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Scenarios of gloregionalization and post-globalization in the beginning of the 21st century: The BRIC Forum

Juan González García
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Abstract

The BRIC Forum (Brazil, Russia, India and China) has projected itself from a simple term that groups together a series of countries that share the quality of having emerging economies, to a category of analysis used in order to comprehend an actor in economic and political international relations that can generate a counterbalance to the unipolar structure under the hegemony of the United States. The new facets of globalization and regionalism have boosted a series of centripetal forces that shake the foundations of the old world order inherited during the post-Cold War era, threatening to shape new spaces of cooperation, and also of competition, in the newly born 21st century.

Introduction

The end of the bipolar world generated a series of transformations in the political and economic international system. On one hand, the collapse of the socialist block and the dissolution of the Soviet Union deepened the role of the United States as a hegemonic power in the new unipolar context of the new post-Cold War era. One fact was clear and evident: the hegemonic cycle deployed fundamentally by the United States after the Second World War, seemed to have a more ephemeral life compared to the long periods of domination achieved by preceding powers. However, unlike the preceding empires, never had it been observed in the history of humanity that a country could

achieve the direct and indirect control of an immense part of the planet in such a profound and intense manner.

On the other hand, the foundations of the new hegemonic system presented two fundamental characteristics: the erosion of an absolute power structure and the surfacing of emerging actors with the abilities to specifically influence certain areas of the so called "New World Order."

These tendencies had been observed since the 1970s decade. During this period, political international relations were marked by the flexibility of bipolarization, while the world economy generated new actors that drove multi-polarization. The European Economic Community (EEC), and Germany in particular, as well as Japan in the Asian region, transformed themselves into new poles of development. The alteration of the production structures and global capital flows, as the result of globalization, allowed the birth of a new segment of emerging middle powers that implied a recasting of the traditional hegemonic system.

Some analysts and academics like Jalife (2007), Stiglitz (2010), Hiro (2010), Wallerstein (2007), and O’Neill (2010) have pointed out that the economic and political dominion of the United States had come to an end (Hiro, 2010: 4) and proposed a reconfiguration of the world order within (post)globalization, which can no longer be understood as Americanization (O’Neill, 2010: 2), but as a new international system with major counter-balances to global hegemonic actors, which can be considered more optimistically because the emergence of new actors contributes to the construction of a more just, safe and representative new international order for the 21st century (Jalife, 2010: 15). Meanwhile, others believe that in the short and medium term the United States will remain dominant within a more decentralized environment.

The emergence of new actors and groups of countries in the international scenario is modifying the traditional geopolitical structure, as well as the geo-economic structure, on a world scale. It is in this context that Brazil, Russia, India and China were identified as the BRICs, an acronym first coined in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, an economist in the Goldman Sachs Asset Management firm. A few years later, a report given by the same firm in October 2003, written by Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, and titled *Dreaming with BRICs:*
The Path to 2050, endorsed the roles of that group of countries in a prospective scenario. This drew the attention of international public opinion, which allowed the subsequently necessary incorporation of the BRICs as a new concept in international topics.

This article analyzes the evolution of international relations since the postwar period and in particular the emerging tendencies of gloreregionalization and postglobalization as a context for BRICs.

The BRIC countries have formed a group that can act as an emerging pole in a new distribution of economic and political power. The study of the BRICs and their geopolitical and geo-economic scope has become relevant due to the unprecedented emergence of macro regions and their members as important actors in international politics (Girault, 2009: 85-100). The last part of this article analyzes the context in which the BRICs emerged, and suggests that, after a first decade of existence, the grouping appears to be entering a stage of formal institutionalization during this second decade of the 21st century.

New stages of globalization

Although the word “global” has more than 400 years of antiquity, the common use of the concepts of “globalization,” “globalized,” and “globalism,” began to be used in the 1970s (Waters, 2001: 20). In his book, The Global Village, Marshall McLuhan used the concept of globalization to refer to humanity as a “planetary tribe” and the world as a “global village.” The phrase assumed that mass media flows would be the creators of a global village where “everyone could talk to everyone” (Waters, 2001: 21).

More than five decades after the emergence of that term, it has continued evolving to become understood as a process of growing economic interdependence, that supplants the old concept of a bi- or tri-polar world.

