/ha), net annual farm income (pesos/year/household), travel time, and transportation cost enabling them to share their constraints and challenges.

5. The participant screening sheet was made more concise by removing some items and leaving the section on gender blank instead of having a male or female checklist. Also, a statement was added to the directions in accomplishing the participant screening sheet that states that participants may opt not to supply information in the demographic profile they are not comfortable divulging.

iii. Study Participants

The study's research design adhered to the qualitative case study approach. It adopted two criteria in the selection of aid authorities. The first criteria are those with actual participation in the Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support Program (ARISP) III approval and its FMR subproject management stages. Second, those who influenced the actual project management process. The data collection procedure began from November 2020 to February 2021, while the data collection phase began from March to December 2021 and lasted for ten months.

The researcher facilitated online questionnaires and interviews among fourteen Filipino aid authority representatives and their four Japanese counterparts who participated in the FMR project management process.

Moreover, two face-to-face FGDs were conducted in Agdangan, Quezon, among sixteen ARBs to identify the FMR's impact on them, and two FGDs were done
among eight landowners, landowner-subcontractor, and landowner-traders. Eight ordinary citizens (non-farmers) to recognize the difference in access to capital among those in the project sites. Below are the participants’ profiles.

**Table 2: Participants’ Demographic Profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Participants’ Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency (Only questionnaire administered)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Head Consultant (from the Private Japanese Consultancy Firm affiliated with ARISP I-III)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>JCM80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Consultant (from the Private Japanese Consultancy Firm affiliated with ARISP I-III)</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
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<td>JCM72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>72</td>
<td>JCM72a</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Ethnicity</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>Identifier</td>
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<td>FPF66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>Former Local Politician</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Filipino</td>
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<td>Former Local Politician</td>
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<td>FFLPM60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>Academe (Informant)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>CAMNa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>Academe (Informant)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>Contractor(Former Representative of Contractor 1)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Fcon1M66</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Japanese research participants were all males who actively participated in all ARISP and the FMR as part of the decision-making and technical team that facilitated the detailed engineering design. One of them started to work in the Philippines in 1981 as a consultant for several agricultural & irrigation development projects of the Philippines under Japan ODA (JICA technical assistant projects,
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) yen loan projects, and others) for National Irrigation Authority (NIA), Department of Agriculture (DA), and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). He was the head consultant and an irrigation engineer who conceptualized and implemented the ARISP project, the FMR, and the project implementation policy manual conceptualization. He and his three Japanese colleagues worked with their Filipino counterparts to achieve the overall project objectives and are still employed in the same Japanese consultancy firm looking for possible ODA-funded infrastructure projects. They were interviewed to know their participation in the overall FMR project management process and their collaborations among actors.

On the other hand, Filipino research participants were predominantly male and participated in ARISP III and the actual FMR implementation process. Specifically, due to a lack of project documents, the DAR bureaucrats provided online answers and granted follow-up interviews to provide in-depth responses. Former DAR bureaucrats who led the CPMO were also interviewed to share their experiences and clarify issues and interactions in facilitating the FMR project. It is worth noting that most of them have developed their expertise while working with Japanese consultants. While some became DAR Regional Directors, most became consultants of other multilateral organizations or were even hired as Japanese consultancy firm consultants in the Philippines.\(^8\)

Filipino consultants from the domestic consultancy firm that facilitated the ARISP III were also interviewed to know their participation and clarify issues regarding consultants' payment gap and rigid reporting system that affected their stint

\(^8\) Based on an interview from the former Technical Coordinator of ARISP III CPMO.
during the FMR management process. In addition, former and current politicians were interviewed to clarify the Local Government Unit's (LGU) participation and the benefits they incurred in the FMR. Moreover, former representatives of contractors were also interviewed to know their interactions and relationships among actors and clarify the FMR contract's variation order.

**Project Beneficiaries’ Demographic Profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Participants’ Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Landowner-Subcontractor</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>LM57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Landowner-Trader</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>LF50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Landowner-Trader</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>LM67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>LM45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>LM47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>LF48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Landowner-Trader</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>LM65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Landowner</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>LF66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Citizen(non-farmer)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>OF50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary Citizen(non-farmer)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>OF59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Citizen(non-farmer)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>OF75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary Citizen(non-farmer)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>OF71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Citizen(non-farmer)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>OM54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ordinary Citizen(non-farmer)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>OM55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ordinary Citizen(non-farmer)</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>OF70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The project beneficiaries were divided into three groups such as landowners, ARBs, and ordinary citizens. Half of them are female and are active farmers from the project site. They were interviewed to know their participation in the FMR management process and how they were affected by the FMR.
iv. Study Locale

This study is in the project site in Sildakin ARC, Agdangan, Quezon, Philippines. It focused on villages (1) and (2) within the municipality that directly benefitted from the FMR. Although the original project documents stated that the FMR would benefit seven villages from Agdangan, Unisan, and Atimonan municipalities in Quezon Province with 1,307 households, 261 ARBs, or 3,142 individuals, three (3) villages did not directly benefit as their constituents are not using the FMR as seen during the fieldwork. For instance, one village is far from the FMR, while a creek separates the other two (2) villages.

Three FGDs were conducted among eight landowners and traders, eight ordinary citizens (non-farmers), and sixteen (16) ARBs to recognize the difference in the access to capital and determine the overall picture of the FMR in the research site while identifying the possible differences in the degree of its impact depending on the asset holdings and sociopolitical capital among the project beneficiaries.

Structured questionnaires are also administered to ask all participants about the power among actors by asking 1) who are the most powerful actor in the project stage, 2) whom they think received the most benefits, 3) who prevailed in the decision-making process, and 4) who were marginalized.

Lastly, the governmentality framework, mixed methods methodology, and other practices are essential to creating a holistic yet comprehensive discussion of the aid authorities' interactions at the project level. The researcher protected the rights, prevented risk, and kept confidential matters shared by the research participants.
v. Data Collection Procedure

Please see the study execution stages and appropriate methods below:

**Study Question 1:** Data gathering entails creating texts, transcripts, and coded tables. It involved qualitative data collection through documental analysis and semi-structured interviews.

**Step 1:** The documental analysis of archival documents and government sources helps gather preliminary information on how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities interact to rationalize and implement the FMR infrastructure project.

**Step 2:** Letters are sent out to identified participants. It provides details of the study with an attached copy of the background information sheet, research plan, and objectives.

**Step 3:** Online questionnaires and online/face-to-face semi-structured interviews help elicit various actors' perceptions of the FMR infrastructure project's power structure and thorough information on how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' interaction modalities, strengths, and level of engagement rationalize the FMR implementation. Questions are simplified to get the appropriate and succinct answers to research questions which are also aligned with the development discourse.

**Step 4:** Structured Questionnaires are administered to gauge the power among actors.

**Step 5:** The thematic analysis, texts, transcripts, and coded tables are reviewed and segregated into four general themes such as FMR initiation, planning (selection and prioritization), execution, monitoring, and closure stages.

**Study Question 2:** Data gathering involved qualitative data collection through semi-structured interviews, structured questionnaires, and FGDs.
Step 5: FGDs are used to know the project beneficiaries' standpoints on the FMR implementation process and its impact on their living conditions and livelihood activities. The study has four FGD sessions (maximum of 8 participants each) among landowners, landowner-subcontractor, landowner-traders, ordinary citizens (non-farmers), and ARBs in the project site to avoid selection bias regarding socioeconomic factors, agricultural problems, and policy and political preferences. The list of project beneficiaries for the study came from the Sildakin ARC.

Step 6: Semi-structured interviews are conducted to clarify the issues and challenges that transpired from FGDs.

vi. Data Analysis and Validation of Findings

The study uses thematic analysis and most significant change (MSC) stories in analyzing and identifying the FMR impact among beneficiaries. Information gathered was used to create narratives and themes. Below are the processes used to create narratives:

Step 1: Transcribe and review the texts and themes

Step 2: Generate narratives for the FMR subproject management processes and create a thematic analysis of Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' modalities of interaction, strength, and level of engagement in the FMR infrastructure project; and

Step 3: Use participants' most significant change (MSC) stories to scrutinize the project's impact. The changes due to FMR were narrated and subjected to thematic analysis and domain categorization to determine the level of outcomes using Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Outcomes.

Responses on how aid authorities implement the FMR subproject management process are identified, transcribed, and categorized to determine common themes
emerged based on the development discourse buzzwords such as collaboration, participation, depoliticization, planning, politics, and accountability based on aid authorities' interactions and relations during the FMR management process.

vii. Most Significant Change Stories (MSC) Methodology

The project beneficiaries' narrations of FMR impacts and their experiences are recorded, transcribed, and encoded to produce the write-ups of the stories. First, the stories are categorized corresponding to the FMR outcomes. After grouping, the stories were further subjected to thematic analysis to determine the specific changes representing the identified domains. Finally, the stories were classified according to the adapted Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Outcomes (Table 3) to determine the impact level of the project as revealed by the stories of change. The study deals with changes among beneficiaries related to levels 4-7, focusing on the FMR's effectiveness.

Table 3. Adapted Bennett’s Hierarchy of Program Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Change</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1: Inputs</td>
<td>Changes in terms of what is invested, such as time, funds, materials, equipment, technology, etc.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2: Activities</td>
<td>Changes in activities developed or delivered (i.e., training/ seminars conducted, farm inputs shared with others, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3: Involvement</td>
<td>How many participated in the FMR? Who participated in the FMR?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4: Reactions to the Program</td>
<td>Changes in the participants' opinion about the FMR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5: KASA Changes</td>
<td>Changes in Knowledge, Attitude, Skills, and Aspirations (i.e., increased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
knowledge about the crops and farming techniques to improve productivity, change in attitude towards the use of FMR to gain more profits and

| Level 6: Behavioral changes | Changes in the participants' behavior in business and farming practices, decisions, social actions, etc., (e.g., inclination to high-yielding crops, etc.) |
| Level 7: End results/changes in conditions | Changes in the participants' economic, civil, and social conditions (e.g., increased yield or farm productions, income, improved livelihood, acquiring assets, etc.) |

The study uses qualitative (soft) evidence to assess whether the FMR met its objectives. Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Outcomes was utilized because it was the simplest, easiest to understand, and contained the most applicable description of different levels of evidence of impact. Thus, qualitative mixed methods methodology created opportunities to perceive knowledge about governmentality holistically and comprehensively.

This part shows the research methods and participants’ details involved in this study.

viii. Scope and Unit of Analysis

The Silangan Maligaya Dayap FMR built last 2013 under the ARISP III. It is a 5.1-kilometer FMR with a 6.4-kilometer bridge subproject in the Sildakin Arc, Agdangan, Quezon, funded by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, a subset of JICA. It is part of Japan's comprehensive assistance in contributing to the Philippines' poverty reduction programs by improving ARBs' livelihood and income living in ARCs. Its main objective is to increase ARBs' income by enhancing their productivity and connecting the community to new markets and other development
opportunities surrounding the area. In addition, it intended to reduce the travel time and the transportation costs of agriculture products within the locality, to improve ARBs’ productivity and income, resulting in ARBs' improved productivity, hence increased income.

The chosen project site is in Agdangan Municipality, a 5th-class municipality in Quezon province, southeast of Metro Manila, Philippines. It was chosen because of its ARBs’ poverty incidence despite the efficient implementation of land reform measures, with land transfer at 98.71 percent while agricultural leasehold scope at 100 percent.

As of 2015, the municipality's population is 12,851, of which most are into prime agricultural activities, such as coconut farming and fishing. Thus, apart from sufficient timeframe for impacts to manifest, the FMR also presents a standard technology that the government adopts to achieve rural economic growth and poverty reduction agenda. However, it did not alleviate ARBs in poverty, with their double-digit poverty index, despite significant investments due to unaddressed socio-political challenges that hamper their income and productivity.9

This study focuses on the FMR context of Japan ODA projects in the Philippines. It uses the FMR project for two reasons. First, it represents a typical Japan ODA project as it belongs to the economic infrastructure sector classification of the third tranche of a 25-year-old Japan ODA-funded ARISP. The ARISP has been one of the Philippine government interventions and the first Japan ODA loan assistance to poverty reduction and rural development. Second, it also denotes a

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9 Philippine Statistics Authority defines poverty index pertains to the part of families/individuals with per capita income/expenditure lower than the per capita poverty threshold. As of 2015, its poverty index of 15.2, higher than some of its neighboring provinces.
typical Japanese infrastructure project used by the Philippine authorities to pursue economic development. However, issues and challenges regarding inequality still linger as benefits accrue mainly to the non-poor sector (e.g., landowners, landowner-subcontractor, and traders). Hence, it is high time to scrutinize the process and identify who reaps the short- to long-term benefits.

The unit of analysis are the participants’ narratives and interactions and project documents. It analyzes the interplay of practices and interactions from project rationalization to implementation and assesses the impact of those developmental governmentalities on the beneficiaries. Moreover, the researcher used narratives to examine how relationships among different institutions and populations have evolved and affected the FMR.

ix. Knowledge Gap

The holistic discussion regarding ODA, FMR, and governmentality provides an eye-opener on how aid authorities legitimize knowledge discourses through constant negotiation and circumstantial coalition-building in an ODA-funded FMR subproject. Moreover, it shows issues of political analysis and FMR governmentality that have been unexplored but remain relevant. Hence this contributes to the limited research that uses governmentality's application in the ODA bilateral relation.

The study intends to do several things to address the gap. First, this study used Foucault’s developmental governmentality approach in analyzing the Philippines-Japan ODA relations. Second, it focuses on the aid authorities network created in the FMR context of the Philippine-Japan ODA relation. Overall, it contributes to the scholarship of aid authorities’ dynamics by creating a framework on how institutions,
political settlements, social norms, and rules embed and strengthened power in social structures in an ODA-funded FMR subproject.
CHAPTER III: SILANGANG-MALIGAYA FARM-TO-MARKET ROAD’S PROBLEMATIZATION PROCESS

This chapter builds on Foucault's problematization process that can be explored through interactions of rationalities, programs for actions, and technologies. First, it starts by thoroughly analyzing how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities view poverty and how they govern and solve ARBs’ challenges, then determining if the FMR is a feasible technique to systematically change and reconfigure the status of the project site in calculated ways. Second, it includes a discussion of the project site and its situation before the FMR construction to see why the aid authorities selected it to help the ARBs in the Sildakin ARC. Lastly, it involves an analysis of the interactions of Japanese and Filipino aid authorities who took part in creating the ARISP, which funded the FMR.

I. The Problematization Process: Rationalities, Programs, and Techniques: The Power of Narratives in Facilitating Development Discourse

a. Rationalities: Making Problems Thinkable

The problematization process starts when authorities compare the practices of groups to be governed against underlying assumptions, and they find practice wanting (Rose & Miller, 2010). Often, the process leads to creating an ideal world where precepts of ideas with moral and ethical standards, such as poverty and government efficiency, are voiced out (Radcliffe, 1998). These ideals to which the government should be directed are called rationalities. The governors show that concepts appear problematic to people through various media, such as development plans, leaders’ narratives, and authorities could be used. These scenarios are consistent with
Foucault's claim that governmentality's primary concern is improving the general condition of the population (Burchell et al., 1991).

Japanese and Filipino aid authorities used theoretical concepts of poverty and economic growth as rationalities in this study. They collaborated to make these problems visible and framed within a common language by aiming to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth. In addition, they intended to remove constraints in areas with great potential for enhanced productivity through pro-poor distributional effects by providing rural infrastructure and other support services.

**a.1 Filipino Aid Authorities' Rationalities**

Filipino aid authorities framed poverty and economic growth as recurring problems. Mainly, bureaucrats used the national development plans narrative to frame poverty and economic growth as persistent problems that need to be addressed.

Based on interviews among Filipino aid authorities, the primary rationale for facilitating the FMR back then was to reduce poverty and promote economic growth among ARBs, as they were confronted by rural poverty. A baseline study prepared by the University of the Philippines Los Baños in 1997 showed that most Filipino smallholder farmers live in poverty and suffer underproductivity. Consequently, about a quarter or more of the Philippine population consists of impoverished landless farmers working as tenants or agricultural laborers (Lahiff et al., 2007). According to the Philippines' National Anti-Poverty Commission (2006), farmers have the second-highest poverty incidence (46.6%), with the agriculture sector having the highest poverty incidence and the slowest poverty reduction experienced...
Two-thirds of agriculture-dependent households, representing 40% of the population, were considered poor.

The Filipino aid authorities have been addressing equity concerns of combatting rural poverty and low economic growth by transferring land ownership to poor farmers and facilitating commercialization and industrialization interventions (Limbo, 2018). Specifically, the policymakers enacted the Magna Carta for Small Farmers last July 4, 1992, ensuring smallholder farmers' welfare and development by providing support services to attain their socioeconomic goals (Aquino, A. & Ani, P, 2013). However, their perception of the poverty concept was limited because it only pertains to low productivity and income, disregarding its multidimensionality. For instance, FBM55, a DAR representative, shared that many ARBs remained poor due to low agricultural productivity, insufficient market activities, and on-farm income, enabling FMR as a tool for poverty alleviation, "FMR is conceptualized as a solution to poverty as enhancing accessibility among smallholder farmers would eventually increase their yield and additional income." He equated poverty to a lack of infrastructure or accessibility, which could be addressed by any simple intervention related to productivity enhancement.

Bureaucrats' perception of poverty and economic growth narrative could also be seen in various development plans and laws enacted. They only push for interventions related to the supply side, such as the adequate provision of rural infrastructure, interventions, government technical assistance, and other market-oriented services as part of poverty alleviation initiatives (Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan, 1999). They advocated capitalism, believing that "efficient"
markets bring prosperity to the poor. For instance, they facilitated Republic Act No. 8435, otherwise known as the "Agriculture and Fishery Modernization Act (AFMA) of 1997, to capitalize on infrastructures, such as FMR, in connecting the agriculture and fisheries production sites to market and production centers in addressing rural poverty and promoting economic growth.

a.2. Japanese Aid Authorities Used Concepts of Poverty and Economic Growth to Justify their Intervention

Japanese aid authorities also used poverty alleviation and economic growth narratives to pursue development cooperation. They used the Millennium Development Goals 1990's narratives as a reference for their ODA objectives to frame poverty as a recurring problem of their recipient states and justify their continuous development cooperation provision. In addition, they created and promoted several "development initiatives" intended for poverty reduction for their recipients while strengthening Japan's bilateral relations. For example, Japan, through JICA, committed its full support to the Philippines to pursue poverty reduction through agricultural and rural development by including it in its priority areas, to wit:

With regard to JICA’s Country Assistance Policy in the Philippines, the project is aligned to the priority area for "Overcoming Vulnerability and Stabilizing bases for Human Life and Production Activity". Under this priority area, Japan will provide assistance on "the enhancement of agricultural production and productivity as well as the improvement of the processing and distribution of agricultural products (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021).
JICA’s response demonstrates how Japanese aid authorities' play of narratives may impact the development discourse. First, they used the poverty and economic growth narratives as rationalities, a narrow conception of development, that make problems thinkable. Escobar (2005) refers to this scenario as the "problematization of poverty," in which he claims that poverty was used by capitalism and modernity as a mechanism to control and produce consumers and change society by making the so-called "poor" into a problem and objects of knowledge and management, with the only solution was the pursuit of poverty reduction and economic growth as necessary and sufficient condition in achieving development. He also asserts that the creation and solidification of this development discourse made systemic pauperization inescapable. Using his framework, donors' use of poverty narratives may have consequences on the ODA ownership concept as the recipient may develop a systematic dependency on the donors by using ODA as a primordial source for its poverty-related interventions. Second, they used the power of words in constructing rationalities and defining what counts as legitimate knowledge and problem, eventually becoming common sense. In particular, they practice the concept of "labeling" to transform people's narratives into cases to be solved (Escobar, 1995). For example, they use poverty and economic growth concepts to target populations such as ARBs to improve their productivity and income. Third, they use the narrative to normalize development in addressing issues such as poverty reduction and economic growth impacts in the development discourse by allowing donors to yield considerable control over the recipient through loan conditionalities and other donor initiatives.

b. Programs: Making Problems Amenable for Intervention
Programs refer to approaches that enable governing authorities to direct subjects according to their desires and thereby link rationalities to techniques. This concept relates to how rationalities are translated into a more practical level that is amenable to intervention.

In this study, both aid authorities advocated for market linkage from farms to the transport system and then to growth centers to promote economic growth and reduce poverty. First, they intended the market linkage to minimize transport costs, stimulate marketing, and increase productivity and income among ARBs. Second, they advocated for creating market connections from the agricultural production areas were valuable and high-value commercial crops, livestock, and fisheries are mobilized and transported to the market. Third, they pushed for traditional market outlets or value chain development and encouraged industrialization to enable ARBs to participate and integrate into the market system. Lastly, they used market-oriented development discourse and attempted to create interventions they thought needed for ARBs' development.

The Filipino aid authorities pursued market linkage for productivity and income improvement among ARBs. They intended to course the market linkage program through ARCs to provide focused interventions and a holistic approach to agrarian reform measures and facilitate agricultural industrialization through the Philippine Program Beneficiaries Development. FBM55 shares that DAR envisioned ARC's industrialization, as seen in his response; "The ARC strategy facilitates industrialization and encourages the buildup of agricultural products based and fine-tuned industry structure to increase ARBs' income and productivity." He also
mentioned DAR's inclination to provide market linkage and multiplier effect in the community. For example, he said, "if ARBs saw agriculture accessibility improvements (e.g., FMR construction), they would contemplate crop production, motivating them to plant more, pursue market participation, then eventually improve their production and income. Even cooperatives may utilize it to minimize spoilage and cheap bulk inputs. Hence, it would encourage the ARBs to make their land more productive and sustainable for their daily needs, resulting in enhanced livelihood. These transformations were assumed to achieve overall development goals of poverty reduction, agrarian reform, and social development in the long run."

Moreover, DAR and the Philippine government’s primary planning agency, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), institutionalized their market-oriented agricultural development under the Program Beneficiaries Development Program and Chapter 2 of the 2004-2010 Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan. For instance, DAR promoted poverty reduction and economic growth by aiming to transform "ARBs into building blocks of agricultural and agribusiness development, consolidating ARCs with non-ARCs or adjacent and neighboring villages into market value chains and promoting production interventions in optimal convergence areas (DAR, personal communication, March 8, 2021)." Specifically, a DAR Representative shared that the ARC strategy highlights Filipino aid authorities' role in making markets work and helping the ARBs adjust effectively to the difficulties associated with market participation. In addition, the ARC strategy aims to level the playing field by delivering necessary social and infrastructure services and implementing programs and policies. Balisacan (2007) calls this kind of
provision among ARBs "beneficiary development," which is assumed to lead to higher income and job creation through ARBs' market participation.

On the other hand, Japanese aid authorities promoted the de-facto concept of inclusive economic growth when their bilateral ODA programs and policy advocacy for governance and institutional reforms increasingly shifted to financing the social and agriculture sectors in the 1990s. Consequently, they announced a "development initiative" for poverty reduction in developing countries while strengthening their bilateral relations. It supported market linkage by providing agricultural and rural development projects to help their recipients achieve economic growth. For example, they helped raise funds for the Philippine Assistance Program to fund the Philippines' agricultural development projects, reconstruct the Philippine export industry, and fund single-component agricultural infrastructure projects such as the Small-Scale Irrigation Development Multi-component Project and Integrated Jala Jala Rural Development Program (IJRDP). Moreover, Japanese consultants used to get involved in the Philippines' agriculture development and worked with various government agencies for JICA's agriculture development projects. For instance, JCM72, a Japanese consultant, shared that JICA and their firm approached DAR representatives to advocate for agricultural productivity and agribusiness through ARC connectivity development. Specifically, JCM80, a Japanese irrigation engineer consultant, introduced ARISP to DAR to launch a project to provide support services among ARBs, as stipulated in his official response;

In 1994, I had a chance to discuss (about) the new project for supporting the CARP with DAR Secretary (Mr.) Ernest D. Garilao. Then the Secretary introduced Mr. Jose Mari B.
Ponce (who was) the Director of DAR Project Development Management Staff (PDMS)

This scenario is aligned with Arnold's (1985) observation that consultants are technical assistance personnel who go worldwide from one assignment to another in getting overseas projects while their careers depend upon the ODA provision. They have influenced ODA projects through research and consulting participation in recipient countries.

Aid authorities use market linkage and the pursuit of agricultural and rural development to promote economic growth and reduce poverty which is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates how donors, through Japanese consultants intervene in the recipient's domestic affairs. They had a close and collaborative working relationship with the DAR officials. For instance, JCM80 started to work in the Philippines in 1981 as a consultant for several Philippine agricultural and irrigation development projects under Japan ODA (e.g., JICA technical assistant projects, Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) yen loan projects, and others), for the Philippines' NIA, Department of Agriculture (DA), and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). He even established relationships with government officials and closed connections with the staff due to his prior engagements in the Philippine agriculture sector.

Second, it demonstrates how aid authorities' play of narratives may impact the development discourse. Specifically, it shows how they used a one-dimensional approach to addressing poverty. They attributed rural poverty reduction and economic growth concepts to the lack of connection between farms and markets to make those
concepts amenable to infrastructure development. Likewise, it shows how they exclude the structure of political-economic relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions. For instance, they focus on the capacities of the poor, such as improving market linkage, compared to the practices through which one social group impoverishes another. In turn, the intended intervention may also lead to James Ferguson's (1990) concept of the anti-politics machine, which pertains to the resource allocation process that appears to be a technical solution for technical problems while ignoring its political nature. In this case, it happens due to aid authorities' disregard for the political questions of the lack of infrastructure and lack of income. It becomes a problem responsive to the technical "infrastructure development" narrative. This anti-politics is hidden and repetitive as aid authorities were capacitated to identify issues in ways that match the kinds of solutions that fall within their resources and capacity. Lastly, it supports Escobar’s (1995) explanation of how development discourse has been translated into practice through a standardized infrastructure package. In this scenario, both aid authorities practice a "rendering technical" shorthand rule representing the agriculture sector as an intelligible field with defined boundaries and visible and measurable problems. They defined and framed poverty and economic growth problems in terms of lack of productivity and income in the agriculture sector aligned to the technical solution of infrastructure development. They screened out cumbersome processes, such as socio-political issues of inequality and inequity, to confine them to an intervention arena in which calculations can be systematically utilized and linked to a solution. Unfortunately, they created temporary solutions, partially addressing the problems and leaving the unresolved socio-political challenges out in the open.
c. Technologies

The ideals of rationalities and the ways of making things amenable to intervention are harnessed in programs using mechanisms to make government operable in practice (Miller & Rose, 1990).

Both aid authorities used FMR as an intervention or technology to address the prospective project site's weak agricultural base and agri-industry linkage among prospective buyers.

Filipino aid authorities, such as Agdangan local politicians and DAR, saw the FMR as an intervention to pursue the municipality's economic growth. For instance, FFLPM65, a former local politician, relayed that FMR aimed to enhance the municipality's supply chain and facilitate efficient delivery of primary agricultural output surpluses (e.g., rice and other coconut products) from the farm to local and regional market sites and food processing centers.

FMR was helpful for the community, especially for traders and coconut farmers. They needed the road to transport their agricultural products to their business clients. Therefore, we (DAR and local government unit (LGU)) rationalized our poverty reduction and rural economic growth objectives and harmonized processes and interactions to construct the FMR in the Sildakin ARC.

DAR prioritized putting FMRs in places with more potential crops and other livelihood activities in demand domestically, regionally, and internationally to create market linkage and ensure a more stable income for rural farmers/people. It labelled the FMR's vital role in agriculture policy through development plans. Consequently,
Filipino aid authorities were also inclined to access ODA in 1992 due to the limited domestic budget available under the General Appropriations Act for support services. For instance, FBM55 shared that DAR saw ODA as an advantage of having a stable funding commitment for the project’s entire duration. Hence, DAR focused on resource mobilization abroad and presented ARC Investment Plans, developed by its Project Management Service, to prospective donor organizations. In the late 1990s, DAR implemented 17 Foreign-Assisted Projects (FAPs) simultaneously, with Japan having the most significant exposure for concessional loans and grants. During the Ramos administration, the amount of foreign assistance increased dramatically with US$22 billion added in support of ARC development, enabling the Ramos administration to use domestic funding of PHP 3,432 ($71.45) per beneficiary on support services lower than the PHP 9,950 ($207) of the Cory Aquino administration (Garilao, 1998).

Japanese aid authorities used the rhetoric that FMR is a significant component of rural development in stimulating local growth and helping integrate the rural economy into the economy. They rationalized FMR as a viable solution to achieving the Philippine overall development goals of poverty reduction, agrarian reform, and social development. They provided it in depressed areas with low road densities to encourage domestic growth and stimulate regional private sector initiatives. They are particularly emphatic in promoting infrastructure development.

The Japan ODA Charter introduces a straightforward investment strategy for promoting national (economic and business) interests for the Japanese. While the Japanese interest in helping the Philippines has always been strategic, it achieves its best by assisting the Philippines and providing infrastructure. Its infrastructure
funding in far-flung areas was also perceived to improve Filipino citizens’ welfare. The JICA’s official response to the author below sums up its position:

The sectors that JICA assists in Asia are very diverse. For example, in the case of the Philippines, we assist in infrastructures (railways, roads, ports, airports, etc.)… Regarding the assistance on infrastructure in the Philippines (context), the country has been facing a serious lack of infrastructure despite its rapid urbanization and proneness to natural disasters. Therefore, we believe that JICA's assistance with infrastructure in the Philippines is helping improve the citizens' welfare and helping to ensure human security. (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021)

In addition, they provided infrastructure projects for agricultural development. The ARBs' situation is the driving force of the Japanese aid authorities' "The will to Improve."\(^\text{10}\) Thus, it reinforces their consistent discourse on pursuing market-oriented agricultural development, aligned with the ideas shared by JCM80:

At the start of the project, qualitative and quantitative effect indicators and national targets for each intervention (Rural Infrastructure Development, Institutional Development, etc) are determined. Monitoring of the accomplishment of these targets was conducted throughout project implementation.

