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Politics, porn, Pisok: a study of contemporary Minahasa, Indonesia

Philipp Borgs

Abstract

Indonesia has been subject to huge changes after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious problems that remained under the surface suddenly erupted and led to violent clashes between different groups in many parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Interestingly, North Sulawesi has not been subject to such incidents yet. Even though it has one of the highest numbers of Christians in Indonesia, the region remains stable and peaceful. This article analyzes this province with a focus on the districts of Minahasa. The ethnic Minahasans played a special role both during the Dutch colonial era and the early years of the Indonesian nation. Now that Islam seems to gain influence in Indonesia, Christian Minahasans pay attention to how politics in Jakarta might affect their region. The controversy over the so-called “porn bill” revealed fears over a subtle Islamization. Despite various differences with the central government, Minahasa and North Sulawesi do not seriously seek independence from the motherland.

This article focuses on Minahasa in North Sulawesi as a window into ethnic and religious tensions in contemporary Indonesia. Situated at the northern tip of the island of Sulawesi, Minahasa might seem a rather atypical location for study. Roughly half of North Sulawesi’s population of around 2.1 million is ethnically Minahasa, and most are Christian. The history of Minahasa suggests that the area could easily harbor resentments or reservations against the Indonesian state down to the present day. The people made a remarkable change from Dutch protégés to Indonesian nationalists, but local rebellions like the Permesta revolt in the late 1950s might suggest that parts of Minahasa’s society seem not to accept its place in Indonesia. This does not necessarily

mean that those elements seek independence, but as the Permesta revolt showed, grievances against Jakarta as the center are found throughout its history.

This article presents the current political situation in Minahasa through three different lenses. The first part examines recent electoral politics. The second covers organization that have threatened secession. The third shows how a so-called “porn bill” highlighted religious divisions. The article concludes that, despite its unusual ethnic and religious complexion, Minahasa is a rather typical site of modern Indonesian politics.

**Politics**

Owing to differences in culture and history, such as being Christian and being closely associated with the Dutch, the Minahasans might be expected to express their feeling of being different by voting for Christian or other “different” parties. North Sulawesi and Minahasa used to be Golkar strongholds. Golkar is largely perceived as a Pancasila-based and secular party which gained votes predominantly from the outer islands, whereas the other big party, the PDI-P is considered a Javanese party, and also a Christian and nationalist party. The label of a Christian party goes back to the 1970s, when President Suharto forced parties to merge into three big parties: Golkar, the Muslim PPP, and the PDI. The nationalist, Protestant, and Catholic parties joined together in PDI. After the 1999 election, one third of the MPs of the PDI-P were non-Muslims, a very high proportion considering that non-Muslims constitute only around 10–12 percent of the population. Recently, Golkar seems to tend towards Islam because of the leadership of Habibie and Akbar Tanjung.

**The 2004 elections**

At the last parliamentary elections in 2004, the voting behavior in North Sulawesi diverged slightly from the nationwide pattern. At the national level, Golkar garnered 22 percent of the votes, PDI-P 19 percent, the NU-affiliated PKB 11 percent, and other smaller Muslim parties between 5 and 8 percent. The Partai Demokrat (PD), the newly established party of now president Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, gained 8 percent. The Christian party, Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) or Prosperous Peace Party, collected 2 percent. In sum, there were two big parties, PDI-P and Golkar, various smaller Muslim parties led by the rather secular PKB, and many small parties with a single-digit share of the votes.

In North Sulawesi, it might be expected that the predominantly Christian population would opt for Christian parties, in order to counter the Muslim parties and to preserve their status in Indonesia, and that the Muslim parties would perform poorly since only 30 percent of North Sulawesi's population is Muslim. In fact, Golkar performed better in North Sulawesi than the national result, gaining over half of the total vote (see Table 1), while the Muslim parties performed poorly, and the Christian party PDS got five times its nationwide share. Only in provinces of Java, including Jakarta, and North Sumatra with the Christian Bataks, did PDS gather more votes in absolute terms. Yet PDS could have been expected to achieve an even better result. One possible reason why Golkar scored so high in North Sulawesi is its voting base. Golkar is perceived as a non-Java party with secular roots. Furthermore, Golkar draws its votes from rather educated and non-urban people,
especially in the Outer Islands, while PDI-P is seen as a non-Muslim, Javanese party. Yet the principal reason why PDS performed no better is that religion and politics are seen as separate. On the basis of the history of corruption, collusion, and nepotism, politics are considered “dirty,” and therefore religion, as something that should be clean, has to stay away from politics.