Roland Robertson, probably one of the first to examine the social phenomenon of globalization, posits the existence of a correlation between trans-nationalization and global consciousness. He suggests that the concept of globalization refers to global comprehension, as well as increased consciousness of the world as a whole. He believes that both interdependence and world consciousness materialize globalization (Robertson, 1992: 25-42).
The first part of this definition, “global comprehension,” reflects the increasing interdependence of nation-states through trade, military alliances, and cultural imperialism (Waters, 2001: 4). Meanwhile, Anthony Giddens considers globalization as the result of an intense process of communication between different regions, which are linked together by exchange networks across the globe (Giddens, 1990: 52). However, he specifies that it is not just and not mainly economic interdependence, but the transformation of time and space in our lives (Giddens, 1999: 40).

Octavio Lanni notes that after the Second World War, capital started to lose its national aspect, due to the emerging predominance of movements and forms of reproduction on an international scale, resulting in a qualitative and quantitative metamorphosis with new conditions and possibilities for movement of transnational capital, dislocating boundaries and giving rise to globalism (Lanni, 2006: 26).

González argues that globalization is a multifaceted, interregional, inter-temporal, inter-spacial, and supranational phenomenon that appeared during the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin wall, the reunification of Germany (1989), the disintegration of the socialist bloc, and the beginning of the Japanese economic recession (1989). One world economic cycle ended and another began, marked by increased integration through trade agreements such as Initiatives for the Americas (1990), the European Economic Union (1992), NAFTA (1994), and the World Trade Organization (1995), all initiated by the United States (González, 2008: 70-72).

Parag Khanna (2008: 23) defines globalization as those interconnections that increasingly become more broad and profound among the peoples of the world, thanks to all types of exchanges. Globalization has been the most penetrating and powerful influence in the present, since it catalyzes the fast growth of nations, while at the same time creating a mechanism of market integration.

Furthermore, globalization can also be understood as a force of interdependence that multiplies itself in global networks, and that has properly evolved through three stages: internationalization, transnationalization, and integration (Jalife, 2007: 23).

Today the societies of the world are immersed in globalization as a result of actions and decisions taken in the past by nation-states,
corporations, and international organizations under the leadership and hegemonic capabilities of the United States.

**Tendencies in the processes of neo-regionalism**

The end of the Second World War had enormous consequences due to the dismantlement of the old European order and the division of the world into two spheres where two new superpowers competed for world domination. In this context, the region gained importance as a unit of analysis due to two factors: the Cold War context and the growing affirmation of regions with the same ideology. Stanley Hoffmann notes that after the war, one reality became evident: the international system, now expanded and heterogeneous, divided itself into subsystems in which the guidelines of cooperation and the manners to control conflicts became more intensified than in a unipolar international system (Hoffmann, 1987: 29).

This was reflected in the creation of new world organizations, such as the United Nations, created to counterbalance the weakness of the League of Nations. Louis Fawcett (1994: 12) explains that regionalism may have made its first formal appearance in the preliminary preparation of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, where it was stipulated that in order to deal with peace and security issues, the regional organisms should not be excluded.1

By the end of the Second World War, a tendency towards the rejection of Western presence and colonialism in Asia and Africa had arisen. Uldaricio Figueroa (2010: 98) explains that this began in 1926, when the Pan-Asiatic Conference took place in Nagasaki, becoming the first international manifestation of Asian solidarity, since it suggested the creation of a League of Asian Nations. In 1943, under Japanese leadership, a Pan-Asiatic policy was being outlined in Tokyo that contemplated the independence of western colonies, the elimination of all western influences, including communist influences, in Asia with the purpose of achieving harmony in the cultural and economic policies between countries while respecting their sovereignty and independence. However, the defeat of the Japanese in the Second World War ended this attempted Asian grouping under Japanese leadership.

In the face of a political vacuum in Asia, the Indian leader, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, made visits to Southeast Asia to promote the idea
of creating an Asian federation. This Pan-Asianist initiative was well-received, which encouraged convening a conference to lay a foundation stone for regional integration. However, this initiative stalled and no organization was established (Figueroa, 2010: 99).

The Cold War led to a series of regional security pacts that were specifically oriented towards the containment of the socialist or capitalist bloc. Some examples include NATO, the Warsaw pact, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the Middle East Treaty Organization, the Pacific Security Treaty, and the Organization of American States.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Non-Aligned Movement was established to find some neutral space in the geopolitical context of ideological conflict between two hegemonic blocs. These examples clearly show that in times of international uncertainty, nation-states look for regional integration mechanisms through cooperation.

Fawcett (1994: 29) argues that this trend towards regionalism resulted from the Cold War context, but remains valid today when the context has changed due to growing economic interdependence, resulting in a new type of regionalism.