In this regard, Japanese aid authorities confined the Philippines' rural poverty solution to infrastructure development. Therefore, it funded the ARISP III to provide

\(^{10}\) It was a concept introduced by Tania Murray Li to show the rationalizing process of the central government on resolving problems
infrastructure and support services in the ARCs, link ARBs to urban growth centers, transform the value chain, and foster a competitive local agricultural sector.

Accordingly, both Japanese and Filipino aid authorities have agreed on FMR as one of the necessary support services in the agricultural sector. For instance, FMR provides access to agricultural input markets and promotes higher incomes. DAR and NEDA representatives (i.e., FBM5 and FBM66) explain that FMR has perceived benefits of helping ARBs shift to being non-poor. Similarly, their ideas coincided with Sethboonsarng (2008), who stipulates that FMR has the most significant impact on the Philippine communities as it offers direct and indirect benefits. In addition, it also aligned with Jalan and Ravallion (2002) who share that FMR plays a crucial role in promoting farmers' income growth and productivity. This scenario showed that they use FMR as a straightforward way for ARBs to participate in the market economy and acquire income source opportunities to advance themselves out of poverty. They encouraged industrialization to enable ARBs to participate and integrate into the market. They also made policies to allow markets to exist and provide for their needs. Based on an interview with a Civil Society Organization (CSO) representative, this resulted in an FMR that was probably necessary but insufficient to improve ARBs' productivity and income as they failed to consider other sociopolitical factors that might affect ARBs' situation.

The discussion of technologies presents some issues as aid authorities' recurring play of narratives may impact the development discourse. First, the Japanese aid authorities' depiction of infrastructure narratives to help "improve citizens' welfare" is problematic. It shows how the Japanese aid authorities' narratives imbibe a "messianic feeling" and speak for the most vulnerable and weak in the sense
that citizens are portrayed as victims who can be given help, suggesting an image of vulnerability and disregarding the idea that citizens' welfare is a consequence of other things as inequality. It aligns with Escobar's (2012) concept that such social construction manifests politico-economic strength among donors, which entails the power to dominate the weak ideologically. Just like the concepts of poverty and economic growth, the idea of citizen has been conceptualized economically, which has justified JICA's involvement in infrastructure development. These apolitical approaches to a foreign-funded project were rooted in early assumptions that development could be stipulated by capital and that political development would automatically follow economic development. Second, aid authorities' pronouncements embraced FMR's vital role in agriculture policy and recreated its images to help achieve a better economy and agricultural development. They framed it as the key to a better future, showing its socioeconomic value to the project beneficiaries. However, these narratives are often aligned to maximize their interests. For instance, Filipino and Japanese aid authorities' complementarity and aligned interests made the project acceptable on both sides; DAR was mandated to create support services programs for ARBs, while the Japanese consultant was expected to secure projects, satisfying their individual goals.

Third, the aid authorities' decision on the technologies manifests their primordial role in knowing how others should live, what is best for them, and what they need. Their intentions may be benevolent; however, they show that the usual course of progress should align with the same development narrative they conform to, which results in theatrically arranging interventions following only their self-interest and will do as they ought. For instance, the poverty concept has emerged around the
lack and deficiency words, lack of accessibility, and income ignoring its other causes such as inequality. Hence, aid authorities' intervention becomes limited as it fails to address other challenges that affect the situation. The next part discusses how the aid authorities use FMR as a technique in addressing poverty and economic growth narratives and conceptualize its suitability for the project site.

c.1. The FMR: Feasible Technique to Facilitate Change in the Project Site

The Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborated to align their countries' ODA policies. As a result, their development plans manifest contingent convergence. In general, they targeted the marginalized (i.e., ARBs within ARCs) and 'society' imagined as a whole. Both aid authorities believe in the market-oriented development discourse by providing infrastructure in the community consisting of the three sectors: the state, the market, and civil society.

The ARISP III, which funded the FMR, is an 11,802-million-yen untied loan supported by the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP 2004-2010) to accelerate agricultural market liberalization, farm commercialization, and encourage market-oriented solutions to agrarian reform issues and challenges. It is an area-based, demand-driven, participatory, inter-agency, multi-sectoral, and integrated development project. It is aligned with the CARP's industrialization principles as provided in Republic Act 6657 for various reasons. First, it focused on the supply side, providing efficiency-enhancing adjustments that directly affected the government's provision of support services and increased the private sector's role.

11 The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets…’
Second, it included measures to ensure Philippine agriculture's stability and increase the efficiency of service delivery by incorporating FMRs, and ARBs in market value chains that extend from suppliers to consumers. Third, it intended to turn ARCs into clusters to accelerate economic development and promote specific ARC connectivity and productivity interventions by facilitating production, processing/development, and marketing of agriculture-based products, establishing critical access roads, strengthening interventions, and constructing communal irrigation systems postharvest/processing facilities. Fourth, it pushed ARCs to build agribusiness development blocks through participatory, multi-sectoral, and integrated area development approaches. Specifically, it aimed to enable economic activities in the rural areas from 54 provinces or 136 ARCs, with most of its funding allotted to rural infrastructure development, particularly FMR construction. Lastly, it cultivated infrastructure development by targeting ARCs across provinces in the Philippines. Its original completion date was August 31, 2014, but it had contract revisions that extended it until August 31, 2015, and December 31, 2015. However, it was only completed on April 15, 2017, due to unforeseen factors in the pre-investment stage.

However, since it was a demand-driven project wherein the ARCs, thru the LGU, requested the specific intervention for their ARC, it would be worth understanding the situation of the FMR project site back then to see the alignment of the approved interventions to the needs of ARBs.

II. Sildakin ARC: Characterized of High Poverty Incidence, Lack of Infrastructure, Road Inaccessibility, and Minimal Economic Growth

The Sildakin ARC is the ARC beneficiary of the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR. It was created in 2000 in Agdangan, 3rd District of Quezon Province, a 5th-
class municipality. It covers five barangays (villages) such as Silangan Maligaya, Sildora, Dayap, Kinaguan Ilaya, and Kinaguan Ibaba, with 4,876 individuals or 1,086 households. It has 2,087.27 hectares of agricultural land with 177 land acquisition and distribution ARBs and 89 leasehold ARBs occupying 27 percent of the agricultural land area at 564.75 hectares. Before the FMR construction, it had a short feeder road of around 1 kilometer, with a rough road to farms and limited business engagements outside ARCs. From 2000, its double-digit poverty incidence went up as high as 44 percent in 2003 (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2003).

The municipality is located in the Resource-Based Area Development Cluster of the Philippines, wherein its Regional Physical Framework Plan, 2004-2030, included development opportunities in competitive agriculture production. Based on historical accounts, it was composed of settlers with livelihood activities such as fishing and farming coconut, rice, corn, banana, and other crops. It is home to raw agricultural materials such as coconut and other crops such as lanzones, bananas, and other export commodities vital to nearby businesses. Based on regional and local development plans, it was intended for crop production and eyed as an agricultural base that could be a source of income for smallholder farmers and LGU. For instance, it has extensive farmland and pasture lands near Metro Manila, which could support the food supply and emerging horticulture industry due to its cold climate or plant major agricultural-commodity such as coconut and expand livestock production such as livestock cattle raising. However, based on the interviews conducted at the regional level, its regional share of the agriculture, fishery, and forestry (AFF) to the total

12 Official document provided by the Japanese consultant
national output has declined as its share of the region's total AFF has also declined due to a lack of infrastructure.

The Sildakin ARC has a limited infrastructure. It comprises five villages within the municipality, has rough roads, and was classified under ARC Level of Development Assessment (ALDA) level 1, denoting that most ARBs were presumed to have low crop production, expensive farm inputs, and inaccessible roads. According to DAR representatives, ARBs incurred losses due to expensive transportation costs (such as the use of horses for product deliveries) and lowball offers from traders who purchase their products at a lower cost citing exorbitant transportation costs (i.e., expensive horse and vehicle rentals) due to village inaccessibility. This situation enabled them to presume that the ARC's limited and poor rural road network was an agricultural bottleneck requiring adaptive approaches and measures to respond adequately to the infrastructure needs without thoroughly considering other factors contributing to the existence of lowballers. They justified their FMR concurrence based on its own Memorandum Circular 3 in 2006, which states that FMR construction is encouraged on resource-based ARCs, which have an essential supply of production inputs that other ARC clusters may tap. They believe that FMR is essential in its agricultural development as it links the Sildakin ARC ARBs to the primary transport system and markets towards urban growth centers. FPF61, a former DAR employee, shared that DAR supported the FMR because it is beneficial for all:

Domestic firms with Japanese international clients, such as JNJ Oil industries and Peter and Paul, contracted big landowners as partner organic coconut farms (under contract-growing schemes). They get profits because it is
organic! [Laughs]. As a DAR employee, I helped them because it was good for the community. More development would create jobs for the poor. So I think profit is the success indicator of the FMR!

In general, the aid authorities characterized the municipality with inadequate infrastructure and an insufficient source of income before the FMR project. Specifically, bureaucrats were willing to achieve their institutional objective of providing support services, collaborating, and facilitating the needed interventions to address the project site's high poverty incidence, lack of infrastructure, road inaccessibility, and minimal economic growth.

III. Aid Authorities in ARISP III

This part shows the specific aid authorities involved in the ARISP, which funded the FMR, and explains their rationale and interests in collaborating on this project.

a. Overview of ARISP III

The ARISP logical framework objective states that it should improve the commodity flow efficiency and ARBs' mobility within and from the ARC's in support of agribusiness, livelihood, and domestic activities. It contained vital FMR component indicators contributing to achieving the ARISP III goal of increasing income by 30 percent. This framing is aligned with Balisacan's (2001) idea that public infrastructure investments, such as FMRs, generate positive linkages and externalities critical to sustained growth and economic development. Moreover, in his 2002 study, he asserts that FMR can improve the poor's well-being given that they have enough human capital to take advantage of such opportunities (Balisacan et al., 2002).
All ARISP tranches have the same processes, governance structure, mechanisms, and actors, with the same Japanese consultants managing the project across the tranches; from 1994 to 2015. Both Japanese and Filipino aid authorities have the same actors active in facilitating their ODA policies, such as bureaucracy, politicians, and the private sector, with the main difference in the flow of power in their institutional setting. For Japanese aid authorities, the bureaucracy, which JICA represents, is the actual decision-maker for the ODA projects. On the other hand, Filipino aid authorities enable the Philippine President, the head of the NEDA Board, and a national politician to be the chief decision-maker in the ODA approval process. Nevertheless, both aid authorities worked meticulously, provided the prescribed documentary requirements, and facilitated collaborations in project management. Specifically, DAR was the project proponent, while the Japanese consultant was the project implementation expert who prepared the technical documentary requirements for the NEDA-Board and JICA ODA approval process, showing Foucault’s governmentality’s collaboration and synergistic approaches in creating the FMR subproject followed the problematization process.

The ARISP started when the Japanese consultants approached DAR to create a project that would provide necessary support services for ARBs, such as FMR subprojects. FPF78, a former DAR employee who was directly reporting to the DAR Secretary and was active in the ARISP implementation, shared that the Japanese consultant's proposal was an offshoot of DAR’s resource mobilization activities in the 1990s with Japan as the most significant donor. With DAR’s objective to provide necessary support services simultaneously as land redistribution, it accepted the offer to work on the creation of the project, to wit:
DAR decided to access ODA due to budget constraints. We were delighted because their [JCM80 and other Japanese consultants] offer showed that we could benefit from funding commitment for the entire project duration. It was a product of our hard work in convincing the donors! It was mutualism; we gave them projects while giving us the funds to fulfill our mandate.

As a result, DAR and the Japanese consultants work in flexible arrangements. They developed a close professional relationship while working during the JICA and NEDA's project appraisal process.

JICA funded the ARISP starting 1990s and implemented it in several phases. It has provided various agricultural support services, such as FMR, in all its phases. The first phase in 1995 included FMR but concentrated on irrigation projects, while the second in 1999 focused on the potable water supply. DAR reiterated that it pushed for ARISP III in 2006 to provide essential support services to ARCs. FPF66, a former DAR employee, shared that they pushed for the third phase due to the Philippines' lingering problem with limited essential support services to ARBs:

We needed help because we must give support services. Japanese consultants have been supportive of the Philippines' development projects. Japan's 2005 Country Assistance Strategy acknowledged ARISP gains and pledged support to replicate them. ARISP III was an offshoot of the lessons learned from previous stages and added institutional development aspects.

JICA's official response also supported this claim by stipulating that "ARISP III was conceptualized after the ARISP I and II implementation (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021)."
The approved ARISP III partially funded the FMR subproject in Agdangan Quezon, while the LGU funded the other half. The Japanese head consultant was an active facilitator throughout the project management process. For example, JCM80 provided more comprehensive copies of FMR documents, such as project implementation policy manuals and ARISP III intervention details per province. His collection of archives could be due to his direct participation and contribution to developing the project implementation policy manual as part of his consultancy services. He said, "In terms of reference (TOR) of the Consulting Services, the preparation of the project management guidelines [project implementation manual] was stipulated as consultant's (my) task works."

Regarding the ARISP III FMR component, it targeted 754-kilometer FMRs. Two (2) of those incomplete FMR sub-projects with a total length of 10.54 kilometers were completed in May 2018, while project implementers completed the remaining ones (1.18 km) in the second semester of 2018. These targets show that FMR was intended as a viable solution for achieving the Philippine overall development goals of poverty reduction, agrarian reform, and social development.

The ARISP III's demand-driven nature involved aid authorities such as bureaucrats, politicians, and private sector representatives in initiating the ARISP and its FMR subproject in Agdangan, Quezon. The next part discusses the details regarding Japanese and Filipino aid authorities who facilitated ARISP and the focused Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR in Agdangan, Quezon province. It is significant as it shares how rationalities and interests were created and embedded in facilitating the FMR as a technology for the project beneficiaries.

b. Filipino Aid Authorities in ARISP III Provision
The aid authorities in this study refer to individuals directly or indirectly engaged in making decisions and governing the ARISP. They craft, control, and implement the project resources and possess privileges and power regarding the project.

Filipino aid authorities in this study consist of the private sector, bureaucrats, and national politicians. Bureaucrats and national politicians came from cabinet-level inter-agency coordination committees called the NEDA- Investment Coordination Committee (NEDA-ICC) and DAR as the project proponent. At the project onset, they have to ensure ODA funding requirements within the government's budget's fiscal constraints and hurdle both the ODA approval process and the budget appropriations' approval process. They also tapped local politicians due to the latter’s power of the purse’ on the project site and the private sector representatives, such as construction and consultancy firms, to participate in the project construction. Figure 3 below presents Filipino aid authorities and their accommodative approach towards other groups.

Figure 3: Filipino Aid Authorities in ARISP*
b.1. Bureaucrats

The bureaucrats, predominantly from DAR, crafted, processed, and implemented the ARISP. Concerning this study, they are known as technocrats who worked as NEDA’s economic managers and heads of executive agencies who joined DAR in facilitating the FMR project. They accommodated the project and ensured its alignment with development plans and institutional objectives of providing support services among ARBs. Below are the stages of the ARISP approval process.

The first stage is called initiation. It started when DAR accommodated Japanese consultants' offer of an ARISP project which was conceptualized based on their prior engagements in big-ticket Philippine agriculture projects in the 1990s. At the onset, DAR, along with Japanese consultants, planned, coordinated, monitored, and ensured ARISP's economic, financial, and social feasibility and aligned it with the Philippines' development planning, investment programming, and budget processes.
The second stage is related to project preparation. It commenced when DAR prepared the ARISP’s preliminary project documents with the technical assistance provided by the Japanese consultants for the project development and evaluation process to denote the project's technical, financial, social, environmental, and operational viability.

The third stage is called project appraisal. It started when the Philippine Executive Department, mainly the NEDA, reviewed the ODA project loan. NEDA-ICC conducted a comprehensive appraisal to justify the project expenditure and certify its alignment with the national development priorities encapsulated in the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) and Public Investment Program (PIP). The project process involved the proponent agency that prepared the project proposal and oversight agencies responsible for its approval and inclusion in the annual National Expenditure Program (NEP) that the Philippine President submitted to the legislators for budget appropriations over the medium-term for domestic funding and congressional appropriations of national government guarantees for loan payment.

The fourth stage was project clearance. It commenced when the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) evaluated ARISP’s suitability in the government's capital outlay, government expenditure program, and overall country's fiscal position. As the ARISP’s technical and economic merits and project’s financial viability were justified, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP; the Philippines' Central Bank), Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and Department of Finance (DOF) released their certification and approval, formed a negotiating team, and requested the President to grant it full powers to negotiate with the donor. Eventually, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the NEDA-Board chairman, and JICA signed the
ARISP-III exchange of notes on December 3, 2007, and the loan agreement on December 18, 2007, using the 27th Yen Loan Package under PHP Loan agreement 242. DOF and BSP monitored loan drawdowns.

Based on interviews among DAR’s former ARISP staff, the ODA approval process had been the most time-consuming because of the rigid rules and requirements. However, it was also an appreciated feature of the project management process because they became meticulous and keen on every project detail. On the other hand, they also had significant roles during the ARISP implementation process as part of the Project Coordinating Council (PCC) that met biannually to assess, provide direction to the ARISP, and approve its corresponding infrastructure subprojects.

The bureaucrats had been crucial in creating and facilitating the ARISP, which funded the FMR subproject focused on this study. However, it is still under the executive branch subordinating its 'power' to the Philippine President, a national politician.

**b.2 Politicians**

National and local politicians participated in the ARISP project. For example, the Philippine president, a national politician, such as the Philippine Presidents, strengthened and consolidated their role when all her appointed bureaucrats, such as government agency representatives, aligned their economic growth and poverty reduction initiatives in crafting and facilitating all ARISP tranches. This scenario manifested in the swift approval of ARISP III during the ODA approval process.

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13 The Loan Agreement was made between the Government of the Philippines and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in 2007. However, in 2008, operations of JBIC were merged with JICA
The President during ARISP III approval process was Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. She was best known for her neoliberal economic and agricultural philosophy of reducing poverty while promoting economic growth. She relied heavily on ODA-funded projects to demonstrate economic development. Thus, a development project such as ARISP III was included in her development and investment plans and flagship projects for CARP beneficiaries (MTPDP, 2010).

On the other hand, the Philippine Congress comprises politicians/legislators with oversight power over the ODA-funded project domestic budget process. It has the power of the purse as it approves the budget appropriations. It shared power with the President in budget provisions. For instance, it appropriated counterpart funds within the Annual Expenditure Program submitted to Congress (ODA, 1996). Hence, it had considerable control over the approval of the ARISP domestic budget during the budgetary hearing for the DAR’s annual budget appropriations. Based on interviews, most congressional members in the Congressional Oversight Committee back then were in the same political party as the President, with the same economic growth and poverty narratives and political agenda, hence facilitating a smooth budget appropriation process where the ARISP III budget was included.

Lastly, local politicians were given an opportunity in the ARISP implementation since it was a demand-driven project wherein the ARC(s), thru the LGU, were responsible for requesting their preferred subprojects. In this study, the municipality's LGU was generally occupied by pro-administration politicians. Seven former local politicians who requested the FMR belonged to the Philippine President's political party. Based on interviews, most former politicians shared that they learned

14 (Section 5 of the ODA Act of 1996).
and requested for ARISP III grant from the President during their political party's assembly and agreed with her pronouncements that helping ARBs address their agricultural constraints would also help improve their municipality's economic situation. One of the former politicians shared that he was convinced they could secure the FMR because it was a promise by the President back then. FFLPM64, a former politician actively getting the FMR subproject funding, pointed out that the Philippine President back then was one of the principal reasons for the FMR request, to wit:

I was confident that we could secure the FMR because it was a promise by the Philippine President. Specifically, the FMR subproject was easy to lobby since our municipality was included in her resource-based cluster areas program. Aside from that, since most of us belong to her political party, we used our political narrative that the FMR would be useful in the upcoming elections. It was true enough! The farmers were happy, and most of us won for reelection.

I hate to say this, but political will and affiliation always matter if we want these infrastructures (Interview, August 20, 2021).

They saw FMR as a significant intervention in facilitating poverty reduction, improving the municipality's agricultural base, and promoting economic opportunities. First, FMR was intended to promote economic opportunities for ARBs by enhancing Agdangan's goods and services market. For example, it could facilitate efficient delivery of primary agricultural output surpluses, such as rice, corn, coconuts, processed oil, sugar, soap, and other coconut products, from the farm to local and regional market sites and food processing centers. Second, it aimed to improve farm-level productivity by reducing transportation costs, input prices, and
delivery time. In turn, these cost reductions by FMR will encourage ARBs to pursue efficient crop production and diversification, generate market activity, and increase competition among input suppliers (Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan, 2004). These Filipino aid authorities' rationalities and techniques demonstrated how they perceive FMR as an image of progress, modernity, and development. They used formal state structures to pursue market-oriented agricultural development, maintain and demonstrate their power and safeguard their existing privileges. Hence, they requested government interventions to improve the condition of the population in a deliberate manner, which could shape the sites' landscapes and ARBs' livelihoods.

The decentralization process was premised on the idea that when people govern themselves and have a proactive role in decision-making, governance outcomes are more efficient, equitable, and sustainable (Musgrave& Wong, 2016).

It is a dual procedure and joint work to pursue inclusive government processes between government and people: from central to local and local governments to people. However, enabling people to participate in decision-making involves rebalancing power relations due to influential positions within the local community (Migdal & Klaus Schichte, 2005).

Table 4: Local Politicians who Requested the FMR

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<tr>
<th>Local Politicians(^{15})</th>
<th>Political Party in 2009(^{16})</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>FFLPF60</td>
<td>LKS-KMP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon.1</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon.2</td>
<td>LKS-KMP</td>
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\(^{15}\) Based on the documents provided by DAR
\(^{16}\) Local politicians’ political parties at the time of requesting the project
LKS-KMP is the political party affiliated with then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
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<td>Hon. 3</td>
<td>LKS-KMP</td>
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<td>Hon. 4</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
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<td>Hon. 5</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
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<td>Hon. 6</td>
<td>Independent</td>
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<td>Hon. 7</td>
<td>Independent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon. 8</td>
<td>LKS-KMP</td>
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The table above shows the national government and LGU dynamics. It shows the local politicians who requested an ARISP budget for the FMR construction which manifests their domination in the preliminary FMR implementation processes. They were included in the ARISP implementation due to the decentralization process in Philippine governance. Three local politicians, who requested the FMR, believed in the president’s pronouncements that the government should focus on increasing income and improving farmers' productivity. Some DAR representatives agreed that FMR’s construction was also due to the high level of political influence, connections, and authority to lobby exerted by the local politician.

The FMR supported Filipino power elites’ political capital. They dominated the FMR process, lobbied with the implementing agency, and participated in the consultation process while simultaneously capturing disproportionate economic benefits. For instance, the FMR benefitted the local politician as the FMR was used to strengthen his family’s political capital, as her wife was elected to the same position.
For instance, most interviewees attributed the FMR construction to the couple, not the implementing agency or the national government that funded it.

b.3. Private Sector Representatives

The private sector from consultancy and construction firms also participated in the ARISP III implementation. Filipino consultants worked with their Japanese counterparts to evaluate and supervise the FMR at the local level for the entire duration of ARISP. The Filipino consultants started with their official consulting services on April 28, 2008, until April 27, 2014, but extended until March 2015 (V. Saplala, personal communication, August 13, 2021). They handled FMR's technical and administrative issues and were involved with guideline formulation, procedure setting, site validation, and technical discussion among implementing agencies. In addition, during the FMR implementation, they conducted training seminars and workshops for the implementing agencies' personnel and individual consultations and technical discussions in the DAR-Central Project Management Office (CPMO) and the field offices. It is worth noting that the Filipino consultancy firm back then is now part of the Japanese consultancy firm that handled ARISP III.

Due to their experiences, knowledge of local conditions, and familiarity with Filipino workers, domestic construction firms relied on technical aspects during FMR implementation. As a result, the Philippine construction firm Contractor 1, with a joint venture with Contractor 2, bagged the Agdangan FMR subproject. However, though involved in some corruption issues and court cases, the construction companies were still allowed to participate in the FMR bidding and other big-ticket infrastructure projects despite the court cases. It is worth noting that these FMR
contractors were top DPWH contractors from July 2016-December 2017, with Contractor 1 occupying the top 120th contractor of DPWH, while Contractor 2 is in 340th place, getting 784,291,736.05 PHP ($16.3M) and 235,478,217.39 PHP ($4.9M) of the total value awarded DPWH contracts, respectively (PCIJ, 2017). cxviii

On the other hand, due to project management guidelines, DAR gave prime importance to agrarian reform organizations such as Agdangan Municipal Cooperative leaders to share their suggestions and recommendations on how the FMR intervention would align with their needs. As a result, they had passive engagement as they concurred on the market and interest-driven agenda rather than offsetting it. The reasons given by academician respondents included that the only way for the cooperative to participate in the process is to align its narratives with the implementing agency’s values, showing that it is better to cooperate than to be in constant conflict with the government and other stakeholders. Hence, this scenario manifests that the cooperative during FMR consultation was just a service provider in the FMR implementation process, prioritizing their immediate parochial interests and survival (Thomson, 2006). cxix

While the traditional basis of consultation, monitoring, and evaluation gave cooperatives legitimacy, the preferences of the participants' FMR processes presented some issues. For instance, CPMO predominantly consulted the cooperative, which was dominated by a traditional leader that favors the status quo and is often associated with interests that regard advances in market-oriented interventions as encouragement in stabilizing the non-poor sector’s rights and interests. Thus, although cooperative heads are at the sharp end of agriculture interventions at the local level, they cannot

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17 Income calculated using the Annual Philippine Peso Per US Dollar Rate End-of-Period 1 US Dollar= 48.036 PhP) of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas as of 2020.
always project the voice of the marginalized. Furthermore, during the FGD, most ARB representatives in the consultation process shared their limited participation as stakeholders in the FMR implementation processes. This experience posts a question regarding FMR ownership and indicates the necessary reforms in conducting a community-level FMR consultation process. These reforms must be directed at effecting changes in existing power relations among stakeholders in CARP and community-level ODA projects.

The private sector representatives had a significant part in the FMR’s implementation process; they reaped benefits by participating as service providers (consultancy firms on technical aspects) and input providers (construction firms on supply aspects) within the FMR’s value chain system. In addition, following updates on the Philippine Development Plans from 1988 to 2007, all ARISP tranches encouraged greater participation of LGUs and the private sector in implementing infrastructure projects, particularly in the financing, operation, and maintenance of facilities.

The discussion above shows how the power relations were governmentalized under the President's patronage towards politicians and bureaucratic circuits and how Filipino aid authorities worked collaboratively to do the project, which funded the FMR as a technology responsive to identified rationalities of economic growth and poverty reduction.

The next part would deal with Japanese aid authorities and their collaborative approaches to the ODA projects.

c. **Japanese Aid Authorities in the ODA**
The Japanese aid authorities are bureaucrats, politicians, and the private sector. They are usually called the Iron Triangle as they represent the three main actors’ vested interests and mutual favors. The figure below shows how these aid authorities collaborated and benefitted each other. It manifests the importance of pursuing national (business and economic) interests.\(^\text{18}\)

**Figure 4: Japanese Aid Authorities in ARISP**

*Illustrated based on the interviews and literature review conducted by the author

Japanese politicians shaped the macro-structure of the overall ODA process. As represented by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Bureaucrats were the constant negotiators, while the private sector, represented by the Japanese consultancy firm, was the connector and facilitator of future ODA projects in recipient states.

c.1. Bureaucrats

\(^{18}\) Based on the combined information from interviews and literature reviews regarding Japanese aid authorities
The Japanese cabinet members have been active in facilitating the ODA charter. For instance, JICA's, as the Japanese ODA project's decision-maker and implementer, included field observations regarding its field experiences in its ODA-funded projects that were heavily considered in the Japan ODA charter to ensure its responsiveness to the recipient's domestic policies.

Other members of the bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), worked with JICA to design and implement ODA projects and provide infrastructure and commercial development loan projects related to their business interests. This scenario is aligned with Johnson's (1982) claims that in a "developmental state," bureaucracy drives all of Japan's economic expansion due to its proactive national interest in conducting ODA projects with Japanese domestic firms. Furthermore, he believes the METI was the focal organization in understanding Japanese industrial policy and the Japanese private sector expansion, denoting their related business and economic interests facilitating their ODA.

*Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Ministry of Finance, and JICA are the most prominent players in ARISP III. JICA was "bureaucratically embedded" with MOFA to facilitate the latter's ODA projects. Its official response suggests their institutional collaboration;*

Country Assistance Policy is primarily owned by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore the question about policy aspect shall be better answered by the ministry. However, JICA makes sure that the Country Assistance Policy is created to address the current challenges that the recipient country is facing (including the latest development plans), based on our observation in the field (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021).
JICA incorporated MOFA’s policies in ODA projects and was involved in the ODA Charter revision in 2003, which facilitated an extensive country-based ODA task force and assistance program that strengthened the creation of Japan's Country Assistance Programs and Rolling Plans. For instance, JICA and its affiliated Japanese consultancy firms worked with the Philippine government to facilitate the last two ARISP tranches through policy consultations. In addition, it reviewed ODA schemes and formed and selected candidate development assistance projects. It also suggested collaborations with the Philippine government regarding project management, institution building, and infrastructure planning, which the latter adopted in the project implementation process.

MOFA has a central role in ODA policymaking. It gives policy direction to Japanese ODA initiatives in the Philippines. It set up the International Cooperation Bureau in 2006, which comprehensively planned and drafted policies related to its ODA. It also pushed for other development cooperation initiatives that strengthened its trinity of development cooperation. For instance, during the ARISP III approval process, Japan Prime Minister Abe and Philippine President Arroyo signed the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership (JPEPA). In addition, both leaders issued the "Philippine-Japan Joint Statement on Partnership between Two Close Neighbors for Comprehensive Cooperation" in December 2006 to promote the free flow of goods, services, and capital between the two economies (MOFA, 2006). It was seconded by its ODA project implementor, as JICA’s official response shared:

that (ODA) loan is just one of the types of assistance JICA offers.

We also provide technical assistance and grants and promote
PPPs and citizen participation. We believe that the variety of menus and our holistic approach are one aspect that makes JICA unique (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021).

Warren (2005) shares that MOFA still retains the right to decide on each JICA project, wherein the former made overall ODA policies, while the latter was responsible for ODA implementation and ensured policy alignment on the recipient’s perceived needs. MOFA-owned documents such as Japan's ODA Charter, Country Assistance Policy Investments, and JICA studies strengthened bureaucratic linkage to the private sector and perceived an increase in the ODA project's effectiveness due to the simultaneous pursuit of economic and business interests.

c.2. Private Sector Representatives

Daniel Okimoto (1988) writes that Japan is a "relational" or "societal" state where the government and private sector are intertwined. He describes an interactive process where the two work together to meet each other's individual and combined needs.

Japanese ODA is mainly infrastructure. The Japanese private sector, such as domestic consultancy and construction firms, expand and operate overseas to facilitate Japanese infrastructure standards among Japan ODA recipients. Based on interviews, they base their own investment choices on the Japanese government's ODA pronouncements, so they treat ODA pronouncements as a “Good Housekeeping Sign of Approval” that denotes investment worthiness. Using Japanese aid authorities’ narrative, it sees the Philippines as lacking infrastructure despite rapid urbanization. Hence, it provides ODA in infrastructure (i.e., railways, roads, ports,
and airports) in other sectors, especially agriculture. For instance, they see opportunities in the Philippines as it lacks infrastructure despite rapid urbanization, which coincides with JICA’s official response:

The sectors that JICA assists in Asia are very diverse. For example, in the case of the Philippines, we assist in infrastructures (railways, roads, ports and airports etc.), energy, communications, health, governance, agriculture, disaster management, water and environment, and peace and development of Mindanao etc. (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021).

The Japanese consultants have a proactive role in the Philippines’ agriculture development. They aligned their interests with DAR and made the ARISP preliminary program proposal acceptable on both sides; DAR was mandated to create interventions on the integrated delivery of services and programs to ARBs, while Japanese consultants were active in the project-finding mission. As a result, they created interventions aligned with the ARC strategy, which was less politically contentious and had measurable and predictable outcomes as it only dealt with technical matters and remained elusive in anything related to politics. For instance, JCM72, a Japanese consultant, conveyed his experience when he and other Japanese consultants such as JCM72a, JCM80, and JCM75 arranged ARISP with DAR:

Together with Mr. Ponce and his staff, we prepared Project Proposal for ARISP-I in 1994. I fully assisted in the actual implementation of ARISP-I

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19 JICA’s official response included its Philippine ODA projects were also allocate on energy, communications, health, governance, agriculture, disaster management, and water to ensure citizen's welfare and human security.
through technical support during the project appraisal by JICA. Finally, the ARISP-I was approved for implementation by JICA and NEDA.\textsuperscript{20}

The claim is consistent with David Arase's (1994) study that the Japanese private sector and bureaucracy worked together to ensure Japan's national interest.\textsuperscript{cxxxiii} He finds that the request-based JICA loan procedure incentivized the Japanese consultants to plant requests in the prospective recipients and allowed JICA to continue case-by-case decision-making on ODA projects. In addition, despite JICA's claim that ARISP is an untied ODA, DAR still hired a Japanese consultancy firm as part of the project showing a conflict of interest. For instance, JCM80 recounted how he became officially part of the ARISP at the onset:

In the Japanese yen loan project, the implementing agency (DAR) should hire a technical consulting firm to implement the project. Fortunately, my firm won the competitive bidding for selecting the consultant services firm in 1996. Therefore, since 1996, I was assigned as Team Leader of the Consultant Team for ARISP-I, -II, and -III until March 2015.

It is worth mentioning that this was the scenario; although the Philippine ODA Act of 1996 prioritizes Filipino over foreign suppliers in procuring services and goods, no local consultancy firm contested the Japanese consultancy firm's involvement. Instead, the Japanese chief consultant subcontracted to Filipino firms and facilitated connections between the recipient and the Japanese bureaucracy. Consequently, the Japanese consultant's initiatives created harmonious interactions between DAR and JICA; JCM72a shared their efforts to promote a collaborative approach as stipulated in his response, "we subcontracted with Filipino consultants,

and we closely communicated with JICA for the ARISP's successful implementation. We were an effective bridge between DAR and JICA."

Moreover, JCM80, as he was familiar with Philippine agriculture projects, mentioned that he also helped in the ARISP III document preparations "the Project Proposal for ARISP II & III were prepared by DAR ARISP Project Management Office (PMO) with me, as the technical assistant, during the implementation of ARISP I & II, respectively." He also mentioned that the ARISP III funded the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR, intended to combat national poverty by increasing the real household family income by at least 30 percent, from PhP58,331 to PhP75,830 (Villanueva, 2011). Specifically, he quickly provided more comprehensive copies of FMR documents than the DAR representatives, which manifested his power, deep knowledge, and complete access to the overall ARISP project implementation.

The Japanese private sector's involvement in the project design and implementation processes reflects the historical beginnings of Japan's ODA, which was facilitated by private entities wherein the post-World War II Japanese government could not implement ODA projects overseas or retain overseas trainees as part of technical cooperation initiatives. The Japanese ODA's role in connecting the Japanese private sector with its trade and investment objectives is structurally included in the ODA policymaking activities, even if modalities change over time. Hence, the ARISP was made possible due to the Japanese private sector and bureaucrats' connection with Japanese politicians' involvement in the overall ODA policy environment.
c.3. Politicians

Japanese politicians’ pronouncements were bureaucrats’ basis on their foreign policy motives and activities. For instance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had great control over ODA, using it for his political goals. His commitment to 'proactive pacifism' in the revised ODA charter had been the guiding principle of the private sector and JICA in approving and implementing ODA projects. Accordingly, they supported the ARISP III, as Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s administration pushed through high-level dialogues with the Japanese prime minister.

The Japanese aid authorities, also known as the Iron triangle, national interests (i.e., the fusion of economic and business) are the unified motive that dominates the Japanese ODA provision. They show how the ODA project demonstrates its triangulation while cementing economic relationships with the developing world, such as the Philippines. They use ODA to leverage trade and investment opportunities and implement trade cooperation. According to Japanese diplomat Koichiro Matsuura;

The general purpose (of Japan ODA) is to win friends. We do not expect quick results. However, it helps Japan when the ASEAN economy is healthy because it is a big market (for us), and even a marginal impact is essential. The benefit will come back to Japan indirectly (Matsuura, 1981).

It is worth noting that six of Japan's top ten developing country trade partners are also in the top ten ODA recipients. This long-term view secures Japanese bureaucrats, politicians' national interests, and private sectors' economic prosperity. Hence, their characteristics affect the overall ODA system and FMR implementation processes.
Based on the information provided, MOFA, JICA, and Japanese consultants transform and continue to bring changes in how the Japanese aid authorities practice development, making them suitable agents of the discourse of development and a means to facilitate the diffusion of the practice and discourse of development as it is defined today. They became international organs that cannot be dissociated with the Philippines' agricultural development projects as they are the heart and mover of the changes they produce.

This chapter identifies the FMR problematization process, from rationalities, programs, and techniques, intended to improve beneficiaries' lives. It shows explicitly how aid authorities construct their own simplistic and technocratic narrative about how development transpires and uses FMR, with the neoliberal ethos, to convert ARBs into self-disciplined subjects.

It also shares the FMR with the neoliberal ethos of converting ARBs into self-disciplined subjects. It also includes an analysis of how narratives and interactions are embedded within the development discourse and concrete practices that determine personal views of 'a problem' and mobilize authoritative actors, techniques, and truth forms as technology. Finally, it also explores how aid authorities sought to govern, remake, and regulate project beneficiaries' economic, political, and social institutions. The next part pertains to how aid authorities implemented the FMR and how aid authorities' interactions demonstrated development discourse. Specifically, it shows the formal and informal practices of the FMR subproject management processes that may spell the difference between the FMR's plan and what it has accomplished.
CHAPTER IV: THE SILANGANG-MALIGAYA FARM-TO-MARKET ROAD

SUBPROJECT MANAGEMENT PROCESS

This chapter examines how aid authorities implement the project processes to execute FMR as a technology for the ARBs in Sildakin ARC. Specifically, this includes an analysis of their interactions and concrete practices within the FMR project implementation process' development discourse. First, it provides an overview of the processes and informal and formal practices generated, which according to Foucault, as Tania Murray Li narrated, "are fragments of reality" which "induce a whole series of effects in the real," "crystallize into institutions," "inform individual behavior" and act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things. (Li, 2007). Second, it scrutinizes formal and informal practices of the FMR subproject management processes that may spell the difference between the FMR's plan and what it has accomplished. Finally, it analyzes the practices facilitated across the project management processes from the initiation to evaluation stages based on the
research participants' central thematic constructs of development discourse through interviews and FGDs about the FMR subproject management processes.

This chapter has two parts. The first part pertains to the FMR stages and their description, while the second pertains to the interactions and practices among project actors in the entire FMR management stage arranged by themes related to current development discourse.

I. The FMR's Project Management Process: The Salient Transition from Inception to Maturity Stages

ARISP III is a demand-driven project wherein the ARCs, thru LGUs, were responsible for requesting their preferred subprojects. Subsequently, Japanese and Filipino aid authorities had to ensure that all requested subprojects undergo the salient transition from inception to maturity stages, referred to as the project development cycle or project management process. Hence, describing the FMR stages used in this study is imperative.

The FMR initiation stage pertains to the ARISP approval, wherein the discussion revolved from ARISP conceptualization to its approval stage. It showed a range of interactions among crucial actors in the FMR subproject management process. Therefore, understanding the project rationale and collaboration processes among Japanese and Filipino aid authorities is essential in understanding the governmentality framework in the FMR subproject.

It started from the ODA approval process of ARISP I, not ARISP III, because it shows how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborate extensively. Japanese consultants conceptualized the project during the first tranche and prepared the
documentary requirements needed in the approval process. On the other hand, the ARISP III approval process was swiftly approved because it was a continuation of previous tranches and was included in Japan's 2005 Country Assistance Strategy for the Philippines' indicative projects.

The FMR planning stage relates to FMR's feasibility study, approval, and financing. It was more of an analytical and consultation exercise in which the FMR's viability and appropriateness were examined from a different point of view of aid authorities and project beneficiaries. In this stage, DAR used the documents and the technical assistance provided by the Japanese consultants; however, a copy was not provided during the research process, citing a lack of copies by aid authorities. Instead, the researcher relied on the narratives shared by the aid authorities and former staff assigned to the FMR.

The FMR execution and monitoring stages involve discussion on the actual FMR implementation and the related issue regarding variation orders.

The last is the FMR closure stage and its corresponding evaluation process, which discuss how it approached its termination stage and how the aid authorities, both Japanese and Filipino, evaluated the project.

The existence of thematic concepts of development discourse discussed per FMR stage in the next part would share aid authorities' point-of-views and their corresponding rationale and interests that affected the FMR's outcome and how they arranged opportunities to make space for themselves in the development discourse.

II. Deconstructing Development Discourse in the FMR Project Subproject Management Process
This part responds to the discursive analysis of development through the FMR project management process by answering the research question on how aid authorities implemented the FMR. Specifically, it focuses on how they and other project actors' interactions demonstrate central constructs of development discourse during the project management process. It is subdivided into themes based on the development discourse buzzwords used by Escobar (1995) and shared by the research participants during the FMR management process. It uses a deconstructionist approach by providing an in-depth analysis of the Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' relationship in the ARISP III and FMR's management processes. This part has six thematic themes: collaboration, participation, depoliticization, planning, politics, and accountability based on aid authorities’ interactions and relations during the FMR management process.

A. Development Cooperation and the Collaborative Approaches of Aid Authorities in the FMR Subproject Management Process

This part focuses on how Japanese and Filipino aid collaborate in developing cooperation from planning, coordinating, controlling, and monitoring the FMR management process. It emphasizes how they worked per the FMR stage, maintained the status quo despite various interests and interactions, and demonstrated how the FMR became a result of the fusion of Japan-Philippine aid authorities' interactions and their inclination to the core concept of market-oriented development discourse.

Development Cooperation is the process of assisting countries to make social and economic progress. It has three criteria: 1) support for developing countries, 2) support for economic development or improvement of living standards, and 3) support
must consist of grants and concessional loans based on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). (Klingebel, 2014). The ARISP III, which funded the FMR, is considered one provided by the Japanese aid authorities to their Filipino counterparts to promote the Philippine agrarian reform through infrastructure development in ARCs previously uncovered by previous ARISP tranches (JBIC, n.d.).

a. FMR Initiation Stage

Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborated to push for development cooperation, such as ARISP’s third phase to link production and market centers, processing/development, and market agricultural-based products of ARBs.

The ARISP funded the focused FMR and is the first comprehensive Japan-funded Philippine agricultural and rural development program. It was a demand-driven project wherein the ARCs was responsible for suggesting their respective proposed subprojects. It consisted of several components such as rural infrastructure (i.e., irrigation facilities, FMRs, postharvest facilities, rural water supply systems, and bridges), institutional development, and other agricultural support services to enhance ARBs’ productivity and income. Its implementation commenced in 1995 until 2017 to provide agrarian support services such as infrastructure maintenance provisions in 79 ARCs, 150 ARCs, and 136 ARCs, in three tranches, respectively. Specifically, the ARISP II facilitation was slow, with only 57 percent of the 1,617 ARBs provided with support services as of December 2004 due to the implementing agency’s time and organizational capacity constraints. Subsequently, DAR pushed for ARISP III to cater to other uncatered ARCs by previous ARISP phases and link production and market centers in facilitating interconnected production, processing/development, and
marketing of agricultural-based products of ARBs to get sustained funding, as seen in the increased market activities and connections of landowners in the project site.

The ARISP has undergone an internal, preliminary review process by the NEDA Secretariat to ensure that the project is attuned to national development priorities encapsulated in the Philippine Development Plan and Public Investment Program. All government agency representatives involved in the ODA planning and implementation, such as DAR and NEDA, accommodated the project using their flexible requirements. In this stage, the Executive Department, particularly the NEDA, has the oversight function by providing an annual review of all ODA-funded projects. In this regard, NEDA conducted a comprehensive ARISP appraisal and approved those projects to justify the expenditure before implementing ODA-funded government projects. Likewise, ICC conducted a comprehensive ARISP appraisal and approved those projects to justify the expenditure.

To expedite and prioritize ARISP III’s approval process, DAR also included it in the Philippine Investment Plan under Major Final Output 3 of Support Services, building on the gains of the Rural Assistance Support and Credit Program (RASCP), ARISP I and II, and advocating agricultural productivity and agribusiness through ARC connectivity development.

Most aid authorities benefitted from the ARISP. For instance, FPF61, a former DAR employee, shared that DAR benefitted from the subproject as it helped to achieve its mandate of implementing support services to ARBs and harnessing their growth potentials, to wit:

We requested an ARISP funding extension to support those ARBs previously not covered by other agricultural programs. Their significant participation in
the market would lead to more opportunities, improved productivity, and higher income. Moreover, working and aligning our objectives with local politicians was required to get the ball running.

The NEDA-ICC and JICA formalized the ARISP III approval process on December 18, 2007, driven by mutual understanding and the perceived success of ARISP I & II from 1994 to 2006 in terms of beneficiaries’ productivity and net on-farm income. Hence, sustained JICA assistance was made available.

a.1. The Development Cooperation and the Collaboration during its Approval Process

Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborated to ensure ARISP approval. They aligned interests and expertise to make the preliminary ARISP program proposal acceptable on both sides. They developed a close, reasonable, and accommodating working relationship to facilitate ARISP’s project charter, appraisal, and approval processes.

The ARISP ODA approval process had collaborations from three main actors in the bureaucracy: approving, proponent, and funding release groups. Each had to ensure that the ARISP had the appropriate documentary requirements. The approving group comprises actors from the central government, including agencies at the national level, the foreign donor representative, and foreign private sector representatives from consultancy firms and the banking sector. The NEDA-ICC reviewed and evaluated ARISP III to rationalize public investment and expenditures. It is further subdivided into two groups; ICC- Technical Board (ICC-TB) which gave
direct advice to the DAR on the documentary requirement improvements, while ICC-Secretariat provided technical support before submission to ICC- Cabinet Committee (ICC-CC) that approved the ARISP III on July 19, 2006. The NEDA Board issued a formal confirmation on September 26, 2006, under ODA loan Agreement, while the Philippine Monetary Board gave the ARISP III the annual budget program over the medium-term and congressional appropriations of national government guarantees in negotiation with JICA. Hence, the NEDA Board chairman, then-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and JICA representatives signed the ARISP III exchange of notes on December 3, 2007, and the loan agreement on December 18, 2007, using the 27th Yen Loan Package under PHP Loan agreement 242.21

The proponent group is the DAR-PDMS and DAR- Foreign-Assisted and Special Projects Office's Financial Unit (DAR-FAPsO- (FU), which led the ARISP III preparation. DAR prepared ARISP III's preliminary technical documentary requirements for the NEDA-Board and JICA approval processes, ensuring alignment with agrarian reform objectives and JICA requirements with help from Japanese consultants.

The funding release group is composed of domestic and foreign groups. The first group comprises foreign group donors, including JICA and Japanese foreign banks such as Mitsubishi, Tokyo Bank, and United Financial of Japan (UFJ), assigned to dispense the JICA funding to the DAR via BSP. The second group was the domestic financial agencies such as BSP, DBM, and Landbank of the Philippines

21 The Loan Agreement was made between the Government of the Philippines and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in 2007. However, in 2008, operations of JBIC were merged with JICA
(LBP), which ensured ARISP III’s smooth funding release during the subproject management process.

An interview with a former JICA representative directly involved with the project acknowledged that Japanese and Filipino aid authorities had a harmonious working relationship pursuing ARISP III. DAR representatives and Japanese consultants reviewed past engagements while preparing for ARISP III business plans and other pertinent requirements. JICA, in turn, aligned the ARISP with its Country Assistance Plan for the Philippines and funded it after completing its Portfolio Clean-Up Exercise. Despite ARISP’s lack of development survey, a usual preliminary requirement for Japanese project approval, JICA still funded it, demonstrating its flexibility in processes and standards.22

a.2. Collaboration Among Japanese Aid Authorities in FMR Implementation

Structure

Both aid authorities collaborated on the actual project implementation after the ARISP approval process. Japanese consultants helped establish technical standards and showed a strong presence in overseas subsidiaries of Japanese consultancy firms. Since a particular consultancy firm initially made the ARISP specifications, it is not surprising that it won the contract once it opened to competitive bidding. DAR contracted Japanese consultants consisting of a Japanese Team leader with three (3) other Japanese expatriates and Filipino consultants included in the DAR-FAPsO as consultants per JICA’s loan conditionalities, as seen in the project management structure. Then the Japanese consultants hired their Filipino consultants at lower rates than foreign consultants to help oversee FMR’s technical and administrative issues.

22 Medium-Term Strategy for Overseas Economic Cooperation Operations (April 2005)
The ARISP III’s project management structure demonstrated that Japanese consultants were also considered vital actors in the project management process who assisted the PCC and CPMO in the overall project management. For instance, the Project Coordinating Council (PCC), composed of the Philippine President and other appointed bureaucrats, and the DAR Central Project Management Office (CPMO) with Japanese consultants, were the project implementers and premier decision-makers for ARISP's and FMR’s overall direction. PCC is an interagency body led by DAR and other agencies such as NEDA, DPWH, DBM, Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Secretariat, and Bureau Local Government Finance (BLGF). In addition, the Subproject Approval Committee (SAC), an interagency committee, with the assistance of CPMO and Japanese consultants, helps PCC in its policy and supervisory roles, specifically in reviewing infrastructure project parameters. During this administration, as PARC was part of PCC, the decision-making process was susceptible to political decisions as the President's political prerogatives were overpowering. For instance, the overall ARISP III supported the President's formation of the "super regions" program. As a result, most (52 percent) of the ARCs catered were from provinces within the North Luzon Agribusiness Quadrangle and Luzon Urban Beltway super regions.\(^{23}\) The CPMO, and the ARISP national inter-agency implementing team, had bureaucratic actors. They have sufficient organic staffing devoted to CARP-related activities such as ARISP and receive additional honoraria comparable to their Japanese counterpart. It is under the direction of DAR-Foreign-

\(^{23}\) Provinces under North Luzon Agribusiness Quadrangle were meant to transform into major agribusiness corridor focused for infrastructure buildup to help farmers increase productivity and spur growth in agro-industry sector. On the other hand, provinces under Luzon Urban Beltway were to transform provinces into globally competitive industrial and service center (Official Gazette, 2006). Source: https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2006/08aug/20060819-EO-0561-GMA.pdf
Assisted and Special Projects Office's (DAR-FAPsO) Project Implementation Officer (PIO) and, with the help of consultants, handled the overall operations and liaised with JICA. It mainstreamed its operation by utilizing DAR's permanent and organic staff at the national, regional, provincial, and municipal levels while operating within their respective areas of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the DPWH-CARP-Central Labor Based-Units (CLBUs) provided FMRs’ general housekeeping processes, facilities and services, and other day-to-day needs. In addition, it worked with DPWH-District Engineering Office (DPWH-DEO), which implemented the FMR on the site in partnership with municipal and barangay24 (village) LGUs.

CPMO and Japanese consultants created and recommended project management guidelines as part of JICA’s loan conditionalities, allowing Japanese influence in terms of knowledge sharing and capacity building. For instance, JCM80, with the assistance of other Japanese consultants, was part of the CPMO involved in the ARISP's overall governance. He also created the project implementation policy manual, which provided a common framework for FMR implementers, decision-makers, and beneficiaries and helped create detailed FMR engineering designs. In addition, he prepared CPMO's monthly progress report requirement and JICA's quarterly requirement of financial management processes, an implementation plan, and disbursement projections. He had official and unofficial meetings with JICA personnel and reported the significant issues and challenges of the ARISP implementation. His commendable work ethic did not go unnoticed as a DAR representative expressed gratitude for helping the CPMO ensure the FMR quality and

24 According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, it is the smallest political unit in the country. It is commonly known as village.
cost-effectiveness. Hence, all operational policies and guideposts prepared based on various subproject documents were influenced by Japanese development thinking.

c. FMR Planning Stage

Actors collaborated to facilitate FMR planning to determine its alignment with beneficiaries' needs. For instance, bureaucracy (CPMO, its local counterparts and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)), politicians (Agdangan local politicians), Japanese aid authorities such as bureaucracy (JICA), and Japanese private
sector (Japanese consultants) and project beneficiaries such as ARBs, landowners/landowner-traders, landowner-subcontractor, and ordinary citizens collaborated during the FMR planning stage. They facilitated FMR preparation, consultation, and approval processes within the community.

They perceived the fundamental problem was poor quality rural road networks and lack of FMR, which resulted in rural poverty and minimal economic growth, legitimizing FMR as essential in agricultural development. They intended to link communities and agricultural fields to the transport system and markets, reduce transport costs, stimulate marketing, increase productivity, expand diversification, and improve income and profitability.

b.1. Collaboration During ARC Pre-Qualification and FMR Approval Processes

CPMO, with the help of Japanese consultants and other government agencies such as DPWH, facilitated ARISP III by accepting requests from the LGUs. JICA, on the other hand, ensured sufficient project funds and compliance with loan agreement provisions and project implementation guidelines at the onset of the subproject.

A year before the election, local politicians, through LGU, filed a 2009 Municipal resolution, lobbied the DAR office to include their municipality in ARISP III, and requested FMR (road and bridge), participatory irrigation projects, system, institutional development, and postharvest facility. Furthermore, they expressed their commitment to provide the counterpart fund of fifty percent of the overall project cost and assist in the Right-of-Way (ROW) acquisition, construction, inspection, monitoring, and support in the operation and maintenance of the FMR after its turnover. For instance, FFLPF60, a former politician, shared, "the FMR is helpful for
the ARBs so they could sell their outputs to traders and get more income. It will improve their agricultural productivity, income, and quality of life."

The CPMO yielded to the local politicians' request. Accordingly, along with Japanese consultants, such as Regional Project Management Office (RPMO), Provincial Project Management Office (PPMO), and Municipal Project Management Office (MPMO), in coordination with DPWH-DEO, it enabled ARC and FMR approval processes.

PPMO, together with its counterpart at the local level, conducted a Barangay (Village) Consultation Workshop (BCW) to consult ARBs regarding their development needs and FMR’s suitability for their needs. It also incorporated the FMR in the ARC Development Plan (ARCDP), guaranteed submission of the consultation report and documentary requirements for project approval and funding, and ensured ARC qualification and its existing local development plans. Its partners, such as ARC representative, village heads, municipal agrarian reform officer (MARO), who also served as DAR facilitator, and DPWH-District Engineering Office (DEO) representative, had to ensure transparency and participatory consultation process among stakeholders and align the updated and finalized version of ARC Indicative Development Plan (IDP) with the ARCDP and other pertinent information in local development plans.

On the other hand, the ARBs expressed approval for the FMR construction due to their inclination to industrialization and development discussions. They believed in the DAR's claim that most of their produce was needed in the industrial plants and convinced them that most of their products went stale due to a lack of
transportation and road inaccessibility. FBM55, a DAR representative, shared that people saw FMR as an instrument to express their desires to improve their living conditions, which will provide easy access from their barangays (villages) to the Poblacion (city center) for the social services and other forms of economic relief. Likewise, constituents identified FMR as the priority need to facilitate better access to the town proper of Agdangan, where the center of the economy and government services are situated.

The ARC approval depended on how the Japanese and Filipino consultants, PPMO, and other local project staff articulated ARBs' concerns to the project implementers, such as DPWH-DEO and CPMO. After the consultation, PPMO and DPWH-DEO prepared the Indicative Development Plan (IDP) summary, while the Japanese and Filipino consultants assigned an FMR engineering consultant to set up procedures, site validations, and technical consultations, conduct the feasibility studies (technical, financial, economic, and environmental criteria, assisted DPWH-DEO in the detailed design (DD) and Program of Works (POW) and reviewed/assessed IDP. After IDP was accepted, the Japanese and Filipino consultants and DAR counterparts completed the site validation and development plan.

After IDP preparation, agreements were summarized into an action plan with recommendations to comply with Strategic Development Plan (SDP) requirements. Subsequent site validation manifested that the FMR was aligned with the adopted management guidelines, with JICA's official response:

The inclusion of this (Silangang Maligaya-Dayap) FMR project means it has satisfactorily met the selection criteria established in the project
implementation guidelines. Its implementation is expected to develop and/or improve (the) distribution of agricultural products within the locality, thereby contributing to the overarching goal of improving the livelihood of agrarian beneficiaries by increasing their production and income. (JICA, personal communication, May 21, 2021)

The CPMO approved the FMR using the standardized project management guidelines and information gathered during the BCW. Then, with assistance from Japanese consultants, it released pre-engineering funds and conducted a site inspection with RPMO, PPMO, DPWH (Regional Office and District Office), the concerned LGU, and beneficiaries to validate the alignment of the FMR to the LGU’s development plans. Next, PPMO, with the help of DPWH-DEO and LGU, prepared the SDP, which served as the basis for preparing DD and POW. It also finalized the DD and POW and released initial cash for the construction works. Since the FMR cost was lower than PHP 50M ($1.04M), only the DAR Steering Committee (DAR-SC) approved the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR and classified it as a high development priority subproject of PCC. Lastly, the CPMO released the Letter of Allotment Advice and Cash for FMR funding through PPMO.

Consequently, the DAR-SC and Agdangan LGU signed a subproject agreement (SPA) to commence the FMR construction. LGU submitted a commitment form to finance and undertake the feasibility studies and detailed engineering to comply with the prescribed project standards and maintenance plan. It also allocated FMR’s annual operation and maintenance funds for ten years. Eventually, both CPMO and Japanese consultants reported to JICA to ensure sufficient project funds and
compliance with loan agreement provisions and project implementation guidelines at the onset of the subproject. Furthermore, the Japanese consultants, headed by a Japanese Team Leader with three other Japanese expatriates, provided technical assistance in engineering and accessed preliminary information for creating, reviewing, and evaluating detailed FMR designs.