Locally, the current situation in politics is as follows. The governor of North Sulawesi, Sinyo Harry Sarundajang, is a member of the PDI-P, and has a very good reputation as “clean” and not corrupt. The province’s capital, Manado, is now run by a Golkar member, Jimmy Rimba Rogi, who replaced Wempie Frederik. Frederik and his family (especially his wife) are prominent figures in North Sulawesi’s politics. After an internal rivalry within Golkar, Frederick joined the PDI-P. His wife, Adrianne Frederik Nangoy, used to be an active member of Golkar as well but recently ran for Bupati (district head) in the Minahasa Induk district on a PD ticket. However, she fared very poor in those elections and the old Bupati, Stefanus Vreeke Runtu, belonging to Golkar, won the election in late December 2007. For local and regional politicians, party membership has nothing to do with ideology or program, but is a matter of personal ambition.

Similarly, one reason why voting behavior in North Sulawesi does not appear to follow religious lines is that all parties are represented by local figures, and individuals seem more important than parties. The Frederiks changed parties various times, and SBY won election as president even though he belonged to a small party.

Bupati elections in Minahasa Induk

The Bupati (district head) election in December 2007 was the first time in Minahasa that this post was directly elected for a five-year term rather than being selected by the regional parliament.

In the local parliament (DPRD) in December 2007, Golkar held nine of the thirty seats and PDI-P had eight (see Fig. 2). The military-connected PKPI, which split from Golkar in 1998, had four, and the Christian PDS had three. The PKB, a Muslim party actually led by a Catholic in Sulawesi, and the PKPB led by one of Suharto’s daughters, held one seat apiece.

Prior to this direct election, the Bupati was a member of
Golkar, and the vice-Bupati came from PKPI as a result of a coalition between these parties. Since the laws have changed, the new Bupati does not have to rely on party politics within the local parliament any more. The election campaign was a good example of how politics in Indonesia are done. In Minahasa there were five candidates each with a running mate: the re-elected Bupati, a Golkar member; a team from PDI-P; a rather awkward joint team from PDS and PKB; the wife of former Manado mayor Frederik, associated with PD and several small parties, insignificant in Minahasa, such as PPP, PBB and PBR; and a PKPI team. The conduct of the campaigns was truly representative of Indonesia. During one typical car ride with a member of the local parliament, a politician handed out posters, calendars, and buttons to people standing in the streets around the Tondano Lake in the heartland of Minahasa. These people not only accepted gifts and gimmicks from the different candidates, but demanded them. A woman approached the car and directly asked how much money the candidate would be willing to give to her. The parliamentarian mentioned Rp 50,000 (c. US$ 5) would be handed out. This was seen as a normal way of getting votes. Another way to convince people to vote for the "right" party are the so-called "morning attacks" on election day when candidates hand out money or other kinds of gifts.

Candidates also give financial support to families for weddings, funerals, and other events which can be a heavy burden. A local, influential politician, such as a Bupati or a candidate, needs to spend money freely to retain prestige, power, and status. Often such practices are associated with financial abuses and nepotistic connections between politicians and businessmen or military figures. Minahasa is not an exception in Indonesia's politics.
In sum, the Bupati election campaign in Minahasa Induk was rather typical for Indonesia, with vote buying, a low party attachment by the candidates, and unusual coalitions among parties. All candidates also made use of certain distinctively Minahasa symbols or expressions. The “Manguni” (owl), a symbol of the region, appeared on many posters along with expressions such as “mapalus,” the Minahasa form of “goyong royong” meaning mutual help. The outcome of the election was also typical in that the re-elected Bupati was a Golkar member and the runner-up belonged to the second biggest party, PDI-P.