According to Mario Telo (2007: 2), regionalism experienced three waves during the 20th century. The first occurred shortly after the First World War. Key events included: the Great Depression of 1929, which resulted from the collapse of the gold standard and the English sterling pound, causing the decline of the British empire, which had exercised a role of multilateral stability; the failure of the International Economic Conference of 1933, which made evident the inability of the United States to assume the role of superpower, as well as signaling the end of the British hegemony; and the end of a long era of auto-regulation and free markets during 1907-1914, an unusual feature of international relations.

Telo (2007: 2-3) argues that the crisis of 1929 had global impact which reflected a change from free trade to discriminatory protectionism and regional imperialism. Events such as the failure of the League of Nations and the efforts of both Germany and Japan to become regional powers manifested a type of *sui generis* regionalism that eventually triggered the Second World War.

The second wave of regionalism in the 1960s was compatible with the hegemony of the United States, which promoted a multilateral
vision as a form of regional integration. In its eagerness to maintain its hegemony and with the help of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the United States implemented this type of regionalism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Nevertheless, Teló (2007: 7) points out that this regionalism failed in these latitudes due to the feebleness of institutional policies, the legacy of colonialism, domestic economic policies, and shallow technological development.

Towards the end of the 1980s, some theorists debated over the economic leadership of the United States and its role as a hegemon in the international system. They pointed out that a theoretical framework had yet been established to explain the new world order. Teló (2007: 7-10) explains that a new form of regionalism has begun with a tendency towards anarchy of states, the international market and globalization.

Fawcett (1994: 29-52) notes that this new regionalism makes sense if we look at it from a global perspective: with the fading of the bipolar system, the world is experiencing tendencies towards cooperation and the decentralization of the international system.

The multilateralism promoted by the United States is giving way to a new pattern of commercial blocs.

**Integration and regional agreements**

According to neoclassical theory, countries trade on the basis of comparative advantage in resources and technologies, resulting in perfect market competition. However, today economies have different kinds of externalities such as foreign direct investment, and economies of large scale that are incompatible with perfect market competition. The conventional model of free trade is an optimum economic strategy, but market imperfections mean that economic integration can make more sense.

Regional integration is a tool used to achieve development goals. The main objectives of integration and regional cooperation are sustainable economic growth and reduction of poverty (Quevado and Villega, 2003: 7). Integration primarily works through free trade agreements and common trade policy across countries (Villamil and Estupiñán, 2004: 120).
In theoretical terms, regional economic integration is a transition from protectionism to free trade. From the 1950s to the new model of open regionalism in the 1990s, integration has been a means to diversify the export of manufactured goods, amplify the market, and give different economies access to economic activities and products in which they themselves are not internationally competitive (Baca, 2000, 351-353).

Renato Ruggiero (1996: 1) argues that regionalism facilitates the integration of economies involved in the global economy. Regionalism can promote a common approach to issues that are the subject of international discussions or negotiations, and regional trade initiatives are a powerful instrument to diminish or eliminate tensions.

Regionalism can be achieved on a basis of geographic proximity (for example, the EU or NAFTA) or by a sui generis (“of its own genre or species”) process of integration like that of APEC. Regionalism is a search for mechanisms of economic cooperation as a means to preserve and augment the economic dynamism of the countries involved. In addition, the creation of regional blocs is a result of geopolitical, ideological and strategic issues confronting the ruling elites of the nations. It is not exclusively an economic phenomenon (Sanchez, 2002: 5).

Regional trade agreements promote the growth of trade, make the market more attractive for investment, and can contribute to political and economic stability of the region. But trade liberalization has to be aligned with other strategies of development (SGPCUE, 2009: 4). The formation of major regional blocs can generate market power and modify the terms of trade with the rest of the world, resulting in a benefit to the region, but a cost to other countries (Stein, 1994: 15-52)

**Gloregionalization**

Globalization and regionalism are not just economic processes, but also political and multidimensional. Both are components of the same historical process of the strengthening of interdependence (Teló, 2007: 10). The extent of these processes has repercussions on a planetary scale, contributing to the interactions between states.

For many analysts the tendencies towards regionalism were well established by the end of the 1980s. Dominick Salvatore (1993) argues that the world has moved perhaps irreversibly towards a model of inter-
national trade characterized by three main blocks (North America, EU, and Asia, meaning Japan). Peter Drucker (1993) suggests that the demands to become what he calls a “society of knowledge”¹ make regionalism inevitable and irreversible. Aaron Friedber (1993: 94) claims that, in spite of the present dominant rhetoric in international politics, the tendency is more inclined toward regionalism than to globalization, toward fragmentation rather than unification, and in favor of dispersion rather than concentration.