All project actors worked and collaborated due to the strict facilitation of project management guidelines and a shared vision of providing FMR for the Sildakin ARC. They had knowledge-sharing to ensure that the FMR requirements were submitted and aligned with the existing project beneficiaries' needs. They developed a strong level of engagement due to institutional setup and deep communication among actors.

Although aid authorities showed collaboration, most participants identified CPMO and JICA as the most powerful actor due to the overall decision-making process during this stage. This scenario aligns with the observation that JICA and CPMO intended to flex their power nominally. JICA allowed the Japanese consultants to pursue their interests, while CPMO took control as the overall project implementor. On the other hand, most participants recognized that ARBs were marginalized due to their passive engagements.

c.FMR Execution and Monitoring Stages

Japanese and Filipino aid authorities fostered collaboration and implemented governmentality to ensure the approved FMR in Sildakin ARC is within the subproject schedule. Their collaboration demonstrates how the governmentality created compartmentalized but cohesive actors with defined processes and stable
interaction patterns and examines the relations and roles of local politicians and Filipino aid authorities.

They focused on the collaborative interactions and relations from the planning and design phases to the end of the construction phase. Specifically, they use the project implementation policy manual to define the work scope and cost-sharing arrangements and structure project implementation schemes that foster collaboration and cooperation. JICA's official response states that "the inclusion of this FMR project [in the community] means it has satisfactorily met the selection criteria established in the project implementation policy manual (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021)."

Due to defined work and structured project implementation schemes, they had minimal interactions in this stage. FPM55, a former DAR employee, said, "project implementation policy manual helped us standardize our processes and minimized conflicts among local politicians. In addition, it provided us the JICA systems that served as our 'bible' in facilitating the ARISP." He even shared that they collaborated, approved, and classified Sildakin ARC as high development priority using the selection criteria provided in the manual.

In this stage, the CPMO, the Japanese, and Filipino consultants collaborated to ensure that the FMR execution was aligned with the project management guidelines on the subproject level. For instance, the work scope indicated that DPWH-DEO implemented the FMR construction while the local politicians provided support services during the construction, implementation, and maintenance. Likewise, after signing the contract between DPWH & the Contractor, CPMO and DPWH DEO held a pre-construction meeting at the project site to inform and explain the FMR goals and
requirements during construction work among concerned agencies (i.e., RPMO, PPMO, DPWH-Regional Office (DPWH-RO), DEO, and LGU,) beneficiaries and contractors.

c.1. Planning and Design Phase

Filipino and Japanese consultants collaborated to undertake the FMR’s road and bridge design phase while CPMO approved the design and implementation processes. On the other hand, DPWH facilitated the pre-engineering, construction, and implementation while PPMO and LGUs spearheaded the consultation and planning exercises. These actors collaborated and worked within a defined scope of work, cost-sharing arrangements, and implementation schemes, resulting in a smooth work process.

The Japanese consultants and DPWH-DEO used standard government designs for the road and bridge components. At the onset, with the help of a Filipino consultant, they flagged that FMR’s bridge foundation needed a thorough geology analysis. However, the CPMO declined due to the limited pre-engineering budget. So instead, they continued to use a simple geological survey and designed a standard bridge component. Hence, nobody knew the actual soil conditions while executing the general standard pile designs for supporting piers and abutments.

Japanese consultants collaborated with CPMO during the FMR implementation process. They were also involved even in major FMR decisions though CPMO always prevailed. For instance, JCM80 advised and informed the CPMO that heavy grading (e.g., full-scale Portland Concrete Cement Pavement (PCCP)) was required for FMR construction due to the site’s proximity to the
seacoast and typhoon-prone area. Hence, additional costs were needed to build steep mountain slopes with practical typhoon-resistant mechanisms, with the anticipated cost of P38,531,284. ($802 M).\(^\text{25}\) Again the CPMO declined and chose the cheapest construction cost.

In terms of the working relationship, Japanese consultants were congenial but strict. The MARO had a chance to work with JCM80 as she took care of him during fieldwork. She even shared that she felt afraid initially because he was strict and meticulous while ensuring that the FMR followed the project management guidelines. On the other hand, FPF70, a former DAR representative, preferred collaborating with the Japanese consultants because of their keenness on FMR's quality while exercising harmonious and flexible relationships, to wit:

JCM80 initially suggested using PCCP instead of gravel to ensure FMR's sustainability and quality; however, it was declined due to the high cost. Nevertheless, to ensure FMR's alignment with the guidelines, he suggested using PCCP on high slope parts while gravel in flat parts, which the CPMO finally approved. Again, I admired how he displayed his humility, flexibility, and creativity to get things done.

FPF71, a former DAR regional staff, revealed that Japanese consultants were firm on FMR technical details. At the same time, flexible in dealing with political issues: "JCM80 followed the project implementation manual and always deferred to CPMO and LGU on political issues related to the FMR construction. He was always amenable if decisions were aligned with the guidelines." These interactions

\(^{25}\) Converted using the Annual Philippine Peso Per US Dollar Rate End-of-Period (1 US Dollar = 48.036 PhP) as of 2020.
highlighted Japanese consultants' and DAR representatives' cooperation and collaboration on power resources. While the former had technical expertise, the latter had decision-making power. Both aid authorities’ inclination to work harmoniously and collaboratively made the FMR process stable and acceptable among actors.

The Japanese and Filipino aid authorities show how they collaborated and protected each other during the FMR construction. Contractors found that the actual soil design differed from the original. For instance, the soil penetration on the test pile driving of two bridge abutments was only 1.10 meters out of the 12-meter approved design depth (i.e., using the 60 blows of the KOBE 25 diesel hammer). In response, the DPWH conducted a series of reviews of the Detailed Engineering Design and found that design modifications were needed, while Japanese consultants checked and analyzed the requested design and conducted a site inspection. Eventually, CPMO, with JICA’s concurrence, yielded to modifications, variation orders, and cost escalations using the Japanese consultants' recommendations. Specifically, it agreed to expand the contract duration to 60 days and instructed the DPWH-RO and DPWH-DEO to revise the bridge foundation works’ design from pile foundation to spread footing as suggested by Japanese consultants. This scenario shows how Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborate and protect each other as they kept the cost escalation at 9.9 percent to protect the CPMO and the designers from the Philippine procurement law’s sanctions. According to the informal interviewees, internal arrangements between DPWH and contractors were made not to exceed the cost by 10 percent.26 This scenario supports the previous claim that the Japanese aid authorities

26 According to the Philippine Government Procurement Act, in case the Variation Order exceeds ten percent (10%), the Procuring Entity must ensure that appropriate sanctions are imposed on the designer, consultant or official responsible for the original detailed engineering design which failed to
exercised passive power, wherein Japanese consultants had enough basis on pushing to use concrete but still chose to act nominally and let the CPMO decide.

On the other hand, JICA ignored the issue and did not introduce drastic reforms to get its concurrence in the FMR documentary requirements related to the project site. Instead, it concurred on the project modifications as long as CPMO followed the agreed-upon project manual during the project's onset. It also supports the claim that they had minimal interference in the FMR technicalities and dynamics unless the project management guidelines and their interests were dismissed. It also developed a good working relationship and less friction between Filipino aid and non-aid authorities.

c.2. Execution Stage: FMR subproject Tendering and Contracting Phase

c.2.a. FMR Management Team

c.2.a.1. Japanese and Filipino consultants’ collaboration in overseeing FMR’s technical and administrative issues.

Specifically, Japanese consultants engaged two homegrown Filipino consultancy firms as part of consultants for ARISP III, on which one of those firms was now under the joint venture of the Japanese consultancy firm. Filipino consultants’ primary function was to help DPWH and the Japanese consultancy firm oversee the FMR’s technical and administrative issues. Once completed, they were also involved in forming and strengthening those in charge of the FMR’s management and sustainability. Moreover, as technical experts in the FMR, they also conducted training seminars and workshops for the personnel of the DPWH-DEO and facilitated consider the conditions that led to the need for adjustments costing more than ten percent (10%) of the original total contract price.
individual consultations and technical discussions with RPMO. However, FCM64, a local consultant, raised the rigid reporting system. He shared that he experienced that CPMO representatives downplayed his suggestions unless endorsed and approved by the Japanese consultants, considering the urgency of the project and his experience working in the municipality in the past, to wit:

Since I had experience working in Agdangan Quezon, I was the one who suggested subjecting the project site to further geology analysis. The subsoil is hard, so the standard design may need modification. I told the scenario to JCM80, and he instructed me to inform the CPMO immediately.

However, the CPMO representative told him that they would not act on it unless it was written formally and signed by the Japanese consultants. The whole process of reporting and recommending took us two months which was too long!

However, he declined to comment on the consultancy fees as he did not know the actual fees received by his Japanese counterparts. All he knew was that the fees received by the Japanese consultants included salary and the cost of living allowance. He even conveyed that payment for consultancy services of the local experts was coursed to the respective companies, which in turn pay the salaries and compensation of their personnel.

c.2.a.2 Filipino bureaucracies and local politicians collaboration to facilitate FMR construction

The CPMO was the lead agency in the FMR implementation and oversaw the overall administration, planning, control, management, and supervision. It
collaborated and developed a harmonious relationship with various bureaucracies. First, it worked closely with the LGU’s Municipal Planning Officer to comply with FMR’s evaluation criteria requirements. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), CPMO’s community representative, had her own office within the LGU premises. She guided construction supervision and monitoring schemes to facilitate implementation and completion based on the approved design, cost, and construction scheme and schedule according to the Guidelines on Procurement and Construction Monitoring Infrastructure component. It also conducted periodic monitoring (e.g., monthly, quarterly, and semi-annual coordination meetings, quarterly assessment meetings, and review of reports) and consolidated completion reports for submission to DAR’s top management and JICA, copy-furnished PCC/SAC. Second, CPMO worked with DPWH-DEO to draw up action plans, assess the FMR implementation status, resolve operational issues at its level, and take action to solve implementation problems. Third, it helped the DPWH implement, inspect, and ascertain compliance of the FMR to standards, specifications, and approved detailed design. However, documentary evidence for CPMO’s collaboration, such as minutes and meeting results, was unavailable.

On the other hand, the LGU assisted the DPWH and CPMO in preparing the pre-engineering studies consisting of feasibility studies (F/S), D/D, POW, and other requisite documents based on the defined scope of work, cost-sharing arrangements, and agreed implementation scheme. It also issued a municipal resolution stating that it would finance 50 percent of the FMR’s approved budget, annual operations, and maintenance (O&M) costs based on the computed amount of approved standard parameters for O&M.
c.2.a.3. JICA Cooperative Approaches to Maintain Status Quo

JICA ensured that other actors, such as CPMO and DPWH, implemented the FMR based on loan agreement provisions and the project implementation guidelines, monitored the subproject and facilitated the fund disbursements. In addition, it conducted a regular project implementation review to assess its performance, determine the issues and concerns, and recommend solutions to unclog bottlenecks in project implementation. As stated in JICA’s official response:

A monthly meeting between JICA and Executing Agency was held during project implementation. Moreover, JICA conducted a Portfolio Review Meeting (PRM)* twice a year with E/As, including DAR. JICA welcomes DAR to a special meeting with JICA OIC anytime when urgent matters arise through any mode of discussion preferred by both parties. The NEDA hosts regular Project Implementation Officers meetings with all ODA implementing agencies where donors, such as JICA, WB, ADB, GOI, others, and oversight agencies are present. The Monitoring and Evaluation Service (MES) of NEDA conducted a quarterly consultation by sector where DAR belongs to the agriculture sector.’

Moreover, it also shared ‘In general, JICA regularly coordinates with the executing agencies about project status and (subproject) implementation matters. As earlier mentioned, JICA has several avenues to coordinate with the executing and oversight agencies (regular meetings, PRM, etc.). To gain first-hand information on implementation status, JICA visits selected project
sites and attends some project activities, if possible. (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021)

JICA usually concurred with CPMO’s overall FMR decisions but was less involved in the day-to-day FMR management. It monitored the FMR progress through a Japanese consultancy firm and intervened in some crucial stages as it recommended solutions to eradicate bottlenecks in program implementation. It met with the project management team biannually during Portfolio Review and Project Implementation Review (PIR) meetings, and each meeting was preceded by a pre-PIR meeting between the JICA program officer and DAR desk officers regarding the subproject’s urgent matters and appeared to be a partner evaluating its financing viability and sustainability. Putting this forward, JICA’s official response.

Basically, all JICA-funded Project is based on the recipient government’s official request; thus, an implementing agency of the recipient country is always at the center of project conceptualization. JICA discusses the concept with the implementing agency and considers the project's rationale, necessity, and viability as the funder (JICA, personal communication, May 17, 2021).

JICA showed a conflict of interest in FMR’s management process by ensuring the supply of Japanese technical experts and checking on the subproject’s viability. For instance, a team of Japanese consultants, headed by a Japanese team leader with three (3) other Japanese expatriates from the Japanese consultancy firm, provided ARISP the technical assistance and evaluation for detailed engineering design and helped JICA and CPMO to prepare the project management guidelines, overall project
implementation plan, and required disbursement projections quarterly. In addition, JICA’s close relationship with the Japanese consultancy firm allowed them to monitor FMR’s progress and inclination to be aligned with its ODA’s interests.

JICA and Japanese consultants collaborated and worked within their scope using the project management guidelines. A former CPMO representative expressed a productive working relationship with JICA. She preferred working with the JICA as it does not tend to micromanage the process and has provided complete trust and support, resulting in a convenient and congenial working relationship. Moreover, the claim was seconded by the response given by the Japanese consultant. JCM80 stated that Japanese and Filipino aid authorities were working collaboratively, “We were always working (on) how to support the agrarian reform beneficiaries and (how to) improve their living standards because those were also DAR’s ultimate objectives. Thus, CPMO appreciated our work. Even we sometimes had heated discussions.”

c.2.a.4. Japanese consultants: The go-between JICA and CPMO

JCM80, with three other (3) Japanese consultants, undertook the role of go-between JICA and CPMO. He had meetings with JICA personnel, reported the major topics about the ARISP implementation, and submitted quarterly reports and required disbursement projections. He also submitted a monthly progress report to CPMO and was immersed in the FMR’s implementation with the help of local consultants. For instance, JCM80 visited the Sildakin ARC whenever necessary. In addition, he visited the FMR sub-project twice, in October 2013, for a pre-construction meeting and in March 2015, for a site inspection. In addition, he had a formal meeting among DAR (CPMO, RPMO & PPMO), DPWH (RO & DO), the concerned LGU, beneficiaries
Agdangan Cooperative, and the contractor related to the design modifications. As a result, he was immersed in FMR’s construction activities, became aware of the score of what the FMR was expected to achieve, and kept JICA informed of the FMR’s progress.

Japanese consultants’ opportunity to work with DAR and local consultants gave him a better chance to advance Japanese knowledge and ideas during this stage. An interview with the local consultant, who handled FMR in the Sildakin ARC, reiterated that his Japanese counterparts had been very understanding and supportive of the local consultants and were focused on the FMR’s objectives in the ARC, making his working relations with other consultants and the CPMO harmonious and respectful.

Despite the FMR’s issues regarding increased contract duration, price escalation, and back and front commitment fees for the ARISP III loan, CPMO and Japanese and Filipino consultants created a convenient, respectful, and congenial working relationship. CPMO representatives preferred working with their Japanese counterparts because of the learning opportunities and the simple and flexible project management system they learned from the consultants.

Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines Koshikawa Kazuhiko stated that the Filipino-Japanese relationship is characterized by reciprocity, cooperation, and mutual understanding. Accordingly, Japanese and Filipino aid authorities collaborated to achieve their FMR interest. For instance, FMR realization enabled Filipino aid authorities to promote market participation among ARBs as a growth engine and facilitated Japanese aid authorities’ interests in projects that advance their
economic and business interests, consistent with Angeles and Neanidis (2009) claim that they have vital positions and incentives to make ODA work for them. cxxix

These observations are aligned with several perspectives. First, it supports John Kenneth Galbraith's conditioned power (Kesting, 2005). The collaborative approaches demonstrated Japanese aid authorities' conditioned power to describe how power is used to change others' beliefs. While the JICA’s request-based approach's official purpose is to respect the recipient's sovereignty, its primary intent is to flex its power nominally and pursue its interests toward the recipients, as shown in several instances.

First, JICA collaborated with Japanese consultants to attain the latter's interest in the project side by indirectly influencing DAR to follow the Japanese consultants’ project management system/ internal guidelines on measures against fraud and corruption upon its approval27 and compelled DAR to implement the FMR per loan agreement provisions and use the Japanese consultants’ project implementation manual. Second, it prescribed ODA documentary requirements that only Japanese consultancy firms could prepare at the project level. Third, it also mentioned the FMR decisions and fund disbursements with the guidance of Japanese consultants.

JICA collaborated with Filipino aid authorities FMR across levels. As the Philippines historically lacked the institutional capacity to produce the needed ODA documentary requirements for the JICA’s approval process, the Japanese consultancy firm created an opportunity to complete the project requirements and indirectly

27 Based on JICA’s response, all its ODA-funded project is required to follow our guidelines on measures against fraud and corruption: https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/compliance/index.html
influence the planning phase to propose the desired project inclusions. However, it had minimal participation in the proposed FMR site. It only concurred with the FMR site when Agdangan Municipality was classified under a high development priority based on the selection criteria prepared by the affiliated private sector representative, a Japanese consultancy firm. DAR also implemented the FMR per loan agreement provisions and the approved project implementation manual. With the help of Japanese consultancy firm representatives, it also monitored the FMR decisions and fund disbursements.

Furthermore, the Philippine government's accommodating donor policies allowed JICA to further exercise its power by allowing Japanese consultancy firms to create project management guidelines denoting their experts' highly specialized knowledge and further exercise their power. This scenario demonstrates that while Japan's request-based ODA approach's official purpose is to respect the recipient's sovereignty, the primary intent is to flex its power nominally and allow the Japanese aid authorities to pursue their interests toward the recipient. The stage manifested how JICA somehow used its "conditioned power" leverage nominally on standards and expertise in project management systems while carefully practicing a non-interference approach in the Philippines' local procurement act. It raises the question of interest. Moreover, Barnes & Wong's framework shows that the Japanese consultant used manipulation and persuasion as a highly subtle and effective form of power (Barnes & Wrong, 1990).

Second, it also strengthens Escobar's (2005) thesis that problematizes the issue of development as a tool for domination and affirms that development continues to play a role in cultural and social domination strategies. For instance, the CPMO
representatives and Japanese consultants' interactions and processes demonstrate how the FMR subproject attracted and coopted itself as a source of soft power 'by default and design. Their interactions and processes are harmonious collaborations that demonstrate how the Japanese aid authorities could easily dictate to recipients what they think the project implementation system should be and create knowledge instrumental to its objectives, biases, requirements, and procedures that undermine project ownership and manifest strong presence of Japanese knowledge in the Philippine ODA process. Moreover, a Japanese consultancy firm initiated, prepared, and designed the project for JICA's approval. Since a particular consultancy firm initially made the ARISP III specifications, it was not surprising that it was most likely to win the contract once the project consultancy was open to competitive bidding. The Japanese consultancy firm, led by JCM80, was the consultant for project management, institution building, and infrastructure planning of ARISP I to III.\footnote{It is one of the leading Japanese consulting firms that had undertaken development projects in Korea and Manchuria under the Japanese colonial occupation during World War II and conducted surveys and supervised construction of ODA-funded large-scale hydroelectric infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia.} Although, eventually, the Japanese firm hired Filipino consultants, the rates applied were lower than foreign counterparts. Another critical issue was the significant portion that went to foreign consulting services. For ARISP I alone, foreign disbursements to consultants from June 1996 to June 2002 covered by loans amounted to more than PhP57 million ($1,123,157), which was higher by 500 percent than the locals. According to FCM60, a local ARISP III consultant, the amount was at least four times higher than the amount they received as a team in the same period.

Moreover, as part of the subproject provisions, the FMR could not be chosen and approved without local and international consultants (Feranil, M& Feranil, S.,
It also demonstrated that Japanese development thinking influenced the general management guidelines, a manifestation of a governmentality perspective that allows governing by embodying discipline in individuals through creating docile agents (van Rensburg et al., 2016). Third, aid authorities benefitted from their collaborative approach; DAR secured the project needed to achieve its institutional objective while JICA created a possible new supplier of raw materials, received income from the ODA loan, facilitated business opportunities for its private sector, and earned political capital among the international community in promoting development cooperation. Hence, both Japanese and Filipino aid authorities benefitted, consistent with Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Hiroaki Shiga's (2016) observation that the Japan ODA seeks to create a cooperative relationship for mutually beneficial economic ties.

Lastly, aid authorities’ interactions, processes, political settings, and the controlled policy space of an ODA-funded FMR subproject were restricted to a few FMR actors. Thus, this stage manifested how the powerful actors held the Philippine-Japan ODA relations and compelled non-aid authorities to participate in the consultation process. DAR representatives shared that CPMO, with the policy guidance from the PCC and technical guidance from a Japanese consultancy firm, had the power to orchestrate the FMR implementation process among actors, while JICA had the power to control the resources. This scenario shows that apart from the implementing agency, which is generally perceived and accepted as the sole most powerful authority in the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR pre-investment stage, donors comprise its technical assistance agency, and Japanese consultants also appear to be considered influential. It aligns with Guillaume Lestrelin, Jean-Christophe
Castella, and Jeremy Bourgoin's arguments that international actors have a crucial role in supporting and reforming governmental policies in mainland Southeast Asia (Lestrelin, Castella, & Bourgoin, 2012). Likewise, findings show that non-aid authorities, such as civil society organizations and project beneficiaries, specifically ARBs, during this stage, have a superficial role in the decision-making process while waiting on which of their suggestions would be included in the FMR construction.

The collaboration between DAR and Japanese consultants describes what Graham Harrison called a "post-conditionality regime" in which it becomes far less discerning to distinguish between external and domestic interests. Japanese intervention provided untied ARISP loans, interfered in preparing documentary requirements in the FMR initiation stage, and facilitated the entire project management process. However, DAR's collaboration initiatives prolonged Japanese private sector firm intervention, resulting in its dependence on Japanese expertise, which could bear consequences vital in project design and implementation because FMR may not reflect the community's real needs but on the consultant's knowledge and donor's interests.

On the other hand, Japanese consultants' presence positively impacted local ARISP staff's personal career growth. Based on interviews, the camaraderie between DAR staff and Japanese consultants created a close professional relationship even after the ARISP. It is worth noting that most former ARISP coordinators have developed their expertise while working with Japanese consultants. While some became DAR Regional Directors, most became consultants of other multilateral
organizations or were even hired as Japanese consultancy firm consultants in the Philippines.  

B. Facilitating Token Participation: The Participatory Approach of ARC Pre-Qualification and FMR Approval Processes

Development participation in this study pertains to stakeholders’ involvement in the FMR’s development planning, project management, and practices (Hickey & Kothari, 2009). It intends to make people, especially the marginalized, partake in decision-making. Moreover, mainstream development discourse enables development processes to be more relevant, efficient, sustainable, equitable, and empowered. Hence, it is the core principle of development and occupies a primordial space in development thinking and practice.

The ARC Pre-Qualification and FMR approval processes, under the FMR planning stage, required Barangay (Village) Consultation Workshop (BCW) to solicit comments, suggestions, and confirmation from project beneficiaries, LGUs, and other partner agencies, to ensure that the FMR is integral to the ARBs’ development which entails participation among the intended beneficiaries, ARBs.

Based on the narratives of retired CPMO representatives and the former national project manager of ARISP III, the BCW enabled participants to express their desires to improve their living conditions with the construction of the new FMR, which intended to offer access from their village to the town proper, where the economic center is situated. However, former the consultation facilitator contradicted the retired CPMO representative’s claims stating his minimal interactions among ARBs but had significant interactions with cooperative leaders due to the importance

29 Based on an interview from the former Technical Coordinator of ARISP III CPMO
to agrarian reform organizations such as Agdangan Municipal Cooperative leaders while partly limiting the individual beneficiaries’ opportunity to share their suggestions and recommendations on how the FMR intervention would align with their needs

During FGDs, most ARBs expressed that they were given token participation in project processes and were mere recipients of the subproject, which affected their overall participation. Further inquiries show how they feel and think about the BCW process and demonstrate reinforced and legitimized power relations. For instance, some ARBs only participated in the BCW process because it was required. The ARC head and local politicians are encouraged to sign the consultation attendance sheets as it is an institutional requirement for the FMR construction. Further consultation showed that part of the reason for ARBs' poor community participation quality is their weak social bonds. For instance, they have a ruptured social fabric due to a culture of mistrust, as the cooperative leader was suspected of benefitting from patronage politics at the expense of others. Based on project site observations, the ARC is fragmented because there is no actual Civil Society Organization (CSO) that can voice its collective concerns. The Agdangan Cooperative, which was consulted during the FMR consultation process, dissolved after a year of FMR consultations as most of the members could not keep up with the documentary requirements. Hence the concept of participation was thin, and the ethos of grassroots participation did not take root because the ARBs were perceived as passive beneficiaries because they were caught up with their day-to-day issues with little or limited capacity to voice out their needs and its alignment to FMR.
The citizen participation that took place is aligned with Sherry Arnstein’s (2019) fourth rung in the Ladder of Citizen Participation called consultation (Arnstein, 2019). The consultation is within degrees of tokenism, also known as counterfeit participatory power. It refers to a discussion with no other ways of participation. It is still bogus since it does not guarantee that citizen concerns will be considered. During the ARC Pre-Qualification and FMR Approval processes, consultation became an avenue for information dissemination and rarely for consultation and collective decision-making. It was only used to cascade information, such as imposing that the FMR should be included and aligned with the village development plan to ensure funding instead of serving as space for bottom-up governance.

Most ARBs who participated in the consultation felt that CPMO did not consider their recommendations and suggestions but took the cooperative leader’s opinions instead. For instance, AF68, an ARB, shared that the cooperative head monopolized the FMR process, limiting ARBs’ overall participation in sharing their thoughts and recommendations regarding the FMR process while tolerating the "culture of silence" due to the ARBs’ insufficient economic capacity and lack of real participation during the process. Nevertheless, the formal consultation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation processes gave the cooperative head legitimacy though he did not project the voice of the marginalized.

On the other hand, academician respondents explained that CSO’s limited engagement was due to its preference for a smooth and aligned relationship with the implementing agency’s preferences and values. The scenario demonstrated that
cooperating was better than constantly conflicting with the government and other stakeholders. Hence, it manifests that the CSO, during FMR consultation, was just a service provider in the FMR implementation process, prioritizing their immediate parochial interests and survival (Thomson, 2006).While the traditional basis of consultation, monitoring, and evaluation gave cooperatives legitimacy, the preferences of the participants' FMR processes presented some issues. For instance, CPMO predominantly consulted the cooperative, which was dominated by a traditional leader that favors the status quo and is often associated with interests that regard advances in market-oriented interventions as encouragement in stabilizing rural elites’ rights and interests. As a result, they advanced the FMR’s market and interest-driven agenda rather than counterbalancing and making it responsive to the beneficiaries’ real needs.

Thus, although the cooperative head is at the local level's sharp end of agriculture interventions, he cannot always project the voice of the marginalized. Furthermore, during the FGD, most ARB representatives in the consultation process shared that he did not voice out what they needed and their limited participation as stakeholders in the FMR implementation processes. Some even shared that their specific suggestions for creating a road canal back then were not included in the constructed FMR. This experience posts a question regarding FMR ownership and indicates the necessary reforms in conducting a community-level FMR consultation process. These reforms could change power relations among intended project beneficiaries and actors in the community-level FMR project.

Moreover, the ARBs’ participation aligns with the observations that they had passive engagements, while the cooperative head representing the ARBs had an active
engagement that advanced his interests. For instance, DAR predominantly consulted the cooperative that favored the status quo, supported its plans, and was often associated with interests that regarded advances in market-oriented interventions. Although the cooperative representative was at the sharp end of agriculture interventions at the local level, interviews have shown that he did not project the voice of the marginalized. This experience posts a question regarding FMR ownership and indicates the necessary reforms in conducting a community-level FMR consultation process to effect changes in existing power relations among stakeholders in community-level ODA projects. Similarly, this finding that the poor (i.e., ARBs) are the least powerful in the network aligns with previous studies on other ODA-funded community projects in Southeast Asia (Mustalahti et al., 2017; Sims, 2018).

C. Depoliticizing Strategies in Foreign-funded FMR

Depoliticization is the process of removing the political character in decision-making (Burnham, 2001). It could be the tools, mechanisms, and institutions through which aid authorities can attempt to move to an indirect governing relationship and seek to encourage the demo that they can no longer be reasonably held accountable for a particular issue, policy field, or specific decision (Flinders & Buller, 2006).

The depoliticization process in this study refers to how aid authorities' conventional project management processes render the FMR technical and conceal the sociopolitical issues that shape preference processes by resorting to communicative, discursive, rhetorical, and ideological strategies to rationalize a political position and make it acceptable. Below are the depoliticization strategies utilized by the aid authorities during the FMR management process.

a. FMR Initiation Stage
a.1. Rationalities, Programs, and Techniques

Aid authorities’ primary purpose was to alleviate poverty and economic growth by improving the market linkage of ARBs. They intended to use the FMR as part of an efficient infrastructure and business agrarian support services to promote ARBs' development by complementing the ongoing land redistribution with infrastructure and encouraging a convergence strategy. For instance, Filipino aid authorities' narrowly interpreted the problem of rural poverty only as a lack of infrastructure and used FMR as a solution via the ARC strategy. FMR was intended to link Sildakin ARC and ARBs to a profitable market, create an optimal convergence area, accelerate ARC's productivity, and consolidate and integrate non-ARCs or adjacent and neighboring villages. Subsequently, DAR approved the Agdangan FMR subproject to facilitate supply-side intervention in implementing poverty reduction initiatives for Sildakin ARC's ARBs, citing domestic and international studies showing that agricultural growth could reduce poverty four times than other sectors' growth (Ferris et al., 2014).