Minahasafication

There is no organization that aims at separation from Indonesia or that wants to set up an independent Minahasa. There is also no indication that Christian Eastern Indonesia including North Sulawesi, parts of the Malukus, and Papua want to set up a “Christian East Indonesia” or a “Golden Triangle” of Christian states in Indonesia. Yet there have been threats of secession issued by certain groups in Minahasa.

“Deklarasi Inspirasi”

In August 2000, a group of people held a congress in Tomohon, in the mountains outside Manado in the heartland of Minahasa, and concluded with a declaration called “Deklarasi Kongres Minahasa Raya” or “Deklarasi Inspirasi.” Earlier, certain groups had demanded the introduction of Sharia law in Indonesia and inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the constitution. Supporters of this idea were found in the Muslim parties, PPP, PBB and PB, and were supported by the vice-president Hamzah Haz. Additionally, Muslim militias such as the FPI, the Islamic Defender Front, were vocal supporters. Besides the Sharia issue, the conflict in the Malukus was in progress at that time. In the declaration issued by the Tomohon meeting, some influential Minahasan politicians argued that Minahasa has always been a part of Indonesia and had supported the cause of the Republic of Indonesia from the beginning. They rejected the Jakarta Charter on grounds that religion should not be part of politics. If the Jakarta Charter
was to be included in the constitution, the Republic of Indonesia would collapse and Minahasa's destiny would be independence, outside Indonesia. The declaration demanded that politicians stop the debates and legal maneuvers in order to ensure the continued existence of the Republic of Indonesia.

The declaration stressed the need for religious freedom, and demanded withdrawal of Laskar Jihad\textsuperscript{24} forces from the Malukus and prosecution of people involved in the violence there, including those behind the scenes. More pointedly, it demanded that the Indonesian army should be held responsible since they were behind the Laskar Jihad. The declaration also demanded that the UN intervene in the conflict in the Malukus.

The declaration next turned to the current autonomy laws and the special autonomy laws that made Aceh a special region, and demanded that the status of special autonomy (\textit{daerah istimewa}) should not be given to any region since all regions in Indonesia should be treated as equal.

The final recommendations returned to the subject of Minahasa. The congress declared that the Permesta rebellion had not been a separatist rebellion but a demand for justice for Minahasa. To ensure that the declaration was not seen as a separatist pamphlet, the paper acknowledged the leadership of Gus Dur and Megawati, endorsed the existing laws and constitution, and asked the government and UN to return Maluku refugees safely.

The arguments of the declaration have to be seen against the background of politics and debate at that time. The Maluku conflict had propelled refugees into North Sulawesi and hence was an important issue for people in Minahasa. The threat to secede over the Jakarta Charter should be seen as bargaining maneuver rather than a real secessionist threat. Both Christian and Muslim groups have commonly used such threats.\textsuperscript{25} The "porn bill" discussed below was also part of the background to the declaration.

The declaration was signed not only by some small-scale politicians but also by the vice governor, the Bupati of Minahasa, two former mayors of Manado, and other local figures. During an interview, one signatory addressed Indonesia as follows:

\begin{quote}
If you want to change the law (and introduce the Jakarta Charter and Sharia), go ahead! But then we will break away! \textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}
"Pisok" is the name of a local bird and a Minahasan dance.\(^{27}\) It also stands for Perkumpulan Inti Semua Orang Kawanua, the "core association for all the Minahasan people."\(^{28}\) The term "Kawanua" is used to refer to Minahasan people outside Minahasa. As one member put it, Pisok is a worldwide organization of Minahasan people that observes the political, cultural and economic situation of Indonesia and Minahasa in particular.\(^{29}\)

According to an interviewee, the organization is not structured with a chairman and regular meetings, but comes together when there is a problem or issue to discuss, such as the Jakarta Charter or Sharia law. The interviewee claimed Pisok had over 1.5 million members worldwide, but this number seems exaggerated. Another Minahasan, residing in Jakarta,\(^{30}\) stated this estimate was definitely too high. Such exaggerations is common in Indonesia and some scholars repeat unlikely figures.