At present, micro-regional schemes use macroeconomics as a pretext to integrate themselves into broader regional blocs. Nevertheless, practice shows that the level of institutionalization in regionalism varies depending on each case. For example, the EU achieved regional integration by means of institutionalization, but some groupings such as ASEAN have avoided any kind of institutional and bureaucratic structure in order not to violate the principal of sovereignty of the member states.

Could it be that the BRIC countries are looking to create a sui generis bloc while retaining respect for national sovereignty? To answer this question, we must first analyze the BRIC group from a perspective that embraces change in the global system. Now more than ever, state economic policies are decided by the structure and dynamics of the globalized world economy. In the current world political system, the boundaries between “domestic” and “international” have become fuzzy lines, penetrated by flows of capital and ideas in new patterns of integration.

In a globalized context, the region becomes a nexus of activity between the state and the supra-state. Regionalism becomes an alternative to counterbalance the weight of economic hegemonies. In general, the state and its cultural specificities cannot be denied. On the contrary, the territory and the region obligate countries, that are generally neighbor countries (a non-indispensable condition in the 21st century), to form an economically collective enterprise. A sort of society is created which the members may convert into a political project inside structures created by economic globalization.

Indeed, the process of globalization has allowed the rapid transfer and exchange of all kinds of products, goods, ideas, and cultures with the only purpose of conceiving of the world as one region. However, this does not mean that states will lose their essential identity. In this
paper, the role of the BRICs is analyzed as a vehicle to examine many of the ideas that underlie modern global economic regionalism, which we shall call gloregionalization.

**Post-globalization: new actors and groups of countries**

Under the flags of economic neoliberalism and a democratic imperialism, Washington proclaimed the emergence of a new world order. Backed by the financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) that were created at the end of Second World War, a unipolar structure emerged with a dominant state which had complete freedom of economic action, political and military.

Edward Cohen (2001: 2-23) points out that globalization spearheaded by the US and UK in the late 1960s was a political-economic program with the sole purpose of expanding the role of market institutions in Western life. The strategy was to reform the international system so that American and European societies could dominate the world economy. The opening and deregulation of markets established a neoliberal framework in the governance of market institutions which favored the more developed countries.

The neoliberal model spread slowly but inexorably to become the dominant model in the world. In order to maintain its invisible management of the market, Washington oversaw various rounds (Uruguay, Doha, etc.) of trade negotiations through GATT and WTO to redefine the institutional structure, and promoted justification of the system through such ideas as the Washington Consensus, Post Washington Consensus, and Santiago Consensus.6

Stiglitz (2004: 275) argues that the neoliberal system initially doubled or tripled the wealth of nations, compared to the wealth generated in the previous decades. However, the ethical failures of major financial players caused financial bubbles around the world, and those caught up in these bubbles suffered.

The international financial system fostered global instability. Crises in developing countries in the mid 1990s reinforced the perception that the United States was determined to direct economic-financial globalization in its own favor. The measures suggested by the IMF during these crises resulted in contraction of economic activity, declines in effective demand, continuing declines of social and economic
development, and absolute dependence on the IMF to determine the internal politics of developing countries (Gonzalez, 2008: 146).

For a long time, the United States government has employed its own rules for market liberalization. However, when it finds itself at a disadvantage, it suddenly changes its discourse to talk about concepts like “administrative trade” or “just trade” with the sole purpose of furthering its interests. For example, it threatened to sabotage all negotiations on the liberalization of financial services unless Malaysia ceded to the demands of one American insurance company, AIG. It also repeatedly threatens China, Japan, South Korea, India, and others with trade sanctions such as special tariffs when these countries do not rapidly accept its demands. The United States has been a prosecutor, judge, and jury in respect to free trade, without having to pass through the WTO.

However, in the last decade, a conjuncture of events has opened up a new era. The manner in which globalization has been promoted by the United States has reached a dead end. The asymmetries created mainly between the industrialized and the non-industrialized countries make it necessary to search for alternative paradigms in economic policy and world government. In the face of an ultimately dysfunctional economic-financial globalization and the inability of the old international institutions to deal with the imbalances mentioned above, post-globalization emerges as an option.