Just like their Filipino counterparts, Japanese aid authorities framed the Philippines’ rural poverty as a lack of infrastructure and investments, which enabled them to bring infrastructural development and promote the Philippines' exports that stimulate economic activity imperative in economic development. Accordingly, they provided ARBs' agricultural support services to promote exports, offered a substantial amount to Philippine investments in agriculture and rural development, and funded various agrarian reform programs, such as the farmers' FMR and irrigation management system modernization for agricultural productivity.
Both aid authorities reduced the ARBs’ poverty and economic growth narratives into mere technical ones, removed their political character, and used the power of words in constructing rationalities and defining what counts as legitimate knowledge and problem, eventually becoming common sense. In particular, they practice "labeling" to make people into cases to be solved (Escobar, 1995) and target populations such as ARBs who need to improve their productivity and income. Their use of narrative to normalize development prohibits them from adjusting to imbalances and eradicating inequitable market mechanisms due to ARBs’ shortcomings (e.g., lack of asset holdings and socio-political capital).

**b. FMR Planning Stage**

**b.1. ARC Pre-Qualification and FMR Approval Requirements**

CPMO prioritized FMR according to the project management criteria, i.e., FMR's economic benefits’ intended strategic spread in the region and poverty and economic impacts on ARBs' agricultural production and productivity and overall ARC development. Therefore, CPMO and JICA reviewed and concurred on the proposed sites and subprojects based on the necessity and viability requirements set in the management guidelines, as shared by JCM80:

1. The positive economic rate of return (i.e., positive project benefits) based on the shadow factor and project evaluation used by NEDA;
2. Absence of any land-related issues, or at least it is already 75 percent complete;
3. The local government unit (LGU) belongs to a fourth- or fifth-income class and does not yet receive foreign assistance for any project;
4. LGU’s willingness to provide 50% equity (in terms of ROW, pre-engineering, clearances/permit fees, and O&M) based on the February 2003 ICC Guiding Principle and NG-LGU Cot Sharing Policy for LGU-implemented infrastructure subprojects;

5. Presence of rice and corn land areas;

6. A substantial target number of small farmers who will benefit from the ARISP subprojects and;

7. Feasible and Accessible for Agricultural production areas

These requirements show aid authorities’ market, business, and economic rationalities in deciding the FMR construction. They catered to the idea that FMR can define the good life according to productivity and efficiency. They envisioned it as a linkage between the agricultural production areas and growth centers within the municipality to foster a competitive local agricultural sector and value chain transformation. They also focused on the FMR’s market and economic indicators and underscored its significance in rural economic growth and poverty reduction.

Their inclination to economic efficiency, productivity, and linkages discourse is consistent with Foucault’s (2008) and Muller et al.’s (2017) concept of liberal governmentality as a governance structure on which the decision-making process is based on rational and economic principles. Foucault argues that it is concerned with the economic management of society and understands it as a natural system with its mechanisms. He also specifies that it enframes social processes in mechanisms of measurability and security so they can take their natural course while slightly tweaked towards quantifiable indicators.
Particularly, aid authorities depoliticized ARBs’ issues by treating their agricultural sector’s issues as merely economic ones, demonstrating Japanese aid authorities’ apolitical stance and ignorance of the Philippines’ class bias. For example, the ARISP could fund only those sites where land tenure problems have been resolved or at least 75 percent of eligible lands were distributed, such as those in the ARCs, while excluding other barangay (villages) not within the ARC. However, this requirement disregards the political issues faced by small farmers who were still fighting for their right to land (e.g., those who were eligible but not able to own land due to landlords’ land conversion mechanisms and those who were indirect victims of land grabbing (e.g., smallholder farmers with land bought at the lowest cost possible). Moreover, they indirectly concealed the antagonistic or conflictual dimensions of small farmers’ social issues, such as poverty, inequality, and exclusion concerns, normalizing the neoliberal order and turning political problems into technical issues.

Further, aid authorities demonstrated their authoritarian governmentality. They clearly articulated their expectations of requiring the FMR subproject management process to all the actors. FPF71, a former ARISP project manager, shared that the project management guideline was used in project planning and delivery mechanisms. For instance, the project actors had to subscribe to every criterion that obliged them to hold consultations and follow all the required processes. She also described that the rules were elaborated and straightforward and mentioned that ARISP project management guidelines were designed for a transformative purpose. Therefore, its innovation lies in how they implement project management and its documentary requirements. To access these project funds, LGU and the project implementer had to subscribe to a detailed set of criteria that obliged them to hold consultations and
follow all the necessary project management processes. In addition, they established congruency of values in the subproject to foster self-control (Franck & Jungwirth, 2003) and elaborated in manuals, information sheets, and other documents and constantly reiterated by CPMO, PPMO, MARO, and Filipino and Japanese consultants. They used the project implementation policy manual to maintain order and strengthen implicit control of the processes by centralizing decision-making, demonstrating clear directions, and having significant power over FMR processes. They contained the rules of engagement that define how actors worked and showed that they were not directly 'steered' by anyone but through their ideologies (Lemke, 2001) by using a project implementation manual that contains all the operational policies, procedures, and subproject parameters resulting in less friction and contestation while maintaining interests among decision-makers and non-poor sector.

Hence, these requirements manifest depoliticization and exclusion issues. These enable depoliticization that reduces ARBs’ issues from socio-political nature to only efficiency and sustainability issues creates an apolitical façade. CAMNa, an informant from the academe, explained that Japanese aid authorities believe that it is the recipient's responsibility, not the donor's, to make enormous impacts from the ODA. Therefore, they are cautious about dealing with subprojects that may have political repercussions, stepping out of "economic" cooperation, and entering the new field of good governance or conflict resolution, as these involve domestic political issues. The autonomy concept allows them to avoid any political side and evade responsibility for their projects that failed to alleviate the project beneficiaries' economic and social plights. Believing in an autonomy or non-interference approach while disregarding their pitfalls means avoiding political issues and benefiting their
“ODA” industry. On the other hand, the ARISP III requirements also raised exclusionary character since it only served and covered ARCs (i.e., Sildakin ARC), disregarding other communities not covered by the ARC strategy program and constraining on directly helping landless farmers outside the periphery of Sildakin ARC.

c. FMR Closing Stage and Evaluation Process

c.1. FMR Outcome Indicators

Aid authorities used economic and efficiency narratives in facilitating FMR indicators. JICA's ex-ante evaluation report includes such as increased average yield per cropping season, increased net annual average farm income, reduced travel time to get to the leading destination, including the market, and reduced transportation costs of agriculture products which are all related to measuring performance but less on welfare impact among project beneficiaries. Likewise, the CPMO's project completion report shows more detailed indicators about the FMR component of ARISP III, namely increased number of trips per/day, increased number of vehicles plying in the area, reduced travel time in (%), reduced transportation cost (%), reduced hauling cost (%), and reduced maintenance cost of LGU (%) had the insufficient depth to tell a story. However, no documentary evidence was available that the evaluation process took place, and no baseline figures were set that prevented aid authorities from evaluating FMR impact accordingly.

These indicators were quantifiable and could not measure the multidimensional (e.g., inequality, social exclusion, and socio-political) impacts among project beneficiaries related to FMR construction. These illustrate
depoliticization and disregard for class bias as they failed to challenge the existing socio-politics that kept ARBs, the intended beneficiaries, poor. For instance, the project implementers did not consider the ARBs' recommendations to facilitate the FMR development, directing the so-called “preference-shaping depoliticization.” According to Flinder and Buller (2006), it involves the recreation of narratives in which development is seen as a rational, technical, and scientific process, and the role of authorities is to present themselves with a technical role by managing and enforcing rule-based tactics or policy stances that are designed to alleviate the negative consequences. In the depoliticization process, aid authorities become rational actors with a narrow focus on improving economic effectiveness and efficiency, wherein they reduce the ARBs’ issues to mere technical ones and remove the issue's political character. For instance, instead of adjusting imbalances due to ARBs’ shortcomings (e.g., lack of asset holdings), they just built FMR and even included ARBs in the market agenda and subjected them to inequitable market mechanisms that further exacerbated the very problem that they tried to resolve. Lastly, they declined to protect the ARBs as a vulnerable sector and gave insufficient services to support the vulnerable in their market participation.

D. Aligning FMR in Development Planning Documents

Philippine Public financial management ensures the alignment of planning, budgeting, and cash management into one integrated process. The Philippine Investment Plans (i.e., all prospective programs and projects in the government)
should be aligned with the goals set by the Philippine Development Plan to promote efficiency and outcome-orientation of government operations (Philippine Financial Management, n.d.)

Aid authorities aligned ARISP III and FMR documents with all development planning documents to satisfy the prescribed systemic, economic, and knowledge requirements for the approval process. For instance, the ARISP III, which funded the FMR as an ODA project, entailed alignment with all planning documents and the concurrence and approval of the Philippine government by aligning it to the planning documents and priority development areas. DAR prioritized ARISP’s approval process to get budget and congressional appropriations by including it in Chapter 2 of the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (2001-2004) and Philippine Investment Plan under Major Final Output 3 of Support Services to advocate toward agricultural productivity and agribusiness through ARC connectivity development and build on the gains of RASCP. On the other hand, DAR aligned ARISP’s corresponding FMR subproject to operationalize localization, ensure national-local priority thrusts alignment, and fulfill loan commitment following the prescribed project implementation manual. As a result, both were part of the priority area for agricultural development and aligned with the Philippine Long-term Development Plans (1978-2000), Midterm Public Investment Plans (2005-2010), regional, provincial, municipal, and ARC development plans, and coconut and livestock production and revitalization programs to improve ARBs’ farm-level productivity and income and ARC’s value-added component of coconut-based activities.
The FMR alignment with development plans supports Escobar’s (1995) idea that development plans are a powerful force in the production and management of development and gives the notion that it was the result of distinct, voluntaristic acts, not the process of coming to terms with conflicting interests in the process of which choices and exclusions are made. It also shows that the Philippines is a developmental state that puts donor and regional development perspectives in the national development planning.

Overall, it also shows how aid authorities constructed poverty and economic growth as social problems requiring knowledge, resource allocation, and inclusion to appropriate development planning to ensure the integrated character of the FMR and its successful implementation.

E. Pursuing Highway Politics

ARISP III demonstrated ‘highway politics which pertains to the extent of political favoritism to exercise political control between patrons and their clients (Selod & Soumahoro, 2019). As the Philippine President was involved in the program and policy approval and FMR implementation processes, the overall scenario facilitated questionable intentions regardless of how politicians initially intended it since there is an inclination that they have used FMR for exercising clientelism and reciprocity to work on their benefits and undermine the projects' positive impacts.

Aside from the market-oriented reasons, the political context influenced the FMR construction decision. As FMR was requested a year before the elections, the president may have exercised beneficial relationships with the Agdangan's local politicians. FPF60, a former DAR employee, confirmed that local politicians
benefitted from FMR due to their direct business interests within the community. She also shared:

FMR greatly benefitted those with stable business relationships outside the community. I knew one former local politician who is into coconut oil supply and connected with her prospective Japanese clients due to the positive prospects of the FMR in the community. Probably, that is out of DAR's hands because that is FMR's unintended benefit. I admit that the FMR may have supported the concept of patronage politics. If the request is within our parameters, we will support and construct the infrastructure needed for agriculture.

The Agdangan local politicians' local social control and DAR provincial counterparts had led to a triangle of accommodations among the bureaucracy, politicians, and the private sector. Specifically, local politicians were given significant discretionary powers in the FMR management process. For instance, two former local politicians within the community also dominated as they benefitted from the FMR construction through circumstantial coalition-building, as recounted by FPM52:

Some local politicians back then were keen on knowing which parts of the FMR would be concretized so they could either request the contractor's staff to concretize the FMR in front of their lot or buy those farm lots covered by the FMR concretization. So, for instance, the contractor concretized those not previously included in the original plan, including those in front of the local politician's 4.8 hectares of land.
The FMR intensified patronage networks between government officials and the non-poor sector enabling the latter to get benefits at the expense of ARBs and dominate the benefits landscape.

FMR supported Filipino politicians' political capital. Most of the municipality’s local politicians belonged to the president's political party. Mark Thompson (2010) saw the Philippine president back then as a master of patronage politics by funneling government patronage funds directly to local politicians, recentralizing clientelist networks, and directing funds to regions favorable to her politics. The President, also head of the NEDA Board, approved and encouraged the ARISP III FMR subprojects in the provinces to support her agriculture programs. As the FMR was requested a year before the election, the president had exercised reciprocity or clientelism to the Agdangan's local politicians, especially those who belonged to her political party. To demonstrate the Philippine president’s inclination to give local politicians more options, she increased LGUs’ overall Internal Revenue Allotment by 20 percent devoted to development funds specifically for infrastructure and social services, giving them more incentives to pursue FMR and other agriculture-related development projects in their area. She announced, "The Internal Revenue Allotment for local governments from the fiscal budget is P210.7 billion. I hope local officials, including the different villages, would utilize 20 percent of your development funds for infrastructure and social service" (Arroyo, G., 2008, para 19).

She also faced various issues and challenges, as her political party needed political capital to generate mass support. She took advantage of the political
circumstances and used agriculture projects to cater to the lobbying efforts of the DAR leadership and major peasant organizations. She used the ARISP III as part of her machinery to award her subordinates and stabilize her position through political ties of mutual indebtedness with local politicians. Using Carl Lande’s framework, her politics is characterized by a power-wielding patron with dependent clients, with the president and the local politicians in a mutually beneficial political relationship. For instance, the president is the person with authority or the patron, and the local politicians are the clients who benefit from her support (e.g., FMR). This scenario manifested that the national aid authorities, such as the Philippine president and the implementing agency, are the power-wielding patrons while local politicians are the clients benefitting from the setup (Lande, 2019).

Like what was repeatedly done by past Philippine presidents in their respective initiatives for agrarian reform, President Macapagal-Arroyo found the instrumental worth of facilitating and aligning the FMR with her Bayanihan concept as a means of an indirect mass campaign for both national and local elections. In an interview with FAM64, academe and former bureaucrat under President Macapagal Arroyo shared how the former president wooed local politicians by providing funding for an infrastructure project. She also stated that the former president is an astute, calculating, and strategic politician because she meddles in foreign and local contracts beneficial to her allies.

This situation supports Joseph Wales and Leni Wild's (2012) claim that FMR could facilitate new patron-client relations. The FMR demonstrates its sociopolitical value as national politicians use it to reward their supporters. It also enabled national and local politicians to reach remote areas while boosting their political capital by
providing the project beneficiaries access to economic opportunities, state services, and political mobilization. On the other hand, it also manifests the Philippine politics' "business-as-usual" mode fueled by patronage, clientelism, and traditional politics. The ODA-funded FMR approval process generally allowed political intrusion in its local processes. For example, the FMR project management process allowed political interventions that led to questionable political motives and transparency in the selection. This situation became possible when JICA ignored the Filipino aid authorities’ political characteristics and the complex nature of the project decentralization process.

Aid authorities dominated and controlled the preliminary FMR planning processes, primarily politicians, specifically on providing their local counterpart budget. The onset of the FMR’s implementation process showed how Filipino aid authorities controlled and dictated its implementation processes. For instance, aid authorities’ prevailing political context played a significant role during the ARISP III approval process. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo pushed for ARISP III and its FMR component to align and benefit her agriculture development programs called Bayan-Anihan Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and super regions, including CALABARZON, where the FMR is located. On the other hand, bureaucrats and national politicians intervened in the ODA approval process to ensure ARISP III’s financial and economic viability and appropriate budget allocation.

30 Provinces under North Luzon Agribusiness Quadrangle were meant to transform into major agribusiness corridor focused for infrastructure buildup to help farmers increase productivity and spur growth in agro-industry sector. On the other hand, provinces under Luzon Urban Beltway were to transform provinces into globally competitive industrial and service center (Official Gazette, 2006). Source: https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2006/08aug/20060819-EO-0561-GMA.pdf
On the FMR subproject level, the local politicians were allowed to strengthen their political capital within the community. For instance, they used FMR construction to their advantage as most project beneficiaries attributed it to the local politicians, not to the implementing agency or the national government that funded it. This scenario aligns with Batalla et al. (2018), who show that this practice is rampant in road development and notes that political interference occurs in all stages of road development and annual budget cycles.\textsuperscript{cxxxviii} As part of the PCC, the President recognizes local politicians' interests and the societal web played by their rules (Migdal, 1988).\textsuperscript{cxxxix} Hence, it may result in an engaging relationship between her and beneficiaries (also known as voters) through local politicians whom "harvest" votes through material incentives (Thompson, 2010).

Moreover, the local politicians played a significant role in getting and shaping the project implementation process. They exercised political power that relied on the overall project and "social control" and exerted their influence through direct involvement and indirect ties with FMR contractors to get substantial foreign aid authorities’ benefits. The observation aligns with Migdal & Schichte's (2005) assertion that they help domestic aid counterparts to benefit from ODA by controlling fundamental distributional support service mechanisms within society.\textsuperscript{cxl} In this case, the ARISP III and its FMR subproject approval and implementation processes were prone to the political maneuvering of domestic national, and local politicians affecting the bureaucracy's ability to respond to shocks and transform challenges into reforms and broader institutional changes due to former’s exercise of clientelism and reciprocity to work for their benefit.
The scenario above shows how the state undertakes decentralization of the governmental solution and becomes an arena of accommodations. It made Agdangan local politicians’ local social control capture and strengthen their vested interests and intervene in the FMR subproject by enhancing their chance to dispense patronage and get credit from it. Specifically, FMR’s provision in locations marred by persistent "local authoritarian enclaves," such as Agdangan, enabled the non-poor sector, particularly those with political connections and landed, and increase invisible yet impactful conflict. It is consistent with Emery and Flora's (2020) concept that those with access to power, connection to resources, and capacity to engage (i.e., political capital) can gain in the process.

F. Demonstrating Limited Accountability and Transparency Due to Non-Existent FMR Evaluation Process

The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was operationalized using the project's logical framework indicators and synchronized with the DAR-FAPsO’s M&E mechanisms based on the project management guidelines. However, no reports or official documents were available. For instance, DAR representatives shared that CPMO conducted monthly, quarterly, and annual reports with success stories, case studies, and field visits concerning FMR evaluation. They also mentioned enhancing training to improve the technical systems monitoring, evaluation, and crisis management skills. They also shared that evaluation results were presented with the DPWH, DAR units, and NEDA claiming that the FMR generated an increased number of traders, lending institution agents, and other business opportunities.

Moreover, through PPMO, CPMO also conducted orientation meetings to update DPWH and LGU on the different operations management systems during the
FMR construction. It also submitted the quarterly progress report to JICA and checked and monitored the FMR implementation. However, just like in previous stages, no documentary evidence (e.g., evaluation results) was provided. Instead, DAR representatives presented a project completion report. Unfortunately, they mistakenly identified the project completion report as evaluation results during the information and knowledge sharing with the researcher.

f.1. Filipino Aid authorities’ Lack of Evaluation Document Repository

Upon consultation and verification, the NEDA central office's Monitoring and Evaluation Staff (NEDA-MES) shared that no information on the details of the specific FMR evaluation due to ARISP III's demand-driven nature was given to them. For instance, the director shared, through a formal letter, that the evaluation and other related documents were predominantly under the CPMO, to wit:

ARISP III employed a demand-driven nature of the project, wherein the communities or beneficiaries are responsible for designing and planning their respective proposed sub-projects. Hence, sub-projects financed under ARISP III were only identified during actual implementation, evaluated at the sub-project committee level, and approved at the Steering Committee level in DAR Central Office. Therefore, while our staff monitored the project's overall implementation, we have no information on the details of the sub-projects. In this regard, we highly suggest that you coordinate with the Department of Agrarian Reform – Foreign-Assisted Project's Office headed by Director XXX to get sub-project information. (V. Corpus, personal communication, February 11, 2021)
Interviews and FGDs further strengthen the claim that NEDA regional office's project monitoring and evaluation division representatives did not receive regular FMR reports. They revealed that only DAR and its provincial counterparts monitored the technical and physical evaluation of the FMR, which concurs with the previous observation that DAR and NEDA regional offices had minimal or no interaction during the FMR subproject management stages enabling the former to monopolize the FMR management processes. For instance, when the researcher requested a copy of the FMR's evaluation report, NEDA regional representatives still had to request a report copy from their DAR counterparts. However, again, DAR counterparts provided a copy of the project completion report, which included the FMR's report physical status, not a copy of the specific evaluation report or impact assessment for the specific FMR.

Further investigation revealed that the RPMO did not establish local baseline figures, which deterred authorities from pursuing effective FMR monitoring and evaluation, hindering them from quantitatively evaluating and analyzing whether subproject goals were attained. Even the designated LGU department responsible for creating planning and monitoring committees had no documents to present, citing a lack of document repositories. Hence, it did not thoroughly examine the FMR's outputs and outcomes and failed to evaluate the FMR's socio-economic impacts among beneficiaries, especially ARBs. This situation explains the project beneficiaries' claim that they were omitted from the evaluation process since no evaluation process occurred. For example, in the FGD, OF59, an ordinary citizen (non-farmer) shared, "We have not heard any news about an evaluation for the FMR project. However, according to them (local politicians), the roads that were
constructed were of high quality.” (FGD, September 15, 2021). Lastly, the
documental analysis showed that ARISP III should have a scheduled midterm review
after three years (2017) and an impact evaluation after seven years (2021). However,
the researcher could not secure midterm review documents citing a lack of copies,
while DAR started bidding for the conduct of impact assessment last November 2019.
Unfortunately, it declared the failure of bidding on its impact assessment due to an
insufficient approved budget contract (DAR, 2020). However, no timelines were given
regarding the FMR evaluation.

f.2. Japanese Aid authorities’ Exclusion of Sildakin ARC in Evaluation Process

JICA hired Kenichi Inazawa of Octavia Japan Co., Ltd. as an external
evaluator/consultant to conduct a third-party ex-post evaluation and ensure objectivity
and transparency from 2019 to 2020. However, it is worth noting that though JICA
recognized the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR completion as it posted the turn-
over-ceremony of the FMR on its website, it was unable to include the specific FMR
in its ARISP III third-party evaluation. Specifically, while it dispatched a post-
evaluation mission using the standard evaluation procedure and instruments two (2)
years after project completion, it disregarded the Agdangan FMR subproject in the
evaluation list. It means that JICA recognized FMR’s success due to the technical
report provided by CPMO while failing to conduct an independent review or monitor
the FMR documents. Furthermore, on the question on the difference between the
FMR outcome to the approved plan, JICA provided a general reply about the ARISP
III, but not on the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR, to wit:
The project was designed to support the agrarian reform communities. According to the ex-post evaluation report, (the) positive effect was found on the targeted residents in poverty reduction and improved quality of life. Therefore, we believe that the project beneficiaries (farmers in agrarian communities) received the most benefits.

According to the ex-post evaluation report, the project met most of the criteria set in advance, and positive effects were found on the targeted residents in terms of poverty reduction and improvement of quality of life. For example, it was found out throughout the interviews conducted in the ex-post evaluation that the FMRs contributed to the improvement of logistics efficiency and diversification of sales channels. (JICA, personal communication, May 21, 2021)

JICA’s response manifested some issues. First, its overall evaluation report neglected an impact assessment to explain and differentiate particular FMR's impacts among various groups of project beneficiaries within the community. Second, its report perceived farmers as the overall beneficiary in general. As a result, it failed to consider the possibility of differentiated impacts among other unintended beneficiaries, such as landowners, landowner-traders, landowner-subcontractor, ordinary citizens (non-farmers), and ARBs. Third, it ignored the existence of power relations and inequitable asset holdings among project beneficiaries. Specifically, who benefits more, in particular, was not an issue as long as the overall community increased market activities and perceived productivity. Finally, when pressed regarding their response on the actual FMR project, JICA recognized that the researcher should ask DAR (CPMO) directly, to wit:
Unfortunately, the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR was not one of the selected sites to be visited during the evaluation. Since the study zeroes on the impact of the specific FMR, the evaluation report that is yet to be published by JICA may not be a suitable reference for this study. For questions relating to monitoring the impact of the specific FMR, it would be best to contact the DAR Provincial Office (DARPO) Quezon and the LGU of Quezon (JICA, personal communication, May 21, 2021).

However, the PPMO and RPMO did not evaluate specific subprojects such as Silangang-Maligaya-Dayap FMR, unlike its regional counterparts, such as the Eastern Visayas, which published all the reports about ARISP III and subproject management processes. On the other hand, according to a grapevine communication with a JICA representative, the JICA’s external consultant collected the necessary data from DAR at the onset and evaluated the ARISP III by comparing its subprojects’ outcomes with the goals stipulated in the ex-ante report. Hence, JICA and its external evaluator declared that the ARISP III was generally successful based on the data from selected field sites provided by the CPMO, disregarding the FMR impacts in Sildakin ARC.

On the other hand, interviews show that Japanese consultants intend FMR as an avenue for Sildakin ARC’s citizens to facilitate regular economic activities with the outside world and get needed appropriate social services and livelihood transformation opportunities. Hence, they perceived that the FMR reduced the perception of isolation and remoteness among the poor, such as ARBs. However, these perceived social impacts could not be quantified rigorously due to the lack of FGD, baseline socio-economic data, and periodic monitoring. Thus, it disregarded the
defined impact indicators needed to evaluate whether the FMR helped the ARBs, manifesting the scenario that Japanese consultants disregarded the overall socio-economic impact of the FMR among ARBs but just on achieving the FMR’s ex-ante outcome indicators stated in the official documents, regardless of who benefitted more. In addition, they did not forge Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR's sustainability, as the FMR was omitted in its evaluation and monitoring reports.

The Filipino aid authorities also led this stage, particularly the implementing agency. Specifically, through CPMO, DAR was the lead agency and was responsible for overall supervision. Based on interviews, CPMO representatives shared that they did not face significant challenges except those relative to the FMR's technical and structural issues. The institutional structure being what it was, coordinating and getting things done on the schedule were already included in the project management guidelines. The actors directly involved in construction were other Filipino bureaucracies, such as the DPWH-DEO as managers and supervisors of the FMR construction project site, PPMO as coordinators, and two construction firms that took over as contractors.

Though Japanese aid authorities were passive in this stage, allowing the Philippine bureaucracy to conduct overall supervision was not done in the spirit of having them participate in the process. On the contrary, the Japanese aid authorities’ primary purpose was to co-opt them in the Japanese-created project implementation policy manual. The Japanese consultant did not concur with this observation, but an academic confirmed it was a usual technique for any Japan ODA project, just like they did in previous stages.
Despite the meticulous planning and approval process prescribed in the project management guidelines, the monitoring and evaluation processes did not occur due to the voluminous work of PPMO representatives on top of the FMR subproject. Borrowing Escobar's (1995) statement that “accountability becomes impossible to enforce,” the scenario above shows aid authorities were unaccountable during the evaluation process as they did not exhibit any significant move to keep documentary requirements and address feedback and issues regarding the FMR. On the other hand, project beneficiaries had different ways of giving evaluations and feedback about the problems they encountered in FMR. For example, the landowners’ group tried to write a letter directly to JICA but failed to prosper due to their inability to get the funder's contact details. On the other hand, ARBs planned to encourage their cooperative head to communicate with the LGU to facilitate a municipal's resolution/request seeking help from JICA to fund the repairs needed. Unfortunately, ARBs’ move did not prosper as LGU representatives did not accommodate the request due to time constraints, while traders chose not to act on the FMR problems as they believed neither the central government nor LGU would respond to their requests. However, this manifests in a lack of information dissemination mechanisms from LGU to the beneficiaries.

Furthermore, the situation above shows that the LGU did not inform the beneficiaries that the Turn-Over-Document (TOD) and the ARISP III contract stipulated that LGU should fund the FMR operations and maintenance from their Municipal Development Fund; not DAR or JICA should fund any repair. The municipal engineer shared that the LGU only concretized 1,274 meters from 2016 to 2021 and still needs to concretize 3,831 meters, which entails PHP 100 million
($1.9M) budget allocation. Therefore, the FMR's poor maintenance problems, aside from the low-cost materials used, could be attributed to the LGU’s improper maintenance due to the inability to allot appropriate funding and lack of savings for its annual maintenance and operations.

Based on the aid authorities’ claims, the FMR has achieved its purpose after eight (8) years of implementation, though it lacked formal and complete documents. However, there are still many issues to consider and further examine when looking at reality. For example, up to now, Agdangan has had high poverty rates, with ARBs still suffering insufficient income to support a socially and officially acceptable standard of living and the lack of agriculture and credit facilities with low-interest loans remained unsolved.