**Militias in Minahasa**

Michael Jacobsen\(^{31}\) claims there are four Christian militias in Minahasa and North Sulawesi: Legium Christum which is considered Catholic; Militia Christi, a Protestant group; Bani Josua, a Pentecostal militia; and finally, Brigade Manguni which consists of several denominations. These militias appeared in response to the violence that happened in Indonesia in the past years, especially in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus. As Jacobsen puts it, these militias are a bulwark against ethnic and religious clashes through their efforts to protect Christian values and property. Militia Christi, Bani Josua and Brigade Manguni are regional militias that cover their particular areas within Kabupaten Minahasa. Their main aim is to defend their respective areas and the population against attacks from especially Muslim organizations from within the Kabupaten, from the province, and from more nationwide Muslim organization. According to informants Legium Christum (LC) is somewhat different in that it can be defined as a kind of rapid mobile force.\(^{32}\)

He continues by claiming that Brigade Manguni is supported by high-ranking members of the Minahasa Evangelical Protestant
Church whereas Legium Christum is not formally attached to the Catholic Church. Jacobsen refers to interviews with a Legium Christum member who claims that Legium Christum has a fighting force of 6,000 men plus 23,000 supporters, including 200 men that were willing to go on suicide missions if needed. The fighters are trained in jungle camps in the province of North Sulawesi where they have two to five rifles and dozens of revolvers.

These numbers are doubtful. The number of Catholics in Minahasa (Bitung, Manado, Tomohon, Minahasa, Minahasa Utara, and Minahasa Selatan), excluding Sangir, Talaud and Bolaang Mongondow, is around 110,000. Around half will be male, and around half will be children or elderly, leaving around 22,500 able-bodied adult men. If Jacobsen is right, 25 percent of them are active members of Legium Christum. That is highly doubtful.

In addition, the amount of weapons indicates that weapons training cannot be of high quality.

I have found evidence of only three militias: the above mentioned Legium Christum and Brigade Manguni, and a third known as Milisi Waraney. Waraney is the local term for “guy” or “boy.” Several informants stated that these militias predominantly consist of rather low-class people with low education, such as taxi and motorcycle drivers. One reason for joining such groups might be the prestige. Like the Muslim FPI militia, they work somewhat like subcontractors to the local police and military forces, particularly as bodyguards and security personnel for local politicians. During the Bupati election campaign, Brigade Manguni members and their logo could be seen by the offices of the various parties.

These militias were doubtlessly set up during and after the incidents in Poso and Ambon, when it was feared that the police and military could not provide protection for everyone. According to an intelligence officer, these militias are actually welcomed by the army as they are considered helpers for the military. The leaders of Brigade Manguni and Milisi Waraney are frequently invited by the local army units to share information on certain issues. The army tries to incorporate these militias, not only to gain their assistance over security-related issues but also to keep them under surveillance.

In sum, the Christian militias that were set up partly as a
response to the religious violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus, currently serve as bodyguards, security personnel, and the like. Whether or not these militias are actually trained to conduct religious raids or suicide missions remains debatable. Personally, I believe these militias are somewhat comparable to the FPI, the Muslim paramilitary troops that carry out raids in Jakarta and other parts of Java. However, FPI is known to have carried out certain religious-based raids, using violence. The Christian militias have not done anything like that so far in Minahasa. The role of such groups should not be exaggerated as they are not comparable to “real” police and military units. Their arms are lead pipes, machetes, and other simple weapons. On Minahasa, I believe the agenda of Brigade Manguni, Legium Christum, and Milisi Waraney is to protect Christian areas if the police and military are not able to do so. But it is unlikely they have the capacity to compete with military units or carry out suicide missions.

Care needs to be taken in assessing the threat posed by secessionist movements in Minahasa. Certainly, threats have been made to secede if Sharia and other “Muslim” laws are introduced. As the “porn bill” case below shows, provinces seem to be quick in setting up independence movements and threatening the central government with secession. However, this may be part of the bargaining process, rather than a serious proposal. Organizations like Pisok and statements like the Deklarasi Inspirasi should not be given too much weight. As in other parts of Indonesia there is discontent with the central government, but it is doubtful whether existing organizations are either serious about separatism or have the capability to threaten the central authority.