Yet one cannot speak of the death of globalization or of de-globalization, as Jalife (2007: 9) suggests, and least of all in the 21st century, due to the interdependence already created. However, mistakes made in globalization may be amended by means of governmental intervention in each country.

Stiglitz (2004: 331) himself indicates that the very nature of globalization created contradictions between the world economy and national economies. For that reason, the global economy should not depend on one supreme political power, but on the participation and consensus of many. The issue is not whether globalization can be a positive force of benefit to the poor of the world—of course it can—but how it should be managed, not mismanaged in the style of the United States.

This approach confronts neoliberalism because it emphasizes the individual interests of nations. Nationalism has re-emerged as a theme of development in the 21st century, but with a cooperative and collec-
tive element, in order to apply the principle that all nations are equal and that none either oppress or be oppressed.

Brazil, Russia, India, and China have formed a grouping to work together in a constructive spirit to promote their national, regional, and international objectives and to confront the problems of the post-global world through a new gloregional identity.

**BRIC: formation and evolution**

The immediate background to the formation of the BRIC was the events of the 1990s including: the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995; the Asian crisis of 1997-1998; the Russian and Argentinian crises at the end of the decade; the emergence of the so called new economy or “dotcom” economy; the first major failure of the Millennium Round in Seattle in 1999; the establishment in September 2000 of the UN’s Millennium Goals, meant to reduce inequality and world poverty by 2015; and the admission of China to the WTO on December 11, 2001. All of these events form the direct background to the creation of the group and its acronym.

Before the term BRIC came into use, many analysts used the term CRIB (Kobayashi-Hillary, 2007: 14). In 1997 a similar term, RIC, was coined by the Russian Yevgeny Primakov for Russia, India and China, a geostrategic triangle (Jalife, 2010: 63). Besides, before 2000 Brazil had started to promote the idea of greater cooperation between emerging countries.

There are organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that supports cooperation between Russia and China (India is also looking to be included); or like IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) where the great countries of the south work to guarantee security and help the poorer countries of the world; or like BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China, created in 2007), which established a position for the four great emerging countries in the negotiations on the UN Climate Change Convention; and finally, the expansion of the BRIC group to BRICS in 2011, with the formal adhesion of South Africa in 2010. All of this shows the extensive roots of the BRICS grouping. However, we must not forget that O’Neill’s perspective has proved more adequate in referring to the new economic superpowers (Kobayashi-Hillary, 2007, 14).
More importantly, the economic dynamism of all the BRICS members prompted some academics to think that these countries could become a bulwark of the emerging countries and dominant poles in the world economy by mid-century (Kobayashi-Hillary, 2007: 23).

Currently the BRICS has more than 42 percent of world population and is responsible for 23 percent of world production. According to the IMF’s estimate, by the year 2014, it will account for 61 percent of world growth. Between 2003 and 2010, the growth of the BRIC countries represented nearly 40 percent of the growth of world GDP. The total trade between the BRIC countries surpassed $38 billion dollars in 2003, $143 billion in 2009, and an estimated $260 billion in 2011 (AFP, 2011: 1). The dynamic growth of trade within BRICS and with the rest of the world positions the groping as a major engine of growth and therefore also a focus of attention.

The emerging countries are going through restructuring, strengthening their economies, and beginning to displace the traditionally dominant countries (Garcia, 2011: 1). The loss of US hegemony is expected to result in the world dividing into trade and currency blocs (Hudson, 2005: 9).

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are countries on three different continents (Africa, America and Asia Pacific) which are seeking to link together as a pragmatic and non-ideological economic bloc in order to gain access to raw materials as well as markets for exports. The BRICS represents a *sui generis* modern economic regionalism and innovative network structure of glo-regionalism as a new international paradigm.

When Goldman Sachs created the acronym BRIC in 2001, neither economists nor the rest of the world imagined that the four countries in scattered geographic sites would one day sit down and establish a common platform (Nye, 2010: 1). In June 2009, the foreign ministers of the four countries met for the first time in Yekaterinburg, Russia to transform an acronym into an international political force. In April 2010, the second meeting took place in Brasilia, Brazil. A year later in 2011, the third summit took place in Hainan, China to mark the accession of South Africa.

This platform of cooperation is based on the principles of solidarity, mutual trust, openness, transparency, common development, and respect of national sovereignty. This new alignment shows that
dissimilar and distant countries can come together to confront the
global challenges of the 21st century, setting a different course for the
world (Lagos, 2011: 1).

These countries, confident of the active roles they play in interna-
tional relations, note that there is a need for mechanisms of coopera-
tion between emerging countries in order to build a model of global
economic cooperation in order to achieve better representation in the
international realm.