The controlled political and policy settings describe the power structure of the project management processes. The power to decide has been restricted to a few actors. Across stages, DAR representatives shared that CPMO, together with the guidance from the PCC and technical guidance from a Japanese consultancy firm, had the power to orchestrate the FMR management processes among actors, prevailed in the decision-making processes, and received the most benefits in gathering their political and social capital. On the other hand, Japanese aid authorities had the power to control the resources, wherein CPMO had to subscribe with loan conditionalities before accessing the funding. This scenario shows that apart from the implementing agency, which is generally perceived and accepted as the sole most powerful authority in the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR, donors consisting of its technical assistance agency and Japanese consultants also appear to be considered influential. It also aligns with Guillaume Lestrelin, Jean-Christophe Castella, and Jeremy Bourgoin’s
observations that international actors have a crucial role in supporting and reforming governmental policies in mainland Southeast Asia (Lestrelin, Castella, & Bourgoin, 2012). Likewise, findings show that civil society organizations and project beneficiaries, specifically ARBs, were marginalized and less powerful due to their superficial role in the decision-making process while waiting on which of their suggestions would be included in the FMR construction.

This scenario shows that Japanese aid authorities’ non-interference approach supported Filipino aid authorities’ social and political capital. They were only in the business of moving money by providing budget support modalities to their recipients. For instance, JICA did not actively evaluate and monitor the specific FMR and only waited for the submitted CPMO reports and updates from Japanese consultants. This scenario manifests that JICA was geared only towards alignment of FMR implementation to loan conditionalities and was more concerned with agreed "logical frameworks" than with the FMR impacts among ARBs.

Japanese aid authorities allowed their Filipino counterparts to exercise their prerogatives and clientelism. They allow the Filipino aid authorities, specifically local politicians, to use the FMR to protect their interests and promote their political purpose, showing that ODA is highly fungible and can be used by recipient local politicians to enhance their social capital while following project management guidelines. For instance, some ARBs shared that during FMR construction, they informed the LGU that FMR should also have accompanying trading/market posts where they could sell their produce. However, the LGU did not respond to the recommendation and did not take appropriate or related projects that would maximize the FMR opportunities. Instead, LGU concretized FMR parts, including the FMR
passing in front of the land owned by a local politician increasing his land’s market price. This scenario shows that despite Japan’s rhetorical commitment, it generally shies away from getting involved in deeper governance reform processes.

This part pertains to the transformation of programs to technologies and the corresponding practices in FMR’s implementation process. It answers the research question about how aid authorities implemented the FMR during the management process. Using the works of Escobar (1995), this part analyzes how the FMR was crafted and the nature of development discourse incorporated into the process. The next chapter discusses the FMR’s differentiated impacts among various groups of project beneficiaries.
CHAPTER V: THE SILANGANG MALIGAYA-DAYAP FARM-TO-MARKET ROAD IMPACTS TOWARDS ITS BENEFICIARIES

This part briefly describes how FMR, as a governmental technology, impact project beneficiaries' social and economic conditions and tangible examples of how they benefitted or even disadvantaged. Using Tania Murray Li's (2007) The Will to Improve framework, which is based on the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, this part details how the FMR was deployed and scrutinized its impacts through outcome indicators to grasp how power is lived, produced, and contested. It also examines the FMR's capital formation processes to produce current conditions and identify the inevitable gap between what it attempted and what it accomplished and its persistence in its shortcomings and failures.

The first portion of the chapter pertains to the current situation of the project site and the FMR, while the second part pertains to the relationships created among aid authorities while implementing the FMR and enhancing their interests. Finally, the third part pertains to the changes the FMR brought among project beneficiaries. Changes were classified into themes based on Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Outcomes to determine the levels of impacts from the FMR since it is critical to measure evidence further up the hierarchy ladder (i.e., levels 4 to 7 in Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Outcomes).

A. Current Situation

a. FMR's Physical Status

The FMR's physical structure was partly gravel and concrete. The majority of the road consists of gravel. The municipal engineer shared that the LGU only concretized 1,274 meters from 2016 to 2021 from its Municipal Development fund and Local
Government Support Fund- Assistance to the Municipalities Fund (LGSF-AMF) 2020. However, it still needs to concretize 3,831 meters, which has an estimated cost of PHP 100 million ($1.9M) in budget allocation. He also shared that the LGU started cementing more extended parts but targets to build the remaining by 2022. Consequently, the former CPMO representatives and Japanese consultants acknowledged that this was a common scenario in ARISP observed in other regions since fixing FMR entails input costs such as labor, gravel, concrete, and other materials.

Currently, the FMR is in a state of deterioration due to wear and tear, improper maintenance, and detrimental weather conditions. Due to poor road conditions, issues and challenges were experienced by project beneficiaries. Based on their narratives, the FMR is poorly constructed. It needs a canal to minimize water flow so the unpaved part would not quickly erode during an outpour. OF75 shared, "Even when the road was newly constructed, while other parts were not yet cemented, sand and rock particles still erode and flow down whenever it rains."

The landowner-traders expressed disappointment in the FMR as they encountered potholes and weeds along the way. For instance, unpaved parts eroded, causing damage to delivery trucks since drivers need to step on the gas and rev up their engines to get pass the muddy road. Also, they reiterated that they do not have an alternate route, as the FMR is the only access available for those coming from Silangang-Maligaya village, and it offers a shorter way to Dayap village. Some expressed disappointment and asked how a poorly constructed FMR had passed the quality assurance stage.
On the other hand, a village official shared that the FMR's deterioration is one of the reasons why ARC has limited engagements with traders outside the village. According to a village official, some traders feared their vehicles would get damaged. Similarly, some residents shared that their horses and motorcycles could not pass through during the rainy season as the FMR becomes covered with moss and drenched with water, causing accidents. Large vehicles could pass, but drivers should observe caution. A landowner shared that fixing the FMR would enable them to increase business activities. However, some beneficiaries who were aware of the funding processes were disappointed that even though the FMR subproject boosted local politicians' candidacy, the latter did not allocate appropriate municipal development funds to maintain it properly.

DAR representatives shared that this was a usual problem encountered in ARISP III subprojects. Based on the 2003 ICC Guidelines: Guiding Principle and National Government-LGU Cost Sharing Policy for LGU-implemented infrastructure subprojects, LGUs should fund the operation and maintenance costs because FMR's sustainability depends on their efforts to provide maintenance expenses. Moreover, the project management guidelines require that LGU should allocate sufficient funds for its maintenance and concretization. Failure to allocate appropriate funds would enable DAR to convert the grant portion into an LGU loan (DAR,1996). However, despite inclusion in the project management guidelines and requirements, the current LGU was unaware of this clause. CPMO did not flag the LGU regarding its failure to comply with the contract, as no formal complaints were filed against the LGU. On the other hand, JICA and the Japanese consultants were aware of LGU's violation but

31 Based on the Chapter 14: Sustainability Measures part of the ARISP III Implementation Policy Manual.
likewise declined to flag the CPMO and LGU. JCM80 expressed that this scenario was expected as it involves politics and reiterated that JICA would not flag any violation unless it affected the Japanese firms' operations or business activities within the area.

The Japanese consultant’s point-of-view is consistent with Kawai and Takagi's (2004) idea that the Japanese ODA is motivated by its economic and commercial objectives as economic cooperation norms and practices remained a defining feature of its ODA model. For instance, their one-dimensional approach in a non-interference narrative shows their inclination to focus on FMR’s technical, business, and economic matters and remain elusive in anything related to politics. This recurring scenario indicated that they were only concerned with the economic and business implications and were cautious in dealing with issues that may have political repercussions. Hence, this non-interference is a deterrent in the FMR's overall pursuit of humanitarian goals.

b. Market Participation

The FMR led to greater value chain incomes. Actual site visitation and project beneficiaries' claims showed that it created more economic activities as subcontractors, traders, and other businessmen were more than willing to transact with these two villages benefitting from the FMR due to road accessibility. As a result, significant business profits were generated, and market and production areas were connected. Consequently, the community's ARC Level of Development Assessment (ALDA) increased from 1 (low growth and undeveloped area) to 3 (increased market activity) in 2019, denoting its growth. DAR's official response stipulated that "FMR catalyzes development, as evidenced by the increasing number of traders penetrating the area to buy ARBs' produce. It provides market access, motivating them to plant more, eventually improving their production and income."
Specifically, it connects ARBs’ from Dayap and Silangang Maligaya to the nearest market and production areas. In addition, it enables barangay Dayap villagers to have two main access roads to the city center. At the same time, it helps Silangang-Maligaya villagers to have direct and fast access to the población (growth center).

Due to FMR construction in Agdangan, production areas and farms were made accessible to the existing and prospective markets. This entailed less transportation and hauling costs and minimized travel time for the community. Hence, inputs and products became more accessible.

The FMR also incurred unintended benefits in the social lives of the community as shared by FBM55, a DAR representative:

FMR catalyzes ARC development, as evidenced by the increasing number of traders penetrating the area to buy produce of ARBs. Lending institution agents and other investors can now go directly to the farmers. Spoilage of agricultural produce decreases because of the immediate pickup. Children can safely go to school without passing through muddy terrains during the rainy season. The Sildakin FMR plays a significant role in the livelihood and food security of the farmers. Their family and the entire rural economy. Being the foundation of modern agriculture, the FMR provides farmers market access, motivating them to plant more with technology adoption, eventually improving their production and income.

Project beneficiaries, particularly landowners and landowner-traders in coconut-related enterprises, had business engagements with Japanese importers, while some had discussions with prospective Japanese firms to expand their business
opportunities. For instance, they have business engagements with local Filipino business exporters, such as JNJ Oil Industries with coconut oil processor and production hub facility within the Quezon province, and with Peter and Paul Philippines Corporation subcontracting for organic coconut farms. Moreover, they also have engagements with Tropical Prime as a coir (coconut fiber) supplier used for fishing and erosion nets. On the other hand, all the businesses mentioned engaged with Japanese firms. LM57, a landowner-subcontractor, shared, "FMR is beneficial because we talked with prospective Japanese business clients and secured supply contracts. Most were into coconut raw materials such as copra meal, refined bleached, and deodorized coconut oil."

On the other hand, due to quota imposition, ARBs rarely participate in direct business engagements with these Japanese firms while directly trading with traders or subcontractors. Based on project site observation, ARBs usually have minimal investments, high reliance on family labor, inadequate access to information, lack of support services, and no direct contact with significant market players. They shared that due to the market commercialization process brought by FMR construction, three emerging marketing channels exist to buy commodities from them. First is through the village consumers, a typical neighbor who buys small quantities for personal consumption. AM75, an ARB, shared that he sells his produce to his neighbors, to wit:

We do not have a business because I do not have money. All we have are our rice and vegetable produce. Our [local] government does not offer us any

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32 Based on an interview with a Philippine Fiber Industry Development Authority representative, coir is a natural fiber that is thick, durable, resilient and resistant to microbial action and saltwater damage. Usually, ARBs and landowners from Agdangan supply brown fibers derived from mature nuts.
support [to improve our harvest]. Only our neighbors purchase my crops because my harvest is just a few. We need to sell it before it gets spoiled. I refuse to sell it to [a trader] because he would be the only one who will profit from it. He is a scoundrel (FGD, August 23, 2021).

The second involves village landowner-traders who act as agents of big companies, while the third is the landowner-subcontractor who owns a significant land size. The third intermediary gets ARBs' commodities through subcontracting scheme. Specifically, he offered contracts to ARBs with available land for cultivation and is willing to accept the terms. Since he was the only one who offered this kind of business opportunity, he enjoyed a monopsonistic position as the only one that sourced commodities in large quantities within the ARC. Based on interviews, only a tiny proportion is sold to village consumers, making side-selling a rare phenomenon. Almost all sales in all sizes are procured by traders or landowner-subcontractor. AF68 shared the current mechanisms and structure:

Maybe 40 percent of the products here are sold to traders, then 45 percent are sold to [the landowner-subcontractor]. Neighbors purchase our produce because we need a daily and instant source of money. I could offer my neighbors some products at the right price and get paid immediately. (FGD, August 24, 2021)

AF71 also shared:

We have three big-time traders and one landowner-subcontractor here. They have been really active buyers ever since, but they became more active in the market when we had an FMR because they have vehicles to collect our crops.
They are really benefiting from the FMR because their vehicles pass by the roads while we only walk on these roads due to lack of sufficient money [laughs] (FGD, August 23, 2021).

Unequal benefits were seen due to the perceived opportunistic behavior of traders. They displayed it via the occurrence of weighing losses. The ARBs estimate that their average annual loss was at least 40 percent of their intended profit due to low offers made by the traders, citing exorbitant transportation costs. Some ARBs also complained that the traders who came to buy farm produce offered lower prices and resorted to cheating by under-weighing. There were even occurrences where traders claimed some extra corn and coconut to compensate for transportation and marketing losses. Due to various issues, some ARBs have minimized their business engagements and connected with only one trader. AF63, an ARB, shared her bad experience dealing with traders:

They (traders) are swindlers. Either they will deduct our unpaid loans or cheat on the weight of products. When we catch them, they will say that we should just give in to compensate for their laborers' high gas prices and meals. I can't do anything about it because I was under a contractual agreement. I do not want to trade with the other one since [he] is a cheater and has no remorse for farmers. So I concentrated on one trader as my only transaction partner. He cheats but is not as rampant as the other (FGD, August 25, 2021).

On the other hand, the landowner-subcontractor also incurred benefits by displaying opportunistic behavior. AF72 shared that:
He [landowner-subcontractor] has big earnings. His buying price is better than a trader's, but there is a huge credit interest of around 20 percent. So I got surprised when [he] told me about my payables. [He] is really greedy. Yes, I have many issues in my business transactions with him, but I will still transact with him because he is the only one who would give accessible credit without collateral (FGD, August 23, 2021).

Depending on the ARBs' requests, the landowner-subcontractor assists in providing planting materials and inputs during the planting phase. ARBs can request credit inputs such as fertilizers from the landowner-subcontractor throughout the contract period also on credit. The former can decide on input use, while the latter supplies those inputs on credit that the former demand. Relatively, AF74, an ARB, cited that landowner-subcontractor and traders display and participate in unequal business engagements, denoting his unwillingness to interact with them, as shared:

All I have are our coconut, corn, and vegetable produce. Our local authorities do not offer any assistance [to enhance our harvest]. Only one trader and my neighbors buy my crops because our harvest is just a few. I should sell it before it gets spoiled. I have only dealt with one trader ever since because he displays less opportunistic behavior than others. I refuse to sell it to other traders and even engage with the landowner-subcontractor because they pay low due to supposed low market prices. I do not believe them. They are scoundrels (FGD, August 23, 2021).

Hence, the credit size depends on the actual use by an ARB. In addition, ARBs are legally bound to the contract until the credit is repaid in full, reinforcing the
subcontractor’s market power in the ARC. On the other hand, landowner-
subcontractor subcontracts ARBs to ensure their quota requirement with big Japanese
firms during the high-demand season. However, the ARBs will only receive their
share after loan deductions they made in the past. AF66, a subcontractee, shared her
choice and experience in dealing with a subcontractor while enumerating other
support services they need from the government to wit:

Given a choice, I do not like selling my coconuts to [subcontractors] because
he will deduct the money I owe him from my earnings. He offers me little
payment because he knows I am not that educated. Traders and subcontractor
are the ones who profit. Also, they add huge interest to our loans. Due to the
subcontractor’s quota system, I am already in debt, but I cannot do anything
because I have children [to support]. We should have our own market
[communal trading post], paved roads without humps [laughs], and financing
from the [local] government. Those would be reasonable provisions. I wonder
when I will experience that. (FGD, August 23, 2021).

Consequently, landowner-subcontractor and traders confirmed that their
market participation led to greater value chain incomes. Notably, the subcontractor
deals with ARBs to ensure his quotas during the high-demand season and his
significant business profits while traders conduct their business regularly, regardless
of the season.

The FMR also paved the way for more development projects for the project
site to address its poverty and encourage economic growth. After the FMR
construction, the Sildakin ARC has gained attraction from other government offices
that gave agricultural support services and development interventions in the field of the coconut sector. For instance, the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) Regional Office's official community provision catered to 24 coconut farmers from 2015- to date through the provision of the following interventions:

1. Participatory Coconut Planting Project (PCPP)\textsuperscript{33} – covering 56.0 hectares with 23 ARBs;
2. Coconut Fertilization Project (CFP) – 3.0 hectares with 2 ARBs; and
3. Kaanib Enterprise Development Project (KEDP)\textsuperscript{34} – 4 ARBs are members of KEDP-CBO and provided funds for livestock production (17 cattle and 14 carabaos) under the coconut replanting program for eighteen (18) ARBs

Moreover, PCA provided other interventions such as Coconut Seedlings Dispersal Project (CSDP), Cash and Food Subsidy for Marginalized Farmers and Fisher Folks (CFSMFF), and Crop Diversification Project. However, the PCA initiatives were limited as it only covers two (2), such as Dayap and Silangang Maligaya, out of five (5) villages. In the coconut industry sector, one (1) existing coco coir plant is on the site and has been operational since 2016 as managed by Tropical Palm, Inc. The production volume ranges from 10-15 tons of coco coir per day and other baled coir, geonet, and coco peat products. However, despite additional interventions, the socio-economic structure remains the same, with ARBs failing to maximize the opportunities.

\textsuperscript{33} The objective of the project is to plant potential areas for coconut and replant senile and unproductive coconut trees in the area to increase production and income of the coconut farmers.

\textsuperscript{34} The project is geared towards enterprise orientation with the Coconut Farmers Organizations (CFOs)/Cooperatives directly involved in producing goods to a market and seek to be viable trading organizations.
Reviewing the narratives, the FMR shaped trade relations and became a critical enabling condition for market participation in Sildakin ARC. This scenario supports Li's (2007) framework called The Will to Improve, wherein aid authorities implemented a governmental practice to direct systematic improvements among the marginal population, landscapes, and livelihoods. Using her framework, this study shows aid authorities' intention to create market opportunities wherein project beneficiaries could be attracted to its progress through voluntary trade engagement and possible capital flows between ARBs, traders, and subcontractors within the Sildakin ARC in Agdangan, Quezon, Philippines. Moreover, it also demonstrates their interest in improving the population and how they have viewed the ARC as backward and needing improvement, and the traditional agricultural sector was not productive enough; hence it needs modification. Consequently, it also determines how the FMR, a governmental technology, is insufficient to address the intended beneficiaries' real issues as the aid authorities lack situational awareness to see the ARBs' real plight as opportunities remain inequitably distributed due to inequitable market mechanisms.

The following section shows the interests and the relationships that existed during the FMR subproject management processes to analyze the primary purpose of aid authorities and understand their social control and existing power inequalities and relationships.

B. The Filipino-Japanese Aid Authorities' Relationships

FMR intends to improve lives while demonstrating aid authorities' economic and business interests. For example, the 2010 Third-Party Evaluation of Japan's Country Assistance Evaluation to the Philippines report showed that they were
concerned with infrastructure investments, particularly in roads and bridges, flood control, airports, and agricultural modernization. Relatively, JICA Report 2013 increased agriculture investments, such as FMR, provide opportunities for Japanese firms, demonstrating that while catering to the Filipino aid authorities' needs, JICA also responds to the needs of their domestic firms transacting in areas relevant to their field. Hence, the FMR management process is an example of how Filipino and Japanese aid authorities' networks and cooperative relationships work in economic and institutional settings.

**a. Strategic Selection**

Strategic selection refers to a situation where one entity has an interest over the other, demonstrating its inclination to pursue collaboration strategically. In this study, JICA helped DAR pursue agriculture development by leveraging and funding massive infrastructure while securing its own economic and raw material needs. In this case, the FMR was used to manifest strategic selection, demonstrating how Japan sees its recipient states as business partners while pursuing economic and business interests. Japan used FMR to foster a strategic selection and created a favorable relationship with the Philippines, which has raw materials, and invested in it so it could import the necessary raw materials. For example, Agdangan, after the FMR provision, became a growth area for the coconut industry that transacts with some Japanese firms.

Currently, the Sildakin ARC has become one of Japan's resource security sites by obtaining coconut products needed by some Japanese businesses operating within the province, a manifestation of the ODA's use for strategic engagement in the Philippines' agriculture development. As Agdangan, Quezon is included in Bondoc
Peninsula ARC Connectivity Cluster Plan for coconut production, most Filipino enterprises in the ARC engage with coconut-related businesses and develop indirect business relations with Japanese firms. As a result, some local Filipino businesses and their Japanese counterparts enjoy mutual benefits, wherein the former delivers the needed raw materials to their Japanese counterparts. For instance, one of Japan's local Filipino business exporters, JNJ Oil Industries, created a coconut hub facility to increase its capacity and accommodate immediate raw material processing needs within Quezon province to export coconut raw materials from its steady supply of coconut raw materials (e.g., copra meal, Refined Bleached and Deodorized coconut oil, glycerin, coconut shell charcoal, coconut water, desiccated coconut, liquid coconut milk, coconut milk powder, virgin coconut oil, and nata de coco). The FMR demonstrated that the alliance between Filipino and Japanese aid authorities ensures their survival due to reciprocity.

Though the PCA representative recognized Sildakin ARC's coconut production, it lacks data on the specific exports of the province to Japan. However, they shared that Quezon province, where the Sildakin ARC is located, had the most significant coconut production in the region. Specifically, it has the largest coconut area in hectares, generating 85% of the region's coconut-bearing trees, which generated 86% of production in 2018 (PCA, 2018), a manifestation of a significant supply of raw materials from the province. However, when asked about data on specific exports of the province to Japan, PCA representatives shared the lack of data as it is not keen on collecting provincial level-export data.

b. Systemic Interdependence
Systemic interdependence pertains to a scenario wherein two entities collaborate due to reciprocity. As Japan is heavily dependent on imports of strategic industrial materials, its ODA played a critical role in promoting its economic security by alleviating chronic trade friction, diversifying the flow of capital, and building a more stable relationship with the resource-rich recipient, such as the Philippines to demonstrate systematic interdependence. On the other hand, the Philippines accepted the loan assistance to create needed agriculture infrastructure while enhancing its capacity to export raw materials.

The FMR symbolized systemic interdependence wherein Japan demonstrated its economic power while the Philippines showed its commodity-resource power. For instance, the Quezon province, where Agdangan is located, is a significant coconut player in the Philippines, while Japan provided a significant amount to fund its FMR and enable ARBs and exporters to produce efficiently.

Japanese aid authorities' FMR investments in the coconut-producing ARC would increase their trading partners and eventually benefit themselves. Being a resource-poor country, they have been a significant importer of coconut products in the Philippines by importing considerable market shares of glycerin (55%), coconut shell carbon (73.9%), nata de coco (80%), coconut milk powder (19.4%), copra meat (4.2%), coco shell charcoal (20.5%) and liquid coconut milk (17.4%) (Agustin, 2016). Moreover, aside from a possible increase in raw material suppliers, it could also be an avenue for expanding their agricultural technology with local Filipino businesses, particularly those who own enterprises. For instance, Pasciolo Agri Ventures (PAV) of Tiaong, Quezon (another municipality which is 2-hour away from Agdangan Municipality) uses Japanese technology to produce and export nata de coco, tropical
fruits, vegetables, natural products like coconut vinegar, coconut jam, and later developed a fermentation process of virgin coconut oil (VCO).

In addition, some Japanese firms had pending partnerships with Filipino traders in Agdangan Quezon regarding coco-fiber and pure coconut oil, demonstrating that the locality turned into another raw material supplier due to the FMR construction helping Japan secure a part of its needs. For example, LM67, a landowner-subcontractor, has a pending partnership agreement with a Japanese firm: "I will be delivering copra (dried coconut flesh) for that business. It will process the copra into coconut oil and oleo chemicals. The Japanese business firm has innovative technology that could turn husks, previously treated as waste, into household objects. I want to take advantage of that." Moreover, LM65, a landowner and trader, seconded LM57's claim: "Japanese businesses have better technology and are very supportive of our coconut industry. We will provide the raw materials they need; then they will help us expand our business opportunities and create more jobs for the community."

Japan provided ODA to enhance the area's economic infrastructure and productive capacity, creating better access to raw materials. In return, the local businesses supply Japan's needed raw materials. The scenario is consistent with Koopel and Plummer's (1989) claim that ODA is a tool for Japan to strengthen economic binding, bolster external trade, and increase its domestic companies' leverage among its ODA recipients.

c. Contingent Convergence
Contingent Convergence relates to a scenario wherein the recipient adopts the donor's policies and mechanisms to ensure smooth collaboration that serves each other's interests.

The Japanese and Filipino aid authorities displayed contingent convergence. As the FMR serves each other's interests, Filipino project implementers agreed with Japan's policy objectives. The ARISP III mechanisms adopted Japan's preferences by facilitating institutional arrangements that impact the Philippines' ODA's everyday politics and implementation options. For instance, FBM55 explained that the Japan-influenced project management guidelines were accommodated, entrenched in the systems, and utilized by DAR's Foreign-Assisted Projects Office (FAPsO). He shared that project management guidelines served as a guide to synchronize the activities of the Project Management Offices (PMOs) at each level of lead cooperating agencies and gave project implementers a clear work scope while achieving their institutional objectives. He even informed that one of the remarkable characteristics of this FMR subproject management process was its adherence to the project evaluation criteria jointly approved by JICA and DAR; which is consistent with Dietrich and Wright's (2015) narratives that the recipient's implementation patterns align with the donor's ODA policy orientation, ensuring a smooth implementation and approval processes between the two institutions. This scenario shows how aid authorities facilitated contingent convergence, stipulating that the recipient agrees with the donor's preferences (Hout, 2015). It is similar to outcomes in Dietrich & Wright's (2015) study, wherein the recipient's ODA delivery patterns align with the donor's ODA policy orientation. For instance, a DAR representative shared that institutional adherence to the project implementation policy manual was a condition for JICA's
loan agreement provisions that ensured smooth funding approval and implementation processes between the two institutions.

The Japanese and Filipino aid authorities' strategic relationship of aligning their respective country assistance policies and investment plans allowed the FMR to create opportunities for both Japanese and Filipino aid authorities. The Japanese aid authorities used FMR to achieve their economic and business interests in several ways. First, it incurred profit from the ODA loan and the hefty commitment fees paid due to ARISP incurrence and implementation delays. Interest rates for FMR infrastructure and consultancy commitment charges were 1.50 and 0.01 percent, respectively. Second, it provided business activities for Japanese firms to handle consulting services. Lastly, it created opportunities for Japanese firms to venture with Filipino domestic businesses within the province and engage with raw materials suppliers. This scenario was consistent with Menocal et al. (2015), claiming that the Japan ODA supports the Japanese firm's business interests while promoting the bureaucracy's economic interests. As a result, Japanese aid authorities increase the recipient's economic infrastructure and expand local politicians’ social power by providing the infrastructures its local economic allies need. In addition, they understood that the Philippines has an agriculture development agenda that could accommodate Japanese aid authorities in the project development process.

This scenario aligns with Foucault's (1979), and Escobar's (1995) claims. Foucault's (1979) relational conceptualization of power and recognition that development is synthetically bound with governmentality, improving, and promoting people's welfare. It also supports Escobar's (1995) implicit premise that there is a conspiracy in development, demonstrating aid authorities' pursuit of their economic
interest and institutional objectives. It also supports his other claim that institutionalized and accommodating relationships conditioned the definition of development and the means of measuring it while delegitimizing the agency of the project beneficiaries. Both aid authorities have the power to make structural changes needed to improve lives and create a cooperative relationship necessary for mutually beneficial trade and investment ties. Their ODA's mutual benefit façade created intimate, interdependent economic relations and furthered its strategic economic and business interests, enabling how FMR helps aid authorities pursue competitiveness and achieve their interests.

Moreover, the scenario also demonstrates how Foucault’s notion of “Dispositif” and conceptualization of power demonstrates the operations of FMR's power through development discourse, including coming to terms with the centrality of aid authorities. He pertains to Dispositif as a concrete social apparatus, a 'thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble' of discursive and material elements such as the concept of development discourses. His dispositif concept is appropriate to the discussion of FMR as a development project because it recognizes its good intentions and the existence of both positive and negative impacts it generated while still giving a basis to comprehend an operation of power through governing.

C. The Impact of the FMR Infrastructure Subproject on the Project Beneficiaries Based on the Outcome Indicators

This part examines the FMR impacts on aid authorities' practices in configuring ways of acting, creating economic linkages, facilitating market
participation, inculcating new habits of competition and choice among its beneficiaries, and remaking society from the bottom up.

FMR plays a significant role in the community as essential public infrastructure, providing affordable access to agricultural inputs and outputs markets. It is an access road connecting major road arteries to Sildakin ARC, an agricultural production area where valuable crops, high-value commercial crops, and livestock are produced. The ARISP funded FMR due to its perceived multiplier effect, strong growth prospects, and the intention to focus on the last-mile challenge\(^{35}\) to market access by constructing a linkage between ARC and local markets. First, it was given to Sildakin ARC, which had a limited and poor rural road network suffering from agricultural bottlenecks and requiring an adequate response to its infrastructure needs. Second, it was intended to increase ARBs' market participation by delivering primary agricultural commodities and creating accessible markets. Third, it is committed to improving others' lives through poverty reduction and economic growth, while aid authorities assume authority and pledge to clear economic gains for project beneficiaries.