The “porn bill”

The case of the “porn bill” demonstrates how Indonesia’s ethnic, religious, and cultural complexity impacts on politics, particularly for Minahasa and North Sulawesi. It portrays the struggle between the defenders of unity-in-diversity on the one hand, and those preferring a stricter, Muslim society on the other.

The initial idea behind this bill was to halt the decline of morality in Indonesia by ending the sale, distribution, and
consumption of pornographic material.\textsuperscript{37} The bill first came to prominence in 1999, after Suharto stepped down as a president. Since then, many changes have been made to the bill but it is still a topic of heated debate.

The bill is strongly opposed by liberal groups, secular people, and non-Muslims. Besides banning pornography, including videos and pictures, the bill also forbids kissing in public as well as erotic poetry, dancing, and writing.\textsuperscript{38} Women would not be allowed to show any sensual parts of their body such as thighs, hips, or belly button. It regulates what Indonesian women are allowed to wear and what not. Wearing a tank top or sunbathing on a beach would incur a 5-year jail term or a fine of more than US$ 20,000.\textsuperscript{39} Drawing with a nude model, or reading out poems in a sexy voice could also be punished. The bill not only wants to restrict the distribution of porn, but also forbids a wide range of actions currently considered acceptable.

Supporters of the bill argue that Indonesian women need to be protected and that the moral decline of Indonesia’s society needs to be stopped.\textsuperscript{40} The supporters are mainly conservative Muslim groups and their attached organizations, including the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), a group known in Indonesia, especially in Jakarta and West Java, for conducting raids on brothels, discotheques, and other entertainment venues. FPI harasses, threatens, and uses violence to make its point. When Playboy Corporation was about to open a branch and launch its magazine in Indonesia, FPI spearheaded demonstrations, even destroying the office of Playboy Indonesia.\textsuperscript{41} The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the United Development Party (PPP) have also supported the bill from its beginning. The PKS is an Islamic party that focuses on fighting corruption. Recently, Golkar started to support the bill,\textsuperscript{42} but only after the content had been diluted.

Opponents of the bill argue several points. First, the vague terminology of the law makes its execution subject to personal interpretation. Who decides what is considered “sensual” or “pornographic”? Second, Indonesia already has laws covering most aspects of the bill,\textsuperscript{43} and the problem lies in the failure to implement them owing to corruption or unwillingness. Third, such a law would be incompatible with local cultures which are highly diverse.
in terms of ethnicity and religious affiliation. Its provisions might be appropriate for some groups, but the indigenous tribes in Papua hardly clothe themselves, leaving women with breasts bare, and in Bali and the Christian areas, many women like to dress in a western way showing the shape of their body. At nightclubs in Jakarta and other cities, young people dance sexily and flirt openly. Under the bill, such actions would be forbidden. Hence the bill is a threat to the cultural diversity of Indonesia, not paying respect to the different cultures of minorities.

The opponents of the bill include various groups. The nationalist parties in the parliament, first and foremost the PDI-P, oppose the bill as well as moderate Muslim parties like the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB). PAN is associated with the Muhammadiyah and PKB with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Especially NU is known for its moderate and liberal Muslim stand, rejecting calls for stronger Islamic laws or the introduction of Sharia. It has even stated that it would choose Pancasila over an Islamic nation. Liberal intellectuals, actors, women’s organizations, and human rights groups are against the bill as they are afraid they might be negatively affected. Some say that the bill is an attempt to make Indonesia an Islamic state.

Most interestingly, the opponents include non-Muslim groups, especially the Balinese and the Indonesian Christians. The provinces of Papua, East Nusa Tengara, Bali, and North Sulawesi (including Minahasa) have already rejected the law. All these provinces have a non-Muslim majority—Hindus in Bali, and Christians in the other provinces. These provinces threatened to break away from Indonesia if the bill is implemented. They fear the bill is a forerunner of moves to convert Indonesia into an Islamic state, and argue that

The bill should have dealt with the distribution of pornographic materials, not prescribe how citizens must behave according to the moral standards of a particular religion.