The association of Brazil, Russia, India and China has gone from
being merely an economic acronym to becoming a more formal polit-
ical group with a stronger identity that promises to have increasing
importance in international politics.

In the next 40 years Brazil, Russia, India and China are expected
to become a power in the world due to rapid and sustained economic
growth. This prediction is based on a number of variables including
capital accumulation, productivity, population, GDP growth and per
capita income. In the context of deceleration and economic crises in
the industrialized countries, this dynamism will propel BRICS into a
more salient presence in global affairs. By means of economic coopera-
tion, the countries have made their economies more complementary
with one another. In the 2009 financial crisis, when world GDP fell by
2 percent drop, the GDP of the BRICS increased and contributed 4.3
percent to the growth of the world GDP. In 2010, 23 percent of global
GDP came from the BRICS. Additionally, the BRICS demonstrate
financial strength in the sense that they hold 39 percent of the world’s
foreign exchange reserves, protecting them from speculative problems
and devaluation.

By strengthening trade links among themselves and diversifying
their external trade, the BRICS countries have shown strong GDP
growth (see Figure 1).

The growth of Brazil, Russia, India and China has greatly expanded
their domestic markets which in turn further stimulates their interna-
tional trade. As a result, the increase in domestic consumption and
investment has given the group an active role in international relations
(Baumann, 2009: 1).

Over the last two decades, developing economies have grown
strongly while most industrialized countries have shown a decline in
growth. In the period 2000-2010, China had an average annual growth
of 10.5 percent, India 7.8 percent, Russia 4.8 percent, and Brazil 3.6 percent. The growing global importance of the BRIC group is based on their size, natural resources, large population, GDP growth over decades, foreign reserves, and the value of external trade. Despite these facts and the high expectations they provoke, the success of BRICS is not guaranteed because this globalized and interdependent world can generate financial crises, economic shocks, and political conflicts that erase existing trends.

Figure 1. BRIC group GDP growth, 2000-2010 (index, 2000 = 100)

Over the last two decades, developing economies have grown strongly while most industrialized countries have shown a decline in growth. In the period 2000-2010, China had an average annual growth of 10.5 percent, India 7.8 percent, Russia 4.8 percent, and Brazil 3.6 percent. The growing global importance of the BRIC group is based on their size, natural resources, large population, GDP growth over decades, foreign reserves, and the value of external trade. Despite these facts and the high expectations they provoke, the success of BRICS is not guaranteed because this globalized and interdependent world can generate financial crises, economic shocks, and political conflicts that erase existing trends.
Final considerations

The macro global trends and national and international events of the last decade have begun to undermine the foundations of a single economic hegemony. The contradictions of globalization have created the political and economic space for countries and regions to create new groupings beyond those promoted and controlled by the United States.

The global problems and the lack of solutions require a redesign of the international geo-economic and geopolitical architecture. The processes of regionalization and neo-regionalization are shaping new structures of integration within a gloregional and post-global perspective.

The BRIC group is devising a mixed formula of globalization. Instead of following IMF recommendations and unconditionally opening up their trade and capital markets, they have opted for mixed strategies based on state intervention coupled with selective or gradual liberalization, and have sought diverse relations of economic cooperation outside the traditional hegemony of the United States.

The BRIC group is a project which aims to contribute to the building of a new international order characterized by new alliances between countries for cooperation rather than competition. The BRIC forum is an emerging actor in the uncertain economic and political international relations of the new millennium.

Notes

1 I refer to the Arab League of Nations, the Commonwealth, and the Interamerican System.
2 The Non-Aligned Countries Movement included 117 countries and one autonomous region.
3 The Soviet Union and the United States
4 The formation of knowledge is the biggest investment in all developed countries. This establishes a substantial difference between the old capitalist society, with its great emporiums and infrastructures, and the postmodern society, in which the qualification of the workers and employees in the mastering of their instruments, that is to say knowledge itself, forms part of
what used to be known as modes of production.

5 In his thesis “Soñando con BRICs: Rumbo a 2050,” Jim O’Neil suggests that the economic potential of Brazil, Russia, India and China is such that they can become the four dominant economies by 2050. This suggestion prompted financial companies to group economies from distinct parts of the globe.

6 A list of economic policies proposed to stimulate growth in Latin American countries.


8 For more information, please consult 'Dreaming with BRIC, the Path to 2050.'

9 Equal to $4.1 trillion dollars

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Herrera.