Based on interviews, landowners and ARB beneficiaries catered to commercial crops and partially displaced subsistence production due to the FMR opportunities. Crops like coconut, vegetables, and corn within the ARC, previously grown for home consumption, can now be sold to outside buyers. Some are growing cash crops and raising more livestock (i.e., Swine and Chicken), stipulating that the FMR is a must in moving their products from their farm to local or regional markets,

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\(^{35}\) indicate the complexity of obtaining commodities from those who are geographically diffused and poorly linked by low-quality roads
increasing the number of products sold, lowering consumer prices due to decreased transportation costs, and opening the ARC for market participation.

a. Impact Among Landowners, Landowner-Subcontractor and Landowner-Traders

There were eight (8) landowners; the majority (6) were married, composed of 4 to 8 family members. Three got their college, three high schools, and two with elementary degrees. Though all of them owned a significant land size, four shared that their other source of income was their business (e.g., swine production, small convenience stores, buying and selling secondhand items, and copra, oil, and nuts trading). Their annual household income ranges from PhP 160,000 ($3,330) – to PhP1,300,000 ($ 27,064), averaging at PhP 400,000 ($7,881), which shows that they are living above the Philippine poverty threshold of PhP 145,000 ($ 3,018) as of 2021.\textsuperscript{36} Their land sizes range from 1 to 10 hectares, averaging 5.2 per landowner. Some transferred their ownership to their children due to the Philippine five-hectare ownership limit. Most of them sell their farm products within and outside the ARC and use the FMR for personal and work-related reasons.

All landowners recognized an improvement in the average yield per cropping season (ton/ha) by 35- 40 percent. Some cultivate coconut, corn, and short-term subsistence crops such as bananas, cassava, and other root crops to increase their income. All agreed that due to FMR, they could get quality farm inputs (i.e., fertilizers, pesticides, and technical assistance), producing better yields per cropping season. However, it is noteworthy that the increased outputs on coconut, corn, vegetables, and bananas were recorded while minimal or no changes for vegetable

\textsuperscript{36} Converted using the Annual Philippine Peso Per US Dollar Rate End-of-Period (1 US Dollar= 48.036 PhP) as of 2020
products due to a lack of sustainable water sources for their farm. The lack of a sustainable and ideal water source prevents vegetable farmers from sustaining market participation. For instance, they usually use rainwater for farming which means that a rainy season will enable them to get enough vegetables, while poor and dry weather will ruin their chance to harvest any vegetables. LM45, a landowner with vegetable crops, suggested that future irrigation projects be included in LGU's or DAR's agricultural projects in the community as FMR provision is necessary yet insufficient to realize their full potential. This observation supports L's (2019) explanation that cash crops were used to improve economic position and social status. In this study, landowners spotted the market opportunity and adopted cash crops spontaneously without needing a push from aid authorities. As a result, their access to appropriate and appropriate resources has achieved greater prosperity, enabling them to earn more, accumulate land, and practice power over others through inequitable market mechanisms within the ARC.

All agreed that their net annual farm income (pesos/year/household) increased and was commensurate with the increasing prices of overall production costs. However, they were not able to quantify the percentage increase. They all agreed on the increased on-farm income as a direct result of the FMR intervention. They also denoted that along with the FMR construction; they could access high-value vegetable production for local markets and more business opportunities for their coconut business, denoting their agricultural expansion in the community at a relatively low cost for some period. They expanded income-earning opportunities in agriculture and allowed household members who used to work in other industries to refocus on on-farm activities and explore other agricultural activities. Unfortunately, their expansion
did not provide catching-up, failing benefits to trickle down to poor farmers, such as ARBs.

Moreover, their asset and production assets increased since they could buy the latest edition of big delivery vehicles and production assets, such as generators and threshers, to accommodate their growing business. LM67, a landowner, mentioned that he bought a delivery vehicle and his family's daily vehicle. In addition, he also encouraged his children to pursue higher education related to business and agriculture to expand the family business in the long run, a manifestation of how the FMR can be an economic artery for those expanding their businesses outside the community. However, they suggested additional and suitable support services to help the FMR be as inclusive as possible. For instance, five requested soft components, such as training for financial management, organizational development, agri-business, and marketing. This scenario shows that the FMR did affect their farm productivity but still needs other support services to realize its full potential. Therefore, FMR may be necessary but insufficient to increase their income and improve the productivity of ARBs.

All landowners shared that FMR's direct impacts include reduced transportation costs and smooth business processes among trading partners outside ARC. LM57, a landowner-subcontractor, shared that FMR has made transportation costs cheaper. For example, before FMR, the landowners will have to hire horses and pay PHP 100 ($1.97) per 100 kilos as a hauling fee and must wait longer hours (i.e., more than 2 hours) to deliver their produce to the intended traders affecting products' overall quality. Now, they could use their delivery trucks and family utility vehicles to deliver products outside the ARC or even put their products at the FMR side and let the traders and buyers pick them directly from the sidewalk, paying only PhP 20-30 ($
0.39- $ 0.59) as a hauling fee, a 70 to 80 percent decrease from the previous processes. Furthermore, they shared that their transport cost savings were used to buy agricultural inputs wholesale, lowering the overall price. They all agreed that the production costs decreased by 20 percent after FMR construction due to transportation cost reduction and that FMR helped them create multiplier effects as they could hire other community members to get their farms and businesses going.

Landowners benefit from FMR as opportunities are generally redistributed to them. For instance, they expanded their asset holding prices due to simultaneous land price increases of at least three folds compared to the original prices brought by the FMR. The increase prompted them to save and buy more land offered by ARBs (i.e., those who held the land beyond ten years) and ordinary citizens (non-farmers) within the community. On the other hand, their business partnership with ARBs reinforces inequitable social relations as the former are equipped to take advantage of the FMR opportunities; ARBs have only human capital and minimal usufructuary rights to derive opportunities, while authorities have socio-political and economic power over the whole project management process. For instance, most of them revealed lowball offers in transacting with ARBs. When asked for reasons, most Filipino aid authorities cited that ARBs' low-quality products usually do not match the agreed quality in their existing supply agreements with big companies, citing that ARBs' crops usually end up in the wet market. They get most of ARBs' products as most ARBs are chronically indebted to landowners. Three landowners, LM47, LM48, and LM66, admitted buying ARBs' lands for only PhP 16,000 ($333) per hectare, significantly lower than
the market price. The practice was illegal, but banks were used as accomplices to enable landowners to buy ARBs’ awarded lands legitimately (leasing the land illegally within the ARBs' 10-year holding period, then paying the land's total amortization amount, real estate tax, and other government fees, and providing minimal pocket money for the ARBs (seller). Hence, landowners’ opportunistic behavior maximizes the FMR opportunities best since they have surplus funds to invest in lands and a network of connections and relationships, enabling them to take advantage of trading or working opportunities and diversify into activities with substantially better returns. In addition, they have the financial security to explore buying lands inside the ARC, though it is illegal to buy one from an ARB.

All landowners recognized travel time reduction due to FMR. They concurred that it became quick for them to visit growth and market centers for business and personal needs. They shared that the FMR helped them because transporting their products is no longer difficult. Before, it was difficult for them to transport their produce because they did it through manual hauling, wherein they had to rent a horse or travel on foot, while the road was muddy and difficult, especially during the rainy season. Because of the FMR, newly purchased delivery vehicles can be used for efficient travel and go from one place to another or outside the community to transport their products to the local market or food processing centers. As landowners and investors travel most frequently and benefit most from FMR, they are given broadened opportunities due to significant time savings and reduced transportation costs, thus, time to engage in other productive activities.

37 The market price was at PhP 50,000 ($1,040) before the FMR while it grew to 500,000 ($ 10,409) after the FMR construction.
Moreover, those landowners recognized that their vehicle's overall maintenance costs decreased, allowing them to deliver their products faster with less spoilage. They are now transporting coconut and palay (unhusked rice) to town for milling instead of pounding it themselves; coconuts are transported to market by trucks rather than by horses. Some also said they could go to their farms quicker because it is simpler to travel in the FMR than through a footpath that quickly becomes muddy during rainy days. In addition, they now have various kinds of vehicles such as horses, tricycles, and motorcycles as their source of transportation to and from their farm and offer them to other ARBs as possible transportation to transport their goods to the prospective buyers.

Landowners, landowner-traders, and landowner-subcontractors play a significant role in the ARC because they act as buyers who can purchase large quantities at a given time. Though their offered prices are generally lower than village consumers' buying prices (although with small price differentials), ARBs still transact with them as the former do not have a storage facility or proper skills to prevent product spoilage. In this regard, landowner-traders and landowner-subcontractor were better off getting commodities at low prices and taking advantage of the economies of scale in transporting large quantities. LM65 shared that landowner-subcontractor and traders are the preferred buyers for two reasons. First, they are secured buyers to buy the output on scheduled dates and in large quantities, minimizing spoilage. Second, they give accessible credit assistance to subcontractees, particularly important because coconut, corn, and vegetables are capital-intensive crops, while subcontractees (usually ARBs) are financially constrained.
Landowners, landowner-subcontractor, and landowner-traders' productivity and income depend on FMR as their social and economic structure, and asset holdings increase due to economic activities. As a result, FMR became a critical social artery for the penetration and exchange of business ideas, and information, exposing landowners to new and dynamic flows of information and opportunities and increasing the desire for mobility.

Based on the discussion, all landowners, landowner-traders, and landowner-subcontractor improved their income and economic status at the expense of ARBs by leveraging their asset holdings and power relations to maximize the FMR opportunities. This scenario aligns with Li's (2011) claim that these kinds of interventions were insufficient as it stems from the exclusion of refractory issues such as power relations and inequality, rendering problems of poverty technical and manageable and acting on it through the prescription of infrastructure development, yet are usually compromised by socio-political practices.

a.1. Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Outcomes: Disproportionately Capturing Project Benefits

The non-poor sector (i.e., landowners, landowner-subcontractor, and landowner-traders) disproportionately captured project benefits as they have better asset holdings via stable access to capital to take advantage of the opportunities provided through market participation. As a result, they are prepared to take advantage of opportunities and gain unlimited access to resources. John Harris (2001) suggests that scenarios like this will likely lead to elite capture and anti-poor outcomes as the intervention addresses the superficial issues while keeping power relations and inequality unsolved.
Landowners have access to appropriate and sufficient resources and socio-political connections of both the actions of the locals and outside forces. Using The Will to Improve framework and the concept of governmentality, Bennett’s Hierarchy of Program Outcome shows how the FMR presents itself as a power to allow landowners to affect changes in their behavior, knowledge, attitude, skills, aspirations, economic and social conditions, and asset holdings among non-poor beneficiaries. Table 5 shows the changes they felt vis-à-vis the FMR indicators.

Table 5: FMR Impacts Among Landowners Using Bennett’s Hierarchy of Program Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes of Change</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>No. of Stories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 7: End results/changes in conditions</td>
<td>Change in economic and social conditions (e.g., increased yield or farm productions, income, improved livelihood, acquiring assets, etc.)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 6: Behavioral changes</td>
<td>Leeway to choose their preferred farm inputs (i.e., fertilizers, pesticides, and technical assistance) available in the markets. Their preference for quality farm inputs translates to better yields for crops per cropping season</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access high-value vegetable production for local markets and more business opportunities for their coconut business</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Change in the way of doing business (i.e., from delivering the produce to the buyers to putting their products at the FMR side and letting the traders and buyers from just accepting the products using a hauling service to direct pickup from the ARBs)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 6: Behavioral changes</td>
<td>They transport coconut and palay (unhusked rice) to town for milling instead of pounding it themselves;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>They transport coconuts using market trucks instead of horses</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5: KASA (Knowledge, Attitude, Skills, and Aspirations)</td>
<td>Their household members who used to work in other industries can refocus on on-farm activities and explore other agricultural activities</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes</td>
<td>Level 1: Inputs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---
|         | From the use of horses to delivery trucks to deliver products outside the ARC | 4 |
|         | They could now use various kinds of vehicles such as horses, tricycles, vans, and motorcycles as their source of transportation to and from their farm | 8 |

The landowners manifested different levels of changes due to FMR. First, they experience economic and social conditions changes. Landowners maximized ongoing market-oriented activities and pursued short-term cash crop diversification and intercrop cultivation to earn additional income for savings and increase their asset holdings. The enhanced value of their agricultural asset holdings increases their social capital and creditworthiness, making their overall transaction costs stable.

Second, they experienced behavioral changes by getting more leeway to choose their preferred farm inputs, planting high-value vegetables, and transforming the way of doing business and production. These positive changes allowed them to participate in high-value markets, getting lucrative prices as produce suppliers.

Third, they experience knowledge, attitude, skills, and aspirations changes by enabling their household members to refocus on on-farm activities and explore agricultural activities. For instance, they were able to improve earnings from their activities on the farm by treating farming as a family business.

Lastly, they also experienced changes in transportation used in their product delivery. They shifted from using horses to other modes of transportation delivery, such as tricycles, vans, and motorcycles, demonstrating agriculture modernization and that their overall benefits outweigh all the additional transaction costs incurred during market participation.
Using Li's (2001) work, this study also shows a classic example of "capitalism from below," wherein the actual capitalist initiators are those within the community. In this way, the FMR strengthens the relations and creates opportunities for those "initiators" or landowners with access to appropriate and sufficient resources. Its positive FMR impact among landowners shows that the level of opportunities is defined by the available resources, which both formal institutions (e.g., the state, market, and civil society) and informal institutions (e.g., traditions and social norms) influence. Based on the observations, the variations in the resource levels define the impact and the economic opportunities landowners could get. For instance, landowners have resources from formal and informal institutions which allow them to practice opportunistic behavior, such as lowballing, due to their domination in ARC's marketing channels.

b. Impact Among Ordinary Citizens (Non-farmers)

Eight (8) non-ARBs were married, composed of 3 to 9 family members. Six (6) finished high school, while two (2) finished elementary. Four are laborers, two are homemakers, and two are village officials. It is worthy to note that since they are allowed to practice their profession and engage in other occupations, two ordinary citizens (non-farmers) who are village officials were also into secondary livelihood opportunities as manicurists and laborers within the ARC during weekends and holidays. Their annual household income ranges from PHP 145,000 ($3,018), averaging PHP 155,000 ($3,226) per capita, hence still living within the poverty threshold. They do not own any land but reside within the ARC, although four

38 Providing cosmetic treatments on hands
admitted that they were former ARBs who sold their land to landowner-trader. All ordinary citizens (non-farmers) use the FMR for personal and work-related reasons.

They recognize that their travel time to and from their house was reduced due to FMR. In fact, because of the reduction, OF50, an ordinary citizen (non-farmer), shared that she could get additional monetary income due to the extra available time devoted to her sideline job offering manicure services. Moreover, they also recognize that there has been better accessibility due to a mix of transport services from the tricycle, horse, and motorcycle they could use daily at a price.

b.1. Bennett’s Hierarchy of Program Outcomes: Getting Additional Savings and Accessible Roads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes of Change</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>No. of Stories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 6: Behavioral changes</td>
<td>Get additional monetary savings due to extra available time devoted to her manicure services.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1: Inputs</td>
<td>Better accessibility and a mix of transport services from the tricycle, horse, and motorcycle they could use daily at a lower price</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accessible Roads

Table 6: FMR Impacts Among Ordinary Citizens Using Bennett’s Hierarchy of Program Outcomes

The FMR was able to exert effort to facilitate changes among ordinary citizens. First, they exhibited behavioral changes by getting additional job opportunities brought due to time saved by using the FMR. Most of them have double job shifts outside the ARC. Second, they also experienced changes in transportation for daily commutes to and from the city center.

c. Impact Among ARBs
There were sixteen (16) ARBs, with the majority (15) being married, composed of 4 to 9 family members. Seven (7) finished high school, while nine (9) finished elementary. They live below the Philippine poverty threshold of PhP 145,000 ($3,018) as of 2021. They also shared that they consume a part of their production while the majority is sold in the market, engaging with multiple-output markets (i.e., short-term crops and coconut markets). Like other groups of project beneficiaries’ participants, they use the FMR for personal and work-related reasons.

All ARB research participants in Agdangan Quezon are active farmers. They are engaging with multiple-output markets (i.e., short-term crops and coconut markets) because of the dual role of crops for consumption and market sales. ARBs produce vegetables, corn, and coconut as sources of income, regardless of their level of market integration. Corn is usually intercropped with coconuts and remains a staple food and a significant livestock feed. Vegetables serve as an additional source of income, while coconut is the primary source of income and the leading exporting agricultural commodity in the area. Some have alternative livelihoods as a babysitter and a faith healer. Their yearly per capita household income ranges from PhP 10,000 ($208)\textsuperscript{39} to 80,000 ($1,665), averaging PhP 37,555 ($781), while their land sizes range from 1 to 3 hectares, averaging 1.95 hectares per capita.

All ARB participants' average yield per cropping season is insufficient to address their needs. They recognize an improvement in the average yield per cropping season (ton/ha) by 20-30 percent. Some ARBs admitted that the FMR made them pursue cash crop cultivation to earn an average additional annual income of PhP 19,000 ($395) to PhP 23,500 ($489) per hectare. However, they still could not feel

\textsuperscript{39} Converted using the Annual Philippine Peso Per US Dollar Rate End-of-Period (1 US Dollar= 48.036 PhP) as of 2020
increased income. For instance, though their production increased, the selling prices were unchanged due to lowball offers from landowners/traders and traders citing excessive supply; AM65 shared, "the traders control prices, and we cannot do about it (contract price) since we have an existing contract with them" (FGD, August 23, 2021). Nevertheless, cash crops enabled them to survive, continue their relations, and earn money for everyday needs.

Moreover, the scenario shows that the FMR enable them to accommodate cash crops to increase income sources, a manifestation that their income depends on the traders or subcontractor controlling the prices. Specifically, cash crop cultivation subjected them to commodity price fluctuations, leaving them unable to diversify to other income sources. This observation supports Li's (2019) statement that cash crops are used to improve farmers' economic status. Like landowners, ARBs saw it as a market opportunity and adopted those cash crops simultaneously without further push from the aid authorities. However, it subjected them to inequitable market relations and high transaction costs, leaving most of them destitute.

The ARBs have expressed various critiques of the FMR and its insufficiency in addressing their current challenges. They complain about how aid authorities failed to deliver on their promises to improve poverty status and promote economic growth within the ARC. However, they did not challenge the structure that gave aid authorities the power to intervene in their ARCs. For instance, they complain that farm inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides, are becoming expensive with a lack of or minimal technical assistance from the government. The costs range from PhP 12,000 ($250) to 17,000 ($353)/cropping, offsetting the preliminary gains of cash crop cultivation. They even shared that those agricultural extension agents visit the
municipal office and landowners more frequently, expecting that information and support services will be cascaded to them and other small farmers within the ARC. However, cascading of information and support services towards them barely happened. They felt that they did not receive enough support services from the government or non-government organizations due to their antagonistic stance towards the a local politician. For instance, AM70, an ARB, shared that he had to access informal credit from a landowner charging exorbitant interest, to wit:

I always borrow money from a landowner-subcontractor to plant my crops. I will just pay it once I sell all my crops. The lender charges high interest, but I cannot do anything because he is the closest that can lend me that much. Unfortunately, no government programs provide credit support services. (FGD, August 25, 2021).

Thus, though their produce yield improved, it was not commensurate with the overall price increases in farm inputs and essential commodities (e.g., coffee, cooking oil and salt, detergents) for daily sustenance. In addition, AF69, an ARB, shared that DAR’s provision of support services in the ARC is weak and sometimes skewed towards the relatively rich ones, to wit:

Besides FMR, we need credit facilities and accessible farm inputs. We also need cropping skills and agricultural education. DAR could visit us in the ARC so our children or we could study different seed varieties and cropping skills that we need to grow our produce. I always try to use new seed varieties, but I still need to figure out the process. I wish someone could help me with the appropriate process. I wish someone could teach us while setting up a
model village to pilot-test the seed varieties. That is good! (FGD, August 26, 2021).

On the other hand, information scarcity of adaptable crop varieties is primarily due to weak extension service delivery of the government, relative to the numerous unfamiliar crop varieties released onto the market without adequate agricultural education on the types and economic benefits of improved varieties to improve their adoption decisions (Langyintuo & Setimela, 2007). Therefore, AF63, an ARB, suggested the LGU institute mechanisms that could improve the farm-related livelihood of its constituents, to wit:

The LGU focused on requesting FMR maintenance funding and should also request other resources to improve agricultural support service here in Agdangan. They should not merely follow the policies or approaches being advocated by DAR and PCA (Philippine Coconut Authority). Instead, they should create innovative programs, facilitate the creation and strengthening of ARB associations and cooperatives, and promote the development of the coconut, vegetables, and livestock industries. All these should be given along with FMR to overcome poverty. Hence, the government simultaneously provides the FMR, agricultural support services, and livelihood activities at the national and local levels. Yes, we already have a walkway, and we can
walk quickly, but when it comes to farming, it did not help. Only traders benefit from it. (FGD, August 26, 2021).

ARBs expressed a deep-rooted and exemplified critique whose earlier livelihoods had been challenged by the FMR, notably those who directly suffered from asset access asymmetry, low market information, and low extension services. They translated unmet promises into demands for accountability, as AF61, an ARB, shared:

They involved us in the commercialization process through FMR. However, they exposed us to the landowner-subcontractor and traders who are greedy for profit. The government should have supported us to compete with them initially, but they neglected us. Like they said, oh, there is an FMR; your lives will get better. But it is not the case. The road is rough and uneven [laughs]. Honestly, we just need to participate without traders to distribute our marketable surplus. During the pandemic, there were no traders. Many vegetables became rotten. We could have given these away for free. At present, we really rely on traders and landowner-subcontractor. (FGD, August 25, 2021).

The claim shows that aid authorities' FMR deficiencies are more readily identified and contested than the usual exploitation when production is arranged along capitalist lines. It also shows that ARBs made sense of their situation on their own terms without attempting to change the structure and failing to collaborate and disassemble the current relations. However, their claim is consistent with the idea that asset holdings such as social, political, financial, and human capital and farm
implements are crucial for marketable surplus production and can help alleviate production and market shocks. (Jayne et al., 2010). On the other hand, it also demonstrates the FMR as a misguided and insufficient intervention due to lacking support services and presents aid authorities’ systematic infrastructure bias toward fostering agriculture development. ARBs claim that aid authorities failed to accompany support that would maximize the FMR opportunities and address imbalances due to ARBs’ lack of asset holding. They even argued that aid authorities included them in the market agenda, further exacerbating the problem that FMR tried to resolve.

All ARBs recognized that their net annual farm income (pesos/year/household) increased but did not commensurate with the increasing prices of overall production costs. Like, previous participants, most of them could not share the percentage increase explicitly. Therefore, some cultivate vegetables, corn, and short-term subsistence crops such as bananas, cassava, and other root crops for subsistence needs. AM73, an ARB, shared their need for crop and livestock-specific intervention:

New variety seeds are expensive, but it would be great if DAR could provide them. Then, once we can afford it, we will purchase it ourselves. I hope they provide us with assistance so that we can bountifully farm. They should include financial assistance so we can develop hog-raising here in ARC. We can benefit and utilize the FMR if we earn the same as the traders. The [government] should provide overall assistance, not just a rough and uneven FMR. [laugh] (FGD, August 25, 2021)
As coconut farming is not labor-intensive, others were into alternative income generation strategies outside agriculture (e.g., babysitting and faith healing services). However, they all agreed to save money by veering away from house renovation and reducing meal intakes from three to two per day. In this way, they could at best satisfy the basic survival needs of their family and improve their basic food security. However, they could not increase their asset holdings or production assets. AM40, an ARB, mentioned that he bought a motorcycle not because his income improved but because he needed it to pursue alternative jobs other than farming, to wit:

I am compelled to buy a motorcycle because it is the most efficient transportation for other job opportunities outside Agdangan while waiting for the harvest season. However, to be honest, farming alone will not help us buy our everyday needs. We still must get jobs outside the community. FMR did not help, but I had to deal with it. (FGD, August 23, 2021)

His claim shows that FMR expanded his income source to non-farm activities but did not affect his farm productivity. However, on the other hand, this shows a possible long-term problem since FMR can cause agricultural diminution and ARBs’ further dependency on the monetary system in return for short-term and higher incomes if they do not mind its source. Moreover, since ARBs can choose the job they want, they may pursue jobs in the industrial and services sector as the agriculture sector offers little financial compensation compared to others.

All ARBs recognized that travel time was reduced by 40 minutes due to FMR. As a result, it became quicker for them to transact their farm products. Before, it was so burdensome for them to transport their produce because they did it through manual hauling, wherein they had to travel on foot, and the road was muddy and difficult,
especially during the rainy season. It is easier for them to go from one place to another because of the FMR and motorized vehicles such as tricycles. However, most of them shared that travel time reduction did not affect their overall income. They further shared that only those who owned a vehicle would feel the impact of travel time reduction. They would continue to walk down the FMR no matter how rough the surface and their products would unlikely be sufficient to pay for transport by others in trucks. This scenario shows a symptom of 'uneven development' (Bebbington, 2004; Smith, 2008). For instance, only those with vehicles could get FMR benefits. For instance, landowner-subcontractor or traders could carry their products to the local market or food processing centers and benefit from the FMR. On the other hand, ARBs have to hire transportation ad shell-out money for transportation costs or negotiate with traders or subcontractors who own the delivery vehicles, making them susceptible to lowballers, which is inequitable in the first place.

FMR, the aid authorities’ the Will to Improve, was futile in helping ARBs obtain better prices and expand the reach for their products. Although ARBs recognized transportation cost reduction of PhP 50 ($1), only one ARB claimed to have felt its impact, claiming that going from one place to another has become cheaper, while most of them expressed that though FMR reduced transportation costs as shared by their traders and rented horse-rider, farm input costs increased, offsetting the gains presented by the former. For example, AF80, an ARB, shared that buyer of her products is the one who would go to her farm, so she does not need to spend on the fare for transporting her produce. However, she revealed that the same buyer gave lowball offers. Furthermore, she shared that she still has debt and an existing supply agreement when asked why she pursued selling her products to the trader.
On the other hand, some ARBs recognized that FMR reduced transportation costs but offset the gains due to the high-interest rates from informal creditors. For example, AM59, an ARB, shared that his subcontractor gives credit and inputs provision but puts a 20 percent interest payable in a year, to wit:

My landowner-subcontractor saved on transportation costs. Since we do not have a vehicle, I did not experience that convenience. I think the trader pities us that when transportation costs are low, they give us some incentive. However, I could not accept that the interest rate for loans that informal creditors give us is pegged at 20 percent. It's really steep. It will take time to pay off (FGD, August 26, 2021).

This situation led ARBs to share unnoticeable differences in selling their products before or after the FMR construction. Hence, this indiscernible difference could be attributed to the changes in trade position and entire social structure where ARBs are often committed to selling their crops back to their debtors as part of their supply agreement. As a result, ARBs are chronically indebted to the same traders and have little to no chance to maneuver in deciding whom they sell to and at what price.

Most ARBs cannot buy their transportation. Remarkably, only those who own transportation or could buy horses and other vehicles could benefit from the FMR benefits. AM66, an ARB, emphasized that they need financial support to enhance their livelihood activities apart from FMR provision. He also mentioned that this would create multiplier effects as he could hire other poor farmworkers to get his farm going. They also mentioned that free plant seedlings would also be helpful. His father
also planned to create a mini fishpond within the ARC for an additional income. In addition, some ARBs could not reap the FMR benefits due to low resources and even sold their lots to the landowner-traders. For instance, some ARBs decided to sell their lands due to their tax deficiencies, while others sold them to other landowners for only PhP 16,000 ($ 333) per hectare, significantly lower than the market price (i.e., the buyer paid the total land cost, real estate tax, and government fees and the PHP 16,000 pocket money for ARBs while illegally leasing the land). This scenario was illegal, but banks were used as accomplices to enable ARBs to sell their lands legitimately and are aligned with Li’s (2001) observation on the existence of "capitalism from below" on which Indonesian highlanders who have switched to commercial crops have displaced subsistence production and became landless and jobless. In this study, some ARBs have been displaced over time as landowner-traders and subcontractors whose financial resources and connections enable them to take advantage of opportunities, withstand market adversities, and take over ARBs’ land. However, it is worth noting that displacement has not occurred through obviously coercive means but voluntary, constant negotiation, and piecemeal. Surprisingly, no one challenged the land ownership and ARC concept; contra Polanyi (2001), ARBs did not dispute land commodification which allowed landowners, who had prospered, to illegally accumulate land from those who were struggling to make ends meet. Using the concept of governmentality, FMR presents itself as a mechanism displacing ARBs from livelihoods and resources. However, the transformation, with its damaging effects on their livelihoods, is apparently because of voluntary and individual transactions.
This study provides an example of Li’s (2007) claim that farmers are not necessarily interested in structural change but in conveying their right to a modest life, as seen in their relationship with the dominant group through an implied social contract that subtly mediates and articulates their needs. They seemed to want some government intervention, as long as it was benign and perceived to be beneficial. Many ARBs saw the need for an FMR to create profit and access appropriate support services from aid authorities. They were not anti-government but merely wanted to get aligned and adequate support services and be recognized as a productive member of society. AM37, an ARB, shared that FMR did not affect his overall status, to wit:

Just like other ARBs, FMR is nothing to me. It is there, so I must live with it. It did not give substantial profit to my farm but enabled landowners, traders, and investors to create business profits at the expense of ARBs. The rich became prosperous because of the FMR, while the poor became poorer. It should have been done along with other support services, such as credit facilities for ARBs. (FGD, August 25, 2021).