Many Minahasans that I have talked to fear a general Islamization of Indonesia, moving away from a pluralistic, tolerant society towards a more singular, Islam-oriented one. The “porn bill” has brought out a deep and basic division in Indonesia’s
society. Several Minahasan women stated that they want to wear whatever they please and not be told what to wear by law.

The bill has not been passed, and in fact has gone through several stages of dilution. In December 2007 all art and cultural performances as well as customary and traditional rituals were excluded from its scope.\textsuperscript{48} Yet the division between supporters and opponents remains unchanged.

An issue like the “porn bill” has the potential to deepen divisions between ethnic and religious groups. Indonesia is a pluralistic society with numerous religious groups, hundreds of ethnic groups, and thousands of different rituals, dress habits, and beliefs. This case shows that the primary potential division is between non-Muslims and Muslims. A second division is between liberal and secular Muslims such as the NU and conservative Muslims. Non-Muslims seem to be united in their opposition to the law. Both Catholics and Protestants, as well as the Hindus of Bali, oppose the law vehemently. A third division runs between west and east Indonesia. Three out of the four provinces opposing the law are all located in the east (Papua, East Nusa Tenggara, and North Sulawesi). These fissures show how difficult and dangerous certain issues are in Indonesia. Laws that would privilege one particular group—ethnic or religious or both—might threaten the unity of Indonesia. The people of Minahasa have stated that the introduction of such a law would make them rethink their membership in the Republic of Indonesia (although this may be a bargaining ploy)\textsuperscript{49} because they fear the bill is a prelude to the imposition of Sharia law on the whole country.\textsuperscript{50}

Conclusion

This article has examined Minahasa in North Sulawesi as a window onto the complexity of ethnic and religious divisions in Indonesia, and their political import. Roughly half of the population of the region are ethnic Minahasans, mostly Christian. Ethnic Minahasans dominate the politics of the region even more than their share of the population. In the last elected assembly, twenty-nine out of forty-five seats were occupied with Minahasans and both the governor and his vice governor were Minahasans. As
the violent clashes in Ambon and Poso have shown, such economic and political inequalities can be one of the reasons for the occurrence of violence. The domination of the Minahasans might give rise to resentment among the Muslim majority.

Despite its atypical ethnic complexion, the electoral pattern in Minahasa is rather typical of Indonesia as a whole. Golkar and the PDI-P are the strongest parties. The Christian party PDS gains a higher share of votes than on a national level, and the Muslim parties score weaker, but these divergences are slight and have not given rise to any grievance. The methods of electioneering in Minahasa, including the use of money and gifts, are similar to elsewhere. Minahasa and North Sulawesi as a whole are rather “normal” regions for Indonesia in terms of electoral behavior.

Minahasa and other parts of North Sulawesi have been the scene of organizations and congresses that protest against Jakarta, particularly over any increasing Islamic character of the state. These groups sometimes threaten to secede from the republic. Yet these movements are also rather “normal” in the Indonesian context, and their threats should be seen as bargaining ploys rather than expressions of deep-seated separatist sentiment. Many provinces are unhappy with the status quo and attempt to change this through issuing separatist threats. Such “separatists” can be found in Riau, Timor, Aceh, Papua, and the Malukus. Again, Minahasa is no exception.

The “porn bill” is an example of an event which brought these issues into public debate. A bill which promised to impose wide-ranging restrictions on personal conduct was seen by Christian and other non-Muslim groups as an example of Islamization and a possible prelude to the introduction of an Islamic state. The bill brought out the differences in culture and perception of different ethnic and religious groups.

Minahasa in North Sulawesi remains a rather typical region in Indonesia including grievances towards Jakarta and the seemingly obligatory secessionist movement.
Notes

1 Minahasa includes the three districts of Kabupaten, Minahasa, North Minahasa, and South Minahasa and the cities of Tomohon, Bitung and the province's capital Manado.
2 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, a nationalist party.
6 Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; National Awakening Party, a moderate Islamic party attached to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), one of the largest Islamic organizations in the world.
10 Interview, 12 December 2007.
11 David T. Hill, ‘Manoeuvres in Manado: media and politics in regional Indonesia,’ *Southeast Asia Research* 15, 1 (March 2007), p. 20; an interviewee told me that instead of buying new cars for his office, he used the money to make education really free, without any ‘table renting fees’ and the like.
12 Hill, ‘Manoeuvres in Manado,’ p. 25.
13 The old district of Minahasa was split into several districts including Minahasa Induk which means “chief Minahasa” or “mother Minahasa.”
14 Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian Justice and Unity Party.
15 Observation during a research trip to Tondano, 29 November 2007. I was lucky enough to spend a day with the campaign team of the PKPI candidate.
16 Interview, 14 December 2007; compare with Hill, ‘Manoeuvres in Manado,’ p. 23.
18 I was long looking for a title for this section and I found a title in a recent paper that deals with Minahasa and possible secessionism from Indonesia: Michael Jacobsen, ‘To be or what to be, that is the question: on factionalism and secessionism in North Sulawesi Province, Indonesia,’ Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series No 29, 2002, City University of Hong Kong, p. 22.
19 Some observers like to predict the break-up of Indonesia, but to date the facts do not bear out such predictions.
20 Florence Lamoureux, *Indonesia, a Global Handbook* (Santa Barbara Ca, ABC-
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22 The nearest translations would be 'Declaration of the Congress of Great Minahasa' and 'Declaration of Inspiration.' This meeting was described in Tim Huxley, Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 66.

23 This is the rough translation of the declaration by a friend in Manado. The original text is at: http://permesta.8m.net/news/2k00805_Deklarasi_Inspirasi-KMR_1.html.

24 Holy War Warriors; an Indonesian Jihadist organization that can be seen as a para-military group.

25 Huxley, Disintegrating Indonesia, p. 66.

26 Interview with one of the signatories who used to work for the Ministry of Transportation under Suharto and who was responsible for the enlargement of the Airport Sam Ratulangi. Name known to the author.


28 Apologies again for the poor knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia, but with the help of some Indonesian friends, this translation is the one best fitting. 'Inti' is a nucleus, kernel, but in this case, maybe 'core' would be the best translation.

29 The interviewee is again the signatory of the Deklarasi Inspirasi. He currently joined the PDI-P and is the head of a R&D department of that party. Additionally, he is a member of 'Team Sukses,' which seems to be a team that works behind the scenes for the governor, and is considered a good recruiting ground for future politicians.

30 He said that he is considered a 'Manado Kart,' a Minahasan who lives outside Minahasa and is only a nominal Minahasan.

31 Jacobsen, 'To be or what to be,' pp. 22ff.

32 Jacobsen, 'To be or what to be,' pp. 22ff.


34 At Poso in Central Sulawesi and Ambon in the Malukus, thousands of both Muslims and Christians were killed in inter-religious clashes in 1999—2002. Both sides have accused the other of having started the violence.

35 Interview with an intelligence officer of the TNI in Manado, 9 December 2007.

36 For example, 'More groups join the chorus against education bill,' Jakarta Post, 14 June 2003, or Huxley, Disintegrating Indonesia, p. 47.


40 Pandaya, 'The naked truth.'

45 Moritz Kleine-Brockhoff, ‘Im Namen Gottes’ [In the name of god], *Tagesspiegel*, 6 October 2006, in German, at www.tagesspiegel.de/zeitung/Die-Dritte-Seite;art705,1895638. The article deals with how Indonesia appears to become closer to an Islamic state. The newspaper is known in Germany and is considered to have a liberal profile.
46 Ridwan Max Sijabat, ‘NGOs sue house over “porn bill”, calling it threat to pluralism,’ *Jakarta Post*, 7 December 2006.
47 Ridwan Max Sijabat, ‘NGOs sue house.’
48 Leon Agusta, ‘A swinging anti-pornography bill.’
49 Such opinions were given various times during interviews conducted in late 2004 and December 2007.
50 Jacobsen, ‘To be or what to be,’ p. 9.