Moreover, it also aligns with the concept of everyday resistance (Scott, 1990). On the outside, most ARBs seemed to accept FMR and tried to live peacefully but with certain apprehensions that the non-poor sector will generally maximize FMR benefits. However, such appearances are slightly contrary to what they feel. For instance, the results of observations and FGDs show that ARBs’ submissions are intertwined in their subjectivities: while in language, some show outrage and apathy to the FMR, and most of them demonstrate its insufficiency to help them, in action, they still choose to use it and follow aid authorities’ conventional norms and rules and continue their market participation. During FGDs, they easily express FMR’s
deficiency and disbenefits while displaying compromise, talking to local aid authorities, and participating in market opportunities. Unlike other resistance, theirs is typically hidden, occurs in unconventional places and ways, and is not politically articulated, ingenious, and disguised in nature. They tried to fight back using the so-called "weapons of the weak." However, it did not displace the structural foundation of these inequitable scenarios.

Aid authorities' Will to Improve FMR failed to achieve its primary objective of helping ARBs overcome their poverty status. For instance, it failed to help ARBs, and other small farmers within the project site increase their income and improve productivity due to the unequal distributive consequences of market-led growth. Its failure to deliver its objectives, address the real problems, and pay attention to the current scenario may speak of a preset and implicit agenda aligned with the primary goal of market expansion—which conflicts or even skews with the needs of the intended beneficiaries. The predominant structural problems (i.e., unbalanced social structure and unequal concentration of asset holdings and land distribution) were unsolved and had an immense bearing on defining how impacts occur in the ARC.

Nevertheless, recognizing how assets are distributed is essential in understanding how benefits accrue and planning mitigation and complementary measures to enable those lacking assets to benefit from any planned investment. For instance, the non-poor sector's inclination to productivity, efficiency, and optimal FMR objectives could exacerbate their capture due to their vast array of available resources. Simultaneously, some ARBs lack the resources and capacity to supply big companies, rely on the former, and enter unjust contractual arrangements.
Most ARBs supply produce at a lower market price. Specifically, they continue to offer lower prices per kilo than the prevailing market rate due to landowner-traders' assertiveness in getting discounted prices for bulk orders. Comparatively, market-led growth's transaction costs (e.g., monthly land amortization, farm operation costs, and family's daily sustenance) hampered them in maximizing the FMR while helping the non-poor sector pursue their business interests. On the other hand, while the aid authorities provide ARBs' de jure political power, the current institutional framework provides the non-poor sector's de facto sociopolitical power to exercise their opportunistic behavior.

This study shows scenarios of critiques of "technology" generated by those who directly experience the FMR effects in the name of their wellbeing. For instance, it shows wherein ARBs questioned and scrutinized aid authorities' discourse by exploring the interplay between the latter's practices in the FMR management process. It also demonstrates how ARBs, who have been FMR's target, developed their critical realization of FMR's insufficiency and analysis of their societal problems but lack the will to confront the authorities.

The FMR rendered socio, economic and political issues into technical ones and adjusted its indicators to portray beneficial results. Consequently, it facilitated social and economic relations among project beneficiaries and became a space of economic relationships through which bonds facilitate individual settlements to microcultures of values and meanings. For instance, most ARBs started to transact with the non-poor sector (e.g., landowner-subcontractor and landowner-traders) despite lacking formal agreements/contracts. However, on the other hand, FMR demonstrated capitalist expansion while its project beneficiaries experienced
dispossession. Notably, it produced negative impacts among ARBs by disproportionately supporting the non-poor sector and enabling them to increase their asset holdings and improve their poverty and economic status at the expense of ARBs. Notably, it subjected the latter to the former's inequitable market mechanisms, exposing them to stories of oppression, dispossession, and deprivation. For instance, the non-poor sector, such as the traders and subcontractors, displayed opportunistic behavior, demonstrated by weighing losses, price-fixing, and using English contracts even if it is incomprehensible to other parties. This situation persists because ARBs are afraid that the non-poor sector would not get their products and instead deal with other flexible small farmers since it would be easy for them to do so as the ARC became accessible to traders with big pickup trucks.

c.1. Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Outcomes: Facilitating Capitalism from Below

Table 7: FMR Impacts Among Project Beneficiaries Using Bennett’s Hierarchy of Program Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Change</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>No. of Stories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level Behavioral changes</strong> 6:</td>
<td>Pursue short-term cash crops cultivation subjected them to natural shocks or fluctuations in commodity prices, leaving them unable to diversify to other income sources</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pursue alternative income generation strategies outside agriculture, such as babysitting and offering faith healing services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Save money by veering away from house renovation and reducing meal intakes from three to two per day</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level KASA Changes</strong> 5:</td>
<td>Facilitate documented and contractual transactions for their farm products to landowner-subcontractor and traders.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to informal credit with exorbitant interest rates</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using Bennett's Hierarchy of Outcomes, the study showed the changes brought by FMR among ARBs following the standards of competition, accumulation, and progress.

The themes of the significant changes narrated by the project beneficiaries were classified based on Bennett's Hierarchy of Program Evidence to determine the levels of the FMR impacts. The aid authorities' FMR failed to address the real issue that ARBs faced but succeeded in modifying their conduct towards the accumulation of activities. They shared high-level negative changes brought by FMR involvement, meaning they had no other option but to adapt to the community's ongoing market-oriented changes.

First, ARBs experienced behavioral changes. FMR promoted market participation that exposed them to the ongoing market-oriented activities and encouraged them to pursue short-term cash crop cultivation to earn additional money. However, ARBs were also exposed to an increase in farming transaction costs related to cash crops' expenses in essential factors of production, such as credit, inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides), asymmetric information, and production technologies, resulting in unequal benefits. For instance, some ARBs incurred income deficits due to lowball offers from landowner-subcontractor and traders amid price increases in input costs. As a result, they instead save by veering away from housing renovation and reducing meal intake to compensate. These scenarios manifest that they could not feel the improvements and were subjected to natural shocks such as fluctuations in commodity prices, leaving them unable to diversify to other income sources and
seeking additional income generation strategies outside agriculture. The claim aligns with a significant number of studies conducted in developing countries confirming that smallholder farmers lack adequate support services and equitable contractual arrangements that allow them to participate in the market formally (Sebatta et al., 2014) (Alene et al, 2008) (Omiti et al., 2009) (Minot & Sawyer, 2016). Subsequently, it also shows ARBs' low bargaining power within their contractual agreements on advantageous terms of exchange (e.g., support services, conformity with standards, payment modes, etc.).

Second, ARBs also experienced knowledge, attitudes, skills, and aspirational changes. FMR market-oriented opportunities enabled ARBs to explore other support services needed for their market participation. For instance, some incurred informal credit despite exorbitant interest rates to buy the needed farming inputs and maintenance, while others facilitated contractual transactions with landowner-subcontractor and traders, which were previously conducted informally due to minimal transactions. Specifically, they chose to accommodate English contractual agreements, despite their difficulty reading and understanding them. For instance, for those ARBs with subcontracting agreements, the researcher found that only a few could understand their contractual obligation. The contract document was written in English and included several lengthy clauses and a cost and repayment schedule. Only a few engaged can read and speak English, meaning that most could not read and understand the contract before signing it. The challenge of inadequate or inaccessible information manifested as only a few ARBs reported that they completely understood the contract before signing it. Those who cannot read English themselves and still
indicated that they understood the contract revealed that they asked the landowner-subcontractor, landowner-traders, friends, or family members for translation.

Putting the Sildakin ARC’s overall case in a bigger context shows that aid authorities’ ARC strategy and agricultural development are factors in the capitalist emergences in the ARC. The scenario concurs with the concept of capitalist relations as used by Li (2014), in which she defined it as the group of relations characterized by inadequate ownership of the means of production (e.g., land and capital) with a group of unequal non-owners compelled to use of capital to generate profit under competitive conditions. Such a description could reflect ARBs’ experience with FMR’s unintended impact and markets’ failure to self-correct. For instance, this study gives an intimate assessment of the nature and effects of capitalist relations by connecting a pattern of inequality peculiar to the ARC. ARBs are desperate to get adequate agricultural support services to help them get by in inequitable market mechanisms in their community, such as their experience price-fixing and using English contractual agreements through it, which is incomprehensible to ARBs, the occurrence of weighing losses, and income inequality.

Overall, ARBs have been negatively affected by the market-oriented brought by FMR. Though they all agreed with its social benefits, some openly expressed that FMR facilitated inequitable market participation. Notably, it facilitated market participation with unequal distributive consequences, such as opportunities for landowner-subcontractor and traders to expand their businesses within the ARC while facilitating ARBs with low-bargaining power.
Using the concept of governmentality, the FMR presented itself as a form of power to increase the ARBs' exposure to world markets and state power and transformed the structure of agrarian relations precipitated by the conjecture of new market opportunities, economic growth, and poverty reduction. It became a symbol of aid authorities' class interest, control, and biased towards economic and business interests and misaligned objectives exacerbated by their focus on the infrastructure they freely and forcefully championed, which veered away from politics and had a neutral nature. For instance, issues and failures were political, whereas the solutions offered were related to increased market participation that remains technical. Hence, the current FMR resulted in inequalities, and weak benefits redistribution mechanisms among the poor sector, such as ARBs, due to a combination of insufficient support services from above and inequitable market mechanisms practiced by traders and subcontractors from below.

d. Unintended Benefits

Using the concept of governmentality, the FMR presented itself as a form of power to facilitate change among project beneficiaries. Aside from manifesting differentiated impacts among project beneficiaries, it facilitated unintended benefits in the social service provision and personal not related to farming. This part shows that not all the effects of governmental interventions seeking development are "dismal, " but also the chances to accomplish minimal social progress in the periphery, despite inequality.

First, FMR facilitated a social safety net within the ARC by providing access to necessities such as education, electricity, and health services. For instance, all
shared that they could quickly meet their Barangay (Village) Health Workers during office hours and get their services, such as vaccination. Mainly, landowner-traders shared that they could create a safety net for any uncertainties or immediate plans to increase their income due to FMR. For example, LF50 shared that they built their homes and used construction materials that were not readily accessible due to FMR.

Second, FMR enabled accessible roads for livelihood opportunities outside the ARC to be an economic artery for those living in ARC who were into seasonal migration work (e.g., babysitting). As mentioned above, all project beneficiaries used FMR to access job opportunities outside ARC, supporting their food security and other needs. In addition, most non-poor sectors’ (i.e., landowner-traders and landowner-subcontractor) educated family members pursued livelihood opportunities outside the ARC with the help of FMR. As a result, some were able to open small convenience stores such as soft drinks, and other dealers came within the ARC, facilitating a greater variety of consumer goods within the community. Therefore, it shows that the FMR is necessary for deciding whether to access additional income sources and develop a small business. On the other hand, ARBs could get additional income to support their daily sustenance since income from farming is not enough.

The scenarios above show that FMR’s positive effects are reasonably apparent as all project beneficiaries depend on it and are hopeful for more opportunities. Moreover, it can broaden and diversify livelihood opportunities given the suitable complementary activities and appropriate focus on the sociopolitical economic structure. However, the ARBs need additional support to maximize FMR's opportunities and suggest that an integrated approach is needed to tackle poverty effectively.
Third, FMR broadened opportunities due to greater time/ significant time savings and thus time to engage in other productive activities. Project beneficiaries recognized faster travel to and from the growth center for personal and business needs. Those in the ARC who travel most frequently benefit most from this, such as landowner-traders and subcontractors. ARBs, on the other hand, could secure alternative temporary livelihood opportunities while waiting for the next harvesting cycle. It became a critical social artery for the penetration and exchange of business ideas, culture, and information, exposing project beneficiaries to new and dynamic flows of information and opportunities and increasing the desire for mobility. All project beneficiaries rely on FMR, benefiting from commuting efficiency and cost savings.

However, it shows a possible long-term problem. FMR can cause agricultural diminution and further dependency on the monetary system by ARBs and the society in return for short-term, higher incomes or if they do not mind the source of income. Since they can choose the job they want, they may pursue jobs in the industrial and services sector as the agriculture sector offers little compared to others.

Fourth, land prices increased significantly, enabling landowner-traders and subcontractors to increase their future asset holdings significantly. For example, they shared that their land prices after FMR construction increased three times compared to their original prices. It triggered them to save and buy more lands offered by ARBs within the ARC. The claim above shows that landowners, landowner-subcontractor, and landowner-traders could use the FMR opportunities best since they can save for diversifying into activities with substantially better returns. Specifically, they have
surplus funds to invest in lands and have a network of connections and relationships, enabling them to take advantage of trading or working opportunities. In addition, they have the security to explore buying lands inside the ARC, though it is illegal to buy one from an ARB.

Fifth, all project beneficiaries revealed that they now feel more secure even if traveling during nighttime using tricycles (motorized three-wheeled cycles) via FMR. Besides, the FMR is now free from snakes and other poisonous insects, making travel more convenient.

These unintended benefits align with Foucauldian insight that while dispositifs or apparatuses fail on their intended objectives, they can still have effects that serve other purposes (Foucault, 2021). This study draws on this insight by arguing that while FMR may fail in terms of its stated aims, it is still accompanied by growth and positive impacts on operations of power. For instance, FMR facilitated social safety net, livelihood, and broadened opportunities based on the manifestations provided by project beneficiaries.

Overall, using Escobar (1995), Li (2007), and Foucault (1979), the whole study reflects how aid authorities work. First, it reveals how they monitor, research, and evaluate every aspect of aid-recipient relationships to gather information and identify the "problems" or technology targets. Second, it demonstrates their ability to subject project beneficiaries to their "governor's gaze," revealing the nature of their powerful position. Third, it also creates a multiplicity of blueprints and plans of action and, in so doing, engages them and the project beneficiaries in the development discourse.
On the other hand, FMR manifests as a form of power that supports Escobar's (1995) post-development theory that claims that development aid does more harm than good, mainly because it disrupts traditional ways of living and creates a dependency between recipients and donors and on the national economy from the people, among other things. It also teases the inherent contradictions and tensions in contemporary development, which concurs with Escobar's (1995) post-development theory that disclosing the imperfections of development practice, enables various actors to abandon development altogether so that the former recipients could be free from the last remnant of inequitable market mechanisms.

This part shows the differentiated impacts of FMR among project beneficiaries. Some benefitted economically, while others had untold stories of dispossession, deprivation, and discrimination. It also shows that FMR's planned objectives were different from what it accomplished because it maintains itself as coherent policy ideas of poverty reduction and economic growth initiatives, but the fact is, it is not always driven by such policies but by the exigencies of aid authorities to pursue their business and economic interests and the need to maintain their relationships.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Conclusions

This study has two main objectives. The first objective seeks to determine the FMR's problematization and project management processes, how it intended to improve beneficiaries' lives, and how aid authorities interacted during the project processes to demonstrate development discourse. The second objective relates to the FMR's differentiated impacts among project beneficiaries. The study has used several frameworks from Escobar (2005), Li (2007), and Foucault (1979) to elicit the problematization processes.

The discussion on the FMR problematization process reflects Escobar's (2005) "problematization of poverty." He claims that the government used poverty as a mechanism to control and create consumers and change society by portraying the so-called "poor" as a problem and an objects of knowledge and management that could only be resolved through the pursuit of poverty reduction and economic growth. Furthermore, aid authorities implemented the FMR to create market opportunities to address poverty through trade engagement and possible capital flows between ARBs, traders, and subcontractors within the ARC. This scenario demonstrates Li's (2007) "the Will to Improve" framework because it demonstrates how aid authorities claim to know how project beneficiaries should live and decide what is best for them and what they need.

The aid authorities facilitated the ARISP III, which funded the FMR, through a salient transition from inception to maturity stages, also known as the project development cycle or project management process. They demonstrate the central
constructs of development discourse during the project management process, such as collaboration, participation, depoliticization, planning, politics, and accountability based on their interactions and relations.

The FMR impact discussion shows how project beneficiaries were affected by the FMR construction through the changes manifested in their everyday lives. The FMR impacts predominantly manifested positive changes among landowners, traders, and ordinary while negative changes among ARBs. This discussion shows the relevance of Foucault's (1979) and Escobar's (1995) claims. Foucault's (1979) relational conceptualization of power and recognition that development is synthetically bound with governmentality is aligned with FMR’s primary objective of improving and promoting people's welfare. It also supports Escobar's (1995) implicit premise of development conspiracy. For instance, the FMR was conceptualized in the guise of aid authorities' real interests. Aid authorities are pursuing the FMR to address poverty reduction and economic growth challenges while pushing for their beneficial economic and business interests on the other.

Moreover, the study also demonstrates how Foucault's notion of Dispositif and conceptualization of power demonstrates the operations of FMR's power through development discourse, including coming to terms with the centrality of aid authorities. His Dispositif concept is appropriate to the discussion of FMR as a development project because it recognizes its good intentions and the existence of both positive and negative impacts it generated while still offering a basis to understand an operation of power affected by governing.

The FMR’s unintended benefits are social service provision and personal farming-related. For instance, due to FMR, all project beneficiaries had access to
necessities such as education, electricity, and health services as they could quickly access Village Health Workers and get appropriate services. Second, the FMR enabled accessible roads for livelihood opportunities outside the ARC as they could get job opportunities supporting their food security and other basic needs. Third, the FMR broadened opportunities by allowing project beneficiaries to engage in other productive activities, such as job opportunities unrelated to farming while waiting for the next harvesting cycle. These results align with Foucauldian insight that while Dispositifs or apparatuses fail on their intended objectives, they can still have effects that serve other purposes (Foucault, 2021). It draws on that insight by arguing that while FMR may fail in terms of its stated aims, it is still accompanied by growth and positive impacts on the operations of power. For instance, FMR facilitated social safety net, livelihood, and broadened opportunities based on the manifestations provided by project beneficiaries.

**Japanese and Filipino aid authorities in partaking in the FMR project management processes**

**Aid authorities’ rationale and rationale behind Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR infrastructure project?**

The primary rationale of Japanese and Filipino aid authorities in funding the FMR subproject is poverty reduction and economic growth promotion through the provision of FMR to address the prospective project site's weak agricultural base and weak agri-industry linkage. The FMR project was proposed to attain several objectives. First, they intended the market linkage to reduce transport costs, stimulate marketing, and increase productivity and income among ARBs. Second, they advocated for creating market connections from the agricultural production areas were
valuable and high-value commercial crops, livestock, and fisheries are mobilized and transported to the market. Third, they pushed for traditional market outlets or value chain development and encouraged industrialization to enable ARBs to participate and integrate into the market. Lastly, they used market-oriented development discourse and attempted to create interventions they thought needed for ARBs’ development. Hence, the various objectives manifest in aid authorities and rationale in facilitating the FMR.

**Aid authorities’ implementation of methodological and apolitical FMR project management process**

The aid authorities facilitated the ARISP III, which funded the FMR, through a salient transition from inception to maturity stages, also known as the project development cycle or project management process. They demonstrate the central constructs of development discourse during the project management process, such as collaboration, participation, depoliticization, planning, politics, and accountability based on their interactions and relations.

They implemented the Silangang Maligaya-Dayap FMR subproject by subjecting the ARISP and FMR subproject to the project management process from initiation, planning, execution, monitoring, and closure. They implemented heterogeneity of governmentality approaches: combination and expression of authoritarian and liberal governmentality in the FMR. During the initiation stage, they facilitated FMR as their tool in facilitating poverty reduction and rural economic growth agenda. They demonstrated an explicit inclination to profit, economic efficiency, productivity, and linkages discourses consistent with Foucault’s (2008) and Muller et al.’s (2017) concept of liberal governmentality as a governance structure on
which the decision-making process is based on rational and economic principles. Foucault (2008) argues that it is concerned with the economic management of society, understood as a natural system with its mechanisms. Also, he specifies that liberal governmentality enframes social processes in mechanisms of measurability and security so they can take the natural course while slightly tweaked towards rational and economic-based principles.

On the other hand, during the planning (selection and prioritization), execution, monitoring, and closure stages, aid authorities used the project implementation policy manual to implement authoritarian governmentality that maintained collaboration, order, and harmony with other support actors such as other partner bureaucracies, and Filipino construction firms. Local politicians were mere tools during the project implementation process. Their involvement was limited to the rationalization of the FMR objectives and actual project implementation rather than an avenue to develop grassroots solutions and real and sustainable participation.

Aid authorities in FMR’s intended objectives

FMR did not meet its original objectives. Project beneficiaries, such as ARBs, shared that outcome indicators such as average rice yield, net annual farm income, travel time, and transportation cost were insufficient to increase income and improve their productivity, hence ineffective in addressing overall poverty reduction and rural economic growth agenda.

First, the average rice yield (ton/ha) improvement did not commensurate with the price increase on input costs and lowball offers among traders and landowner-subcontractor. Second, an increased net annual farm income (pesos/year/household) did not commensurate with the price increase on overall production costs. Third, the
reduction of travel time and transportation costs did not affect their overall income as most of them could not buy their business transportation. Hence only those who own transportation benefitted from the FMR. Fourth, despite FMR investment, nothing significant happened to ARBs, the intended beneficiaries.

These indicators were quantifiable and could not measure the multidimensional (e.g., inequality, social exclusion, and socio-political) impacts among project beneficiaries. These illustrate depoliticization and disregard for class bias as they failed to challenge the existing socio-politics that kept ARBs, the intended beneficiaries, poor. It means that both aid authorities reduced the ARBs’ issues to mere technical ones and removed the issue's political character. For instance, they failed to address the imbalances due to ARBs’ shortcomings (e.g., lack of asset holdings, several challenges in access to essential factors of production, such as credit, inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides), information, production technologies, and poor access to output markets (Pingali, 2012; Poulton et al., 2010). Instead, they built FMR, even included ARBs in the market agenda, and subjected them to inequitable market mechanisms, further exacerbating the problem it tried to resolve. Moreover, they declined steps to protect the vulnerable sector and gave insufficient services to support the vulnerable in their market participation.

**The FMR infrastructure project benefitted the landowners, traders, and ordinary citizens**

This study provides a rarely discussed aspect of the completed FMR's impact on project beneficiaries, especially ARBs. Using the concept of governmentality, the FMR presented itself as a form of power to facilitate change among project beneficiaries by redistributing its benefits through market participation. For instance,
all landowners, landowner-traders, and landowner-subcontractor improved their income and economic status at the expense of ARBs by leveraging their asset holdings and power relations to maximize the FMR opportunities. On the other hand, ARBs and other small farmers failed to increase their income and improve productivity due to the unequal market mechanisms that exposed their stories of oppression, dispossession, and deprivation. For instance, the non-poor sector, such as the traders and subcontractors, displayed opportunistic behavior, demonstrated by weighing losses, price-fixing, and using English contracts even if it is incomprehensible to the other parties. Specifically, FMR's failure to deliver its objectives, address the real problems, and pay attention to the current scenario may speak of a preset and implicit agenda aligned with the primary goal of market expansion—which conflicts or even skews with the needs of ARBs. The predominant structural problems (i.e., unbalanced social structure and unequal concentration of asset holdings and land distribution) were unsolved and had an immense bearing on defining how impacts occur in the ARC.

It also claims that ARBs are not necessarily interested in structural change but in conveying their right to a modest life, as seen in their relationship with the dominant group through an implied social contract that subtly mediates and articulates their needs. They seemed to want some government intervention if it was benign and beneficial. They saw the need for an FMR to create profit and access appropriate support services from aid authorities. They were not anti-government but merely wanted to get aligned and adequate support services and be recognized as a productive member of society.
Aside from manifesting differentiated impacts among project beneficiaries, it facilitated unintended benefits in the social service provision and personal not related to farming. It shows that not all the effects of governmental interventions seeking development are "dismal," but also the chances to accomplish minimal social progress in the periphery, despite inequality.

b. Recommendations

The main problem is that the aid authorities focus on poverty reduction and economic growth narratives through market-oriented FMR intervention. As a result, they indirectly exclude ARBs in the development and participation processes, have limited appreciation of support services, and lack an ARB database. Moreover, they are focused on infrastructure provision and relatively weak on capacity-building. Hence, despite FMR investments, nothing significant has changed in the Philippine agriculture sector. As the Philippine economist once said, 'small farmers in the Philippines remain the poorest in our society, unable to bring their products where they may fetch the best price (Habito, 2019).

The main recommendation for this research is to address the challenges related to income and productivity by looking for alternatives to development discourse. The study shows that the current discourse was exacerbating the problem it is trying to resolve. The economic and political considerations in addressing rural poverty are far more complex and intertwined. What appears to be an FMR solution must be taken with caution because many interrelated factors constrain the FMR to confront poverty effectively. Thus, ARBs must facilitate FMR considering the socio-economic and political contexts, especially in the ARC, where there is inequality in asset concentration.
The results presented entail the following recommendations:

1. First, address ARBs’ farm productivity challenges by designing aligned and customized potential solutions. FMR catalyzed the market participation of all project beneficiaries within the ARC. However, some indications were that the benefits were not asset neutral, as landowner-subcontractor and traders benefitted significantly. Most ARBs felt that FMR would positively impact if the government (i.e., national and local levels) provided sufficient, differentiated, and targeted agricultural support services to their group. Specifically, they face several challenges in access to essential factors of production, such as credit, inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides), information, production technologies, and poor access to output markets (Pingali, 2012; Poulton et al., 2010).

2. Second, prevent unfair practices, including price-fixing and market segmentation, and address inputs sourcing and distribution costs. ARBs denoted that their market participation resulted in unequal benefits from the non-poor sector (i.e., landowner-subcontractor and traders). The non-poor sector disproportionately captured project benefits as they have better asset holdings via stable access to capital to take advantage of the opportunities provided through market participation.

Hence, the government should prevent unfair practices, including price-fixing and market segmentation, to protect ARBs from the non-poor sector's inequitable mechanisms. Specifically, the government should strengthen the Philippines Republic Act 7581 or the Price Act of 1992 implementation at the ARC level that allows the Department of Agriculture to punish abusive businesses that manipulate the supply of agricultural commodities to their gain and individuals that manipulate commodity prices to minimize discrepancies between farmgate and market retail prices.
3. Third, provide holistic agricultural support services. Along with FMR, the government credit facility is a recurring need requested by ARBs. With the current Philippine Development Plan (2021) encouraging credit guarantee use (NEDA, 2021), it would be worthwhile to consider the credit guarantee scheme in the ARC as a pilot test area. In this way, the credit guarantees could cover part of the ARBs' default risk, confirming secure compensation of all or part of the loan in case of default (Levitsky 1997). Moreover, it is also helpful in addressing the issue of ARBs' lack of collateral and poor credit history and improving credit terms. Additionally, enabling loans to those who would otherwise have been excluded from the lending market allows them to prove their repayment reputation in the future (De Gobbi, 2002) and benefit from lower transaction costs which will help raise their productivity (Navajas, 2001).

4. Create and strengthen documentary evidence among ODA-funded FMR subprojects from the village to the national levels.

The aid authorities did not appropriately monitor the FMR subproject due to a lack of documentary evidence. First, no baseline indicators were available, making it hard to monitor and measure impacts quantitatively. Second, no document repository is available for the project, making it hard to check aid authorities' claim veracity. Unfortunately, most aid authorities' claims lacked evidence citing loss of documents due to lack of repository. The existence of a repository would enable authorities and researchers to study and maximize processes and monitor the possible impacts of community subprojects funded through ODA.

Agriculture is the predominant activity in the Philippines, yet most of its accompanying interventions entail significant transaction costs. For instance, banks could not comply with the mandated credit for the agricultural sector, and ARBs cited
a lack of functioning collateral, high transaction costs due to inaccessibility, peculiar demand for financial instruments, and the lag between investment needs. In addition, they suffered overall volatilities and risks such as pests, diseases, underdeveloped communication and transportation infrastructure, and high covariate agricultural risks due to variable rainfall and price volatilities.

As most ARBs realized their market participation subjected their farm to higher transaction costs, the government should create initiatives to reduce transaction costs since these costs are high on small farms. They could find it challenging to take advantage of the economies of scale, negatively affecting their development. Based on interviews, capital market imperfections (e.g., limited access to formal credit for them with lowland endowments because they have limited value as collateral (Besley, 1995a; Besley, 1995b) could exacerbate their situation, which in turn restricts other's needs such as access to inputs, extension services, equipment, and inputs such as machinery. Due to their limited access to resources, ARBs often do not have bargaining power, leading to low asset holdings (Hazell et al., 2010; Johnson & Ruttan, 1994; Poulton et al., 2010).
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- Author, Farm-to-Market Road (FMR) Development Programs in the Republic of the Philippines: Analyzing the Prevailing Neoliberal Ideology Symbolisms in a Post-Marcos Era (Peer-Reviewed Refereed Journal) (Journal of Man and Society Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences)
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b. MAIDS- GRID Scholarship for ASEAN Students by Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand)
c. Overseas Research Experience Scholarship for Graduate Student, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand)
d. Canada-ASEAN Scholarships and Educational Exchanges for Development, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario (Canada)
Graduate School of Management, Kyoto University (Japan)
- Received Asian Development Bank- Japan Scholarship Program
- Ranked 1 in the Graduate School of Management Kyoto University, Batch 2017; received Great Academic Accomplishment Award and Performance Award with 3.96 out of 4.0 GPA,
- Received Excellent Presentation Award for the thesis entitled Measuring Inclusivity and Marginality: Determining the Accuracy of Various Location Quotient Approaches in Estimating the Philippine Regional Input-Output Coefficients, Graduate School of Management, Kyoto University
University of the Philippines, Manila (Philippines)
- Graduated with Latin Honours and with Best Thesis Award (PD 907)

\(^1\) See Jain P.(2014). “National Interest and Japan’s Foreign Aid Policy”
\(^{iii}\) See Embassy of Japan (n.d.) “Japan’s ODA in the Philippines”